Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-94-192 *4 October 1994*

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NOTICE TO READERS: Effective 1 October, the processing indicators appearing in brackets at the start of each item in this publication will be changed. All new indicators will begin with "FBIS" to make the material more easily identifiable in databases. Some will also indicate whether the item has been translated from the vernacular or transcribed from English.

All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

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Slovene, Croat Officials on Ties With Italy

BR3009125894 Milan FAMIGLIA CRISTIANA in Italian 5 Oct 94 pp 116-119

[Report on interviews with Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek in Ljubljana; and Smiljan Simac, Croatian under secretary of foreign affairs, in Zagreb, by Carlo Remeny; date not given: "Some People In Your Country Do Not Like Us"]

[FBIS Tranlated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Remeny] Do you agree with Croatian President Tudjman's opinion that Italy wants to destabilize its neighbors, such as Slovenia and Croatia?

[Drnovsek] I think that that assertion is exaggerated. However, it is not clear exactly what Italy wants. It is not clear what path it intends to choose—the constructive path of good relations or the other, which aims to correct history.

[Remeny] Why did the Slovenian Government not respond until a few weeks ago, when it criticized the Italian law that permits the reacquisition of Italian citizenship by former citizens of the Italian territories ceded under the Paris Treaty of 1947 and the Osimo Treaty of 1975, when the law concerned dates back to 1992 (some 4,500 applications have been submitted in Slovenia and 11,000 in Croatia, and the deadline was 15 August)?

[Drnovsek] We must consider the framework of Italian-Slovenian relations, which were good until the latest elections in Italy. After the elections, Italian policy changed. We accept the Osimo Treaty as the foundation of our bilateral relations, whereas the Italian side wants a revision of the agreement. Italy is using its influence within the European Union [EU] to seek such a revision. Some Italian political sectors are giving clear signs of a deterioration in relations. The law on citizenship has been interpreted as a desire on Italy's part for more citizens, and in the future it could form the basis for further claims.

[Remeny] Do you think that Italy could have territorial claims in Slovenia?

[Drnovsek] If the policy of the far Right prevails in the government's action, this is possible, judging from the remarks of some Italian politicians. We have noticed that since the spring Italy has adopted stances against Slovenia in the various international forums. At the European summit of foreign ministers in Brussels at the beginning of October Italy should publicly proclaim whether or not it intends to prevent Slovenia's association with the European Union.

[Remeny] If the Italian Parliament were to decide to extend the law on granting Italian citizenship to Slovenian citizens, how would the Ljubljana government respond?

[Drnovsek] We would probably adopt a more restrictive law with respect to people having dual citizenship. The demand for Italian citizenship is clearly motivated chiefly by the desire to keep Italian pensions or to secure other economic benefits for those who enjoy them while living in Slovenia. I want it to be clear that there are no anti-Italian feelings in our country. Italy is not regarded as an enemy country: On the contrary, it is considered a friend. But if these tendencies continue to manifest themselves, the general climate could change.

[Remeny] Exactly how many assets and homes are exiled Istrians demanding be returned by Slovenia? Do you have a detailed list?

[Drnovsek] We have never received one. In the bilateral negotiations the Italian delegation has always demanded the right to priority in buying back assets abandoned by exiles, implicitly setting this as a precondition for supporting Slovenia's application for association with the EU. But our constitution forbids foreign private citizens from owning property in our country. We are willing to harmonize Slovenia's legislation with that of the other EU countries, but only when the time comes to negotiate full membership. It is not so easy to change the constitution; it takes time. However, we are willing to discuss these matters and to change our laws—but in the normal manner, not under pressure.

[Remeny] Former Slovenian Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle said recently that Slovenia has 11 friends in Europe. So is Italy the enemy?

[Drnovsek] Slovenia has extensive relations with Italy—economic, cultural, tourist, all kinds of relations. So I consider it not an enemy but an important neighbor, a friendly country. However, the impression is that Rome previously respected Yugoslavia because it was a strong country, whereas now it considers that a policy of pressure on the small Republics of Slovenia and Croatia can yield it benefits. If the policy of the stronger state were to spread, it would have negative consequences for Europe. Merely consider the claims that the exiles from Sudetenland could make against the Czech Republic.

[Remeny] How do you regard the situation of the minorities in the two countries?

[Drnovsek] I think that that of the Slav minorities is much worse that that of the Italians in Slovenia (of whom there were 2,758, according to the census in 1991). I will merely remind you of the television broadcasts in the mother tongue and the guaranteed seat in parliament that the Italian community in Slovenia enjoy—but not the Slovenian community resident in Italy (60,000 people, according to the first report on linguistic minorities in Italy, though in fact there has never been an official census of Slovenes in the Provinces of Udine and Gorizia, but only in that of Trieste). [Drnovsek ends]

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After Ljubljana, Zagreb. We discussed Italian-Croatian relations with Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Smiljan Simac, head of the Croatian delegation to the negotiations with Italy.

[Remeny] Why does Croatia oppose a law that permits the Italian minority resident in Croatia to have dual citizenship by regaining Italian citizenship?

[Simac] The issue was resolved once and for all by the Osimo Treaty, a bilateral agreement between the former Yugoslavia and Italy. Croatia, as one of Yugoslavia's successor states, accepts the rights and obligations of those agreements. Italian law, however, presumes to settle the issue unilaterally. This could have a negative impact on the Croatian territory of Istria.

[Remeny] There are exiles of Croatian origins around the world who have had returned to them the assets that they once abandoned in Croatia. Why can the same measure not be adopted now with respect to Istrian and Dalmatian exiles?

[Simac] This was settled between the former Yugoslavia and Italy in an agreement signed in 1983 in Rome, following the Osimo Treaty. Those who opted for Italy and left the former Yugoslavia were due to receive compensation from the Italian Government, whereas Italy was due to receive $110 million in compensation from the former Yugoslavia. In this instance too, Croatia, as one of the successor states, agrees to pay its share, and on this point we agree with Slovenia in meeting our obligations. This concerns relations between two states, not between the Croatian State and individual Italian citizens. Some 19 months ago Croatia asked Italy for permission to open a consulate in Trieste. We have never received a reply. In all the meetings of the two countries' delegations all the talk is confined to the issue of interest to the Italian delegation, that is, the assets of the Italians who left the former Yugoslavia and the conditions of the Italian minority in Croatia. Italy expects the issue of assets to be dealt with not as a financial issue but as a political issue. At the latest meeting, at the end of July in Rome, we were handed a list comprising some 20 demands concerning the Italian minority—for instance, that the Italians be granted the status of an autochthonous minority, because Italy's is supposedly different from the other minorities resident in Croatia; that Italian be taught at every level in traditional settlement areas, irrespective of whether or not Italians still live there; and so forth. Furthermore, Italy does not recognize the border between Slovenia and Croatia as far as the Italian minority is concerned, and considers this minority a single entity that must have the same status within both states. It is a permeable border, but a border nevertheless.

[Remeny] What is your opinion of relations between National Alliance circles and Serbian circles in Krajina?

[Simac] Such things do not facilitate good relations between Croatia and Italy. On the contrary.

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Berisha Announces Referendum on Constitution

AU0310205594 Paris AFP in English 2019 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, Oct 3 (AFP)—Albanian President Sali Berisha announced on Monday [3 October] the country's first referendum, which would call on the public to back a new constitution to replace the existing 1974 version drawn up by the communists. "The people must have the right and the honour to approve the first democratic constitution in our thousand-year history," Berisha said in a television address. He did not specify when the unprecedented vote would be held.

The process of drawing up the new document has taken two years. Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi earlier handed the draft to Berisha, who said it "conforms to all European standards" and would turn the Balkan state into a parliamentary republic. "I am against presidential republics," he added, "not because they are not democratic but because Albania has always been, for five centuries, the country of one sole individual and does not have a parliamentary tradition."

Further on Referendum

LD0310212494 Tirana Radio Tirana in English 1900 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The president of the Republic of Albania, Dr. Sali Berisha, proposed Monday the constitution of Albania be approved with a referendum in which, as he said, every Albanian will be given the chance to give his opinion concerning the fundamental law of the Albanian State.

In a televised message addressed to the Albanian nation, President Berisha said that his proposal is based on the profound conviction that it is up to the people to have the great honor of the approval of the first democratic constitution in the 1,000-year-old history of the nation. The president pointed out that, making use of his legislative initiative, he has sent to the parliament the law on the referendum accompanied by the request of its approval with an accelerated procedure. Berisha considered the referendum as a new, dignified, and deserved institution for the maturity and civilization of the nation.

The constitution can be approved even in the parliament, he said, but the laws of this constitution have been passed once by the parliament. Besides this, he also mentioned the fact that the attitudes of definite elements or groups prove that their aims have been the artificial parliamentary crisis and the defense of Hoxa's spirit, and not the approval of the constitution. No consensus has been reached, even for the case of the constitutional assembly suggested to the parliament recently, Berisha said.

Different were the opinions of the representatives of some parties reaching sometimes to absurd fantasies. President Berisha pointed out that a powerful consensus exists in Albania; that is the great consensus of the free people characterized by seriousness, by the hope for a better future, by the ideal of freedom, and national interest. This consensus, Berisha went on, will enable the country to have the constitution of the new century.

Presenting the content of the draft constitution, whose compilation ended last week in Albania, Mr. Berisha said that it proclaims Albania a republic. The legislative executive and court power are independent from the Albanian parliament, and the Albanian parliament remains the basic trunk of the state, which elects the president, the power of the Supreme Court, offers trust to the government and controls it.

I have always been against the presidential republic, Berisha said. The charter of the human rights and freedom was regarded by Dr. Berisha as the genuine spirit of this constitution and as the basis on which all infrastructural democracy—the free press system, the political parties, the trade unions association—are to be developed and consolidated. The human rights charter schedules no discrimination. It guarantees the rights of national minorities, their culture and traditions, their language, the development and consolidation of their identity. It realizes the national reconciliation, the settlement of discords and divisions through the language of dialogue and understanding.

The charter of human rights and freedom is in full conformity with the European Convention of Human Rights and Freedoms and is regarded as one of the most advanced charters in Europe, Berisha said. The draft of the constitution, President Berisha went on to say, clearly determines the activity of the independent courts for the guaranteeing of rights and freedoms of citizens, and it guarantees the independence of the court power.

The draft constitution reconfirms the Constitutional Court as one of the most competent courts of the time, which interprets the constitution and guarantees the constituency of all laws and sub-legal acts of the Republic of Albania. A special article of the draft constitution sanctions the (?inviolability) of the republican form of the Albanian State.

The changes in the amendments of the constitution and the addition of new ones will be made only after the approval of two-thirds of Albanian parliament and after their subjugation to the referendum of the people, President Berisha said.

Appeal Trial of 5 Ethnic Greeks Opens in Tirana

AU0310113694 Paris AFP in English 1121 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, Oct 3 (AFP)—The appeal trial of five ethnic Greek Albanians against their conviction for spying for Greece opened in the Albanian capital on Monday.

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Relations between Greece and Albania have been in crisis since the trial in mid-August, which ended with the five men being jailed for between six and eights years last month. The Greek Government has said that nothing less than their release will be needed before it will resume dialogue with Tirana and lift its veto on Albania receiving the first tranche of a European Union loan of 35 million ECUs ($43 million).

Three diplomats and four Greek deputies, as well as the U.S. and German ambassadors to Tirana, William Rayerson and Klaus Vollers, were in court for the opening of the appeal.

The court refused a request by one of the appellants, Theodor Bejani, who has double Albanian and U.S. nationality, to be represented by two American lawyers. The judge pointed out that Bejani's Albanian lawyer, Kujtim Puto, had had the time to prepare his defence.

Since the crisis erupted Greece has expelled 70,000 Albanian illegal immigrants, while Tirana has reinstated a visa requirement for Greeks to visit Albania.

Last Tuesday the European Parliament called on Albania to free the jailed five, condemning their trial as "political" and in flagrant violation of human rights conventions.

The 12 EU members are scheduled to discuss the loan to Albania on Tuesday.

Prosecutor on Sentences

AU0310161394 Paris AFP in English 1531 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Tirana, Oct 3 (AFP)—Prosecutor Petrit Duka called for confirmation of prison sentences handed down to five Greek Albanians accused of spying for Greece, at their appeal hearing in the Albanian capital Monday [3 October].

The official said the guilt of the five men had been proven as had their "links with Greek secret services." [passage omitted]

Government Protests Treatment of Albanians in Athens

LD0310214994 Tirana Radio Tirana in English 1900 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On 2 October 1994 the charge d'affaires of the Greek Embassy in Tirana, Mr. Toloupos [name as heard], was summoned in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania, which handed over to him a note of protest referring to the blocking for hours on end of Albanian citizens in the Greek airport of Athens ignoring even their regular documents. The note points out that among them have been also members of the families of the Albanian diplomats equipped with diplomatic passports, who were in transit to the airport of Athens while being in their own way for Albania. The note also protests for the case of a pregnant woman who had also been kept in the Greek airport of Athens for 24 hours even though she still had been equipped with all regular documents and visa.

At the end the note of protest says that the Foreign Ministry of Albania protests and requires from the Greek Embassy in Tirana to mediate to the respective authorities to adopt measures for putting an end to such reiterated cases towards the Albanian citizens travelling to Greece or crossing through it in transit. It also wants an end be put to the cases of blocking of the Albanian citizens with a regular visa in the airports of Greece. Such acts, the note of protest says in conclusion, run counter to all the international forms and conventions and with the agreements signed by the two governments for the free movement of citizens between the two countries.

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Military Counterintelligence Chief on Arms Deals

AU0310111494 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 29 Sep 94 p 25

[Interview with Vasil Stoyanov, head of Military Counterintelligence, by Ognyan Stefanov; place and date not given: "The Special Services System in Bulgaria Is not Functioning, There Are Many Indications of Spying"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Stefanov] Mr. Stoyanov, what was the involvement of the Military Counterintelligence in arms deals with Yemen?

[Stoyanov] We checked the credentials of the representatives of Yemen and did not find anything wrong. We were acquainted with the initial information regarding their intended trade with our Defense Ministry. We knew that the ministry participated as a mediator, and that it will make a profit, which meant that the deal was a good one. From a judicial point of view, the tank deal especially is perfect and fully open. The financial documents have been signed, and the contracts were precise and categorical. We still owe Yemen almost $1.5 million, because a part of the production could not be delivered after the Interdepartmental Council interrupted the deal. I know all this from former Deputy Defense Minister Iliya Marinov, but I and my people did not take part in the official talks related to the deal. I think that the deal could be extended, and we could earn several more millions of dollars, in addition to the $12 million we are making from the deal. [passage omitted]

[Stefanov] Has the Military Prosecutor's Office sought your cooperation regarding the arms deals with Yemen and Albania?

[Stoyanov] Yes, we cooperate with our colleagues from the Military Prosecutor's Office to the best of our ability. It is unfortunate that now we must gather information after the deals. We were not asked to cooperate in time. Now we encounter gaps and missing links all the time.... Much of the information cannot be put together any longer at this stage.

Things are different with the Albanian deal. We were informed about the deal in time and we have full information. Thus, we were able to open appropriate operational files and create the relevant operational documents, investigation, and search.

[Stefanov] The $600,000 is still missing.

[Stoyanov] We know where the money is and what happened.

[Stefanov] Does the Serbian Secret Service have the money?

[Stoyanov] Something like that. However, the Military Prosecutor's Office is now dealing with this matter. It must clarify the matter. We reported everything we know to them. However, there are no documents.

[Stefanov] How will all this end?

[Stoyanov] Only the Military Prosecutor's Office could tell you.

[Stefanov] Does Military Counterintelligence have information regarding the formation of armed units by ethnic Turks in our country in and outside the Army?

[Stoyanov] If you mean "Pan Slavia," a subject STANDART NEWS wrote about, I can tell you that they are rivaled only by the Mafia. Information regarding units of ethnic Turks is a very serious matter. A very serious matter indeed. One could learn something about this from Bulgarian Turks who are fighting on the side of the Muslims in Bosnia. Personally, we, together with the National Security Council, investigated tipoffs regarding concealed weapons in the Velingrad region and the training of pro-Turkish elements there. The investigation showed that there were no such things. However, I am not saying that it does not exist. The fact that the special services system in Bulgaria is not functioning at present is much more dangerous. First the services were destroyed, and what they are doing now could be described as piece work. We are unable to fully investigate tip offs such the aforementioned ones. This is the truth. [passage omitted]

[Stefanov] General Gures, the former chief of the Turkish General Staff, said that their military spies remained without a job as a result of open relations between the two countries....

[Stoyanov] This is an absolute lie. Could Gures prove this in any way? The opposite is true. At present, their secret services have intensified their activity. Now it is their high season. The Turkish services, as well as the services of Greece and Serbia, are now creating intelligence positions for the next 10, 15, and 20 years. In a way, they are creating their future.

[Stefanov] Have you recently had any specific revelations to prove this?

[Stoyanov] Yes, but we will not "publish" them, for obvious reasons. We do not intend to catch someone and put him in prison. We could not utilize him in our favor there.

[Stefanov] Does the conflict in Bosnia continue to threaten Bulgaria?

[Stoyanov] I am not authorized to make political assessments. However, from a professional point of view, what you said is true. The intelligence services of the fighting sides and the services of the neighboring countries are conducting frantic activity in an attempt to learn our economic, personnel, and military secrets.

[Stefanov] Do you have any information regarding the use of Bulgarian Turks by the Turkish Army and secret services as translators and for other tasks?

[Stoyanov] Of course. Those are proven facts. We have a lot of information regarding the fact that Turkey is developing a purposeful policy aimed at studying,

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inciting, and controlling ethnic turbulences and contradictions. This is done by their intelligence services. This is an obvious political task. [passage omitted]

RDP 'Leader' on Dimitrov Resignation, SDS

AU0310113594 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 29 Sep 94 p 10

[Interview with RDP honorary leader Elka Konstantinova by Iva Petroni; place and date not given: "Elka Konstantinova: Only the Resignation of Filip Dimitrov and the Rest Would Save the SDS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Petroni] Mrs. Konstantinova, Filip Dimitrov has said that it would be rather strenuous for you to try to pull the Radical Democratic Party [RDP] out of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]. Would you do it nevertheless?

[Konstantinova] No one intends to pull anyone out of anything. Those who persecute their loyal friends are in the National Coordinating Council [NCC]. They expelled in many places the Radical Democrats and organized coups in the municipal structures. This purge is harmful and dangerous for the SDS.

Vasil Mikhaylov has stated that Stefan Savov will be the main enemy of the SDS in the upcoming elections—note, not the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], but Savov. This is terrible. We must do everything possible to stop this disintegration process, which is contributing to the general disintegration in our country. It appears that an evil spirit reigns in our country. The NCC just adds to the general disintegration of the SDS—the only force that could implement the democratic idea.

[Petroni] Is SDS-II the alternative to this disintegration?

[Konstantinova] I do not see any alternative because the elections will come soon, which is precisely why the SDS must be saved. It is because of this that I repeatedly demanded the resignation of the NCC leadership headed by Filip Dimitrov.

[Petroni] Could the old SDS be saved now that even Stefan Savov has left?

[Konstantinova] It is sad to see what is happening. Nevertheless, I hope that the common sense of all SDS members and an energetic activity on the eve of the elections will save the SDS idea. There is still time to explain to the people who is trying to promote Bulgaria's interest. Those are not the ones who are searching for enemies among their own people. Stefan Savov is not an enemy.

[Petroni] In other words, the struggle must take place at the SDS headquarters and not in some formation outside the SDS?

[Konstantinova] Yes. However, if this does not help, then the SDS should be created anew because the existing one is ruined. In many places, there are two coordinating councils, in other places—none. This is a result of the national coordination effected by Ivan Kurtev. However, no one is prepared to assume responsibility. Only two months remain until the elections and yet the NCC has not established election staffs or clubs anywhere.

The RDP is the party of the thinking people. It has its own image, which we do not want to lose. In practice, the blue [SDS] coalition is a survivor. However, the behavior of those fanatic people in the NCC does not coincide with our liberal notion of democracy. We appear to be an alien organism there. Now that the state is disintegrating, we should unite around the painful issues of crime, the economic situation, and the intellectual problems.

[Petroni] Would this be the core of the new democratic alternative?

[Konstantinova] Yes, this would be the new SDS, if we succeed to cleanse it of envy and the dissemination of hatred.

[Petroni] The RDP will hold its congress in mid-October. Will you have enough time to select your road?

[Konstantinova] The NCC is relying precisely on this fact—that there will not be enough time. However, there is enough time to see who is a real SDS member and who joined in order to destroy the SDS.

[Petroni] The people are saying that Aleksandur Yordanov is the main opponent of your thesis—namely, that the RDP should leave the SDS.

[Konstantinova] I do not know. We did not talk. I cannot say anything at this stage. However, I was very much surprised by his article in DEMOKRATSIYA, in which he said that if the RDP leaves the SDS, it would guarantee the communists' their election victory. We will have to meet and talk. After all, we are people who were always able to reach a consensus in the party.

[Petroni] Do you not feel betrayed by Mr. Yordanov's hesitant position? It appears that he is trying to be everyone's friend.

[Konstantinova] I refuse to discuss this matter. I still cannot believe it.

[Petroni] Will Mr. Yordanov be replaced as party leader at the upcoming congress?

[Konstantinova] So far, we have not posed the issue of replacing the leader. However, there were recently several surprising moves, articles, and acts on his part. We will discuss all this at the congress. This is precisely why we are convening this congress—to hear the opinion of the people throughout the country. We will see what transpires at the congress.

I wanted to fully retire from political life. I will not be a candidate for a seat in the National Assembly and Filip

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Dimitrov is wasting his pathos on me. However, as long as I am alive, I will do everything possible to strengthen the liberal spirit of the democratically minded people in Bulgaria.

Social Democrat Leader Opposes Ludzhev Cabinet

AU0310172194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A government led by Dimitur Ludzhev as prime minister would be worse than Berov's cabinet—Dr. Petur Dertliev, chairman of the BSDP [Bulgarian Social Democratic Party], said at a news conference today. The formation of a strong government with broad-based support is a good idea, but someone suitable is needed as prime minister and Ludzhev is not such a person, Dertliev said.

It is cynical to put forward the idea of a caretaker government led by Ludzhev, Petur Dertliev said. Apart from the fact that a cabinet elected on the mandate of New Choice would be isolated from parliament, its appointment as a caretaker cabinet would put it in a position to manipulate the elections, Dertliev believes.

SDS Faction Leader on Crisis, Dimitrov Conflict

AU0410100694 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 21 Sep 94 p 5

[Interview with Stefan Savov, Democratic Party leader and head of SDS parliamentary faction, by Miroslava Belcheva; place and date not given: "Stefan Savov Prepares To Win Preelection Battle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Belcheva] Mr. Savov, why do I have the feeling that you retreated in a fearful and defeatist manner and succumbed to the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] by announcing that the SDS parliamentary faction does not want a new cabinet?

[Savov] I think that you are wrong. It has always been clear to me that against the background of the existing situation—a truly divided SDS parliamentary faction—there could be no thoughts at all of a noncommunist blue [SDS] government in this parliament. I always said that it would be very difficult to form a cabinet in this National Assembly, thus, I did not retreat from my position. I did not succumb, but merely expressed the position that the Democratic Party adopted. I remained loyal to myself and the Democratic Party.

[Belcheva] Was it right that you should so closely adjust your positions to those of the National Coordinating Council at a moment that is so decisive for the Executive Branch? After all, you are not a member of the National Coordinating Council, and have constantly reproached it for its shortsighted and stupid policy.

[Savov] I am first of all an SDS member. I am an SDS member and the parliamentary faction belongs to the SDS. Are we not the people who received the votes of the blue voters?

[Belcheva] You cannot deny the dualism within the SDS. Was it not more prudent to work out this issue precisely during the talks on forming a new cabinet?

[Savov] The National Coordinating Council and the SDS parliamentary faction should have sorted the matter out. Actually, this was done at the Fifth and Sixth SDS Conferences. However, afterward the SDS parliamentary faction was badly hit. This Coordinating Council is not the original one. It does not adhere to the SDS goals and ideals, with which we won. However, the positions now coincide. This is merely a coincidence.

[Belcheva] Where will the Democratic Party seek its political road, since it no longer fits in with the blue coalition?

[Savov] As you know, the Democratic Party has already left the National Coordinating Council. We will not be included in the election lists prepared by this Coordinating Council. We continuously seek and are already finding relations with other noncommunist parties. For example we are negotiating on specific expert issues with the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union of Anastasiya Mozer, and I think that we will agree on coalition cooperation.

[Belcheva] By the end of the week the president will entrust another faction, apparently New Choice, with the mandate to form a new cabinet. Will you and your people support such a cabinet?

[Savov] Rather not. Personally, I would not support such a cabinet, and it is another issue what such a cabinet would represent. In principle I am against a new cabinet in this parliament.

[Belcheva] Well, then your conclusion is identical to that of your opponent, Filip Dimitrov, namely, elections in November-December.

[Savov] The elections will most probably take place at the beginning of December. Personally, I do not think that the elections will favor the neocommunist forces. They know this and therefore they are bluffing when they demand new elections.

[Belcheva] Do you know that Ventseslav Dimitrov and Georgi Markov were somewhat insulted by your refusal to support their initiative on forming a blue cabinet?

[Savov] Yes, but this means nothing. What does it mean that they are insulted? We have always been friends. I could not support their initiative because it meant forming a cabinet with the support of 30 Communists, if they had agreed to do so at all. Well, I cannot accept this. Any cabinet now would be supported precisely by those people in the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], whose position is completely different from the position of those SDS members who do not want a new cabinet. The only alternative would have been to form a really noncommunist cabinet. However, after the split between the

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SDS National Coordinating Council and the parliamentary faction, this possibility was eliminated. I do not oppose compromises, but they should not be bad compromises. Many people in the National Coordinating Council do not think logically, and even betray the blue anticommunist idea.

[Belcheva] Who are those in the National Coordinating Council that serve the interests of the Bulgarian Socialist Party?

[Savov] Many people are doing this. They serve the former communists' plans and intentions. However, I do not want to point their names out at this moment.

[Belcheva] When did your differences with Filip Dimitrov begin?

[Savov] They began a long time ago. Actually it was not us that exacerbated those differences, but rather our opponents in the National Coordinating Council. When the blue cabinet fell, we were loyal, and personally, I supported Filip Dimitrov. The differences began afterward. Most probably, they began because I was a candidate at the December elections for the post of National Coordinating Council chairman. However, it is Filip Dimitrov who should tell you whether he dislikes competition.

[Belcheva] Would you retire if you lost the battle now? Who are your heirs?

[Savov] First of all I do not think that I would lose the battle, therefore, I have not thought about any heirs. The Democratic Party will cope with the elections.

[Belcheva] Why was the story about Stoyan Ganev's "yellow envelope" suppressed?

[Savov] Stoyan Ganev, Filip Dimitrov, and Aleksandur Yordanov should know why. They dealt with this issue at the time.

[Belcheva] Was not then an appropriate moment for an upheaval in the SDS?

[Savov] What do you mean by an appropriate moment? I oppose the tactic of various envelopes, something that actually represents a compromising plot.

[Belcheva] Precisely the current leaders of the National Coordinating Council work with such compromising plots. Have you heard the claim that thanks to Yordan Sokolov, Filip Dimitrov has collected enough personal files to serve him at any opportunity, and that he keeps them in his personal safe?

[Savov] Look, this is not something I know. They should know this. I have no idea whether there are any personal files in their safes. Perhaps this is true. I reject Filip Dimitrov's policy. He is responsible for many SDS mistakes. Nevertheless, I am not the person who will say anything about safes with [illegible]sonal files. I hope that everyone understands thi[illegible]r five years of political activity—I adhere to perso[illegible] dignity. I have never been involved in games, machinations, and compromising plots.

[Belcheva] Why was it that Aleksandur Yordanov did not support you in your struggle with the National Coordinating Council? Was it because of his conformism, or was it simply a matter of fear?

[Savov] You are asking me all the time about other people. We fought many battles together with Aleksandur Yordanov. You should ask him about this matter. I think that Aleksandur Yordanov and I together will implement many useful things in our political life.

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Official Outlines Policy on B-H, Croatia

AU3009215494 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 28 Sep 94 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Alexander Vondra, first deputy foreign minister, by Vera Ivanovicova; place and date not given: "We Are a Credible Partner in the Countries of the Former Yugoslavia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ivanovicova] What do you think of the decision by the UN Security Council to ease the sanctions against Belgrade and, on the other hand, to toughen its stance against the Bosnian Serbs?

[Vondra] Because Belgrade agrees with effective international supervision of the blockade on Serbia's borders with Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H], the Czech delegation in the Security Council supported the UN resolution facilitating a certain reduction, but not the lifting, of some of the sanctions against the new Yugoslavia. On the other hand, in view of the continuing intransigence of Pale and Karadzic, we also supported the toughening of sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. We believe that this differentiated course of action will, in the end, make a contribution toward everyone's agreeing with the contact group peace plan. Of course, this new dynamism within the United Nations and the countries of the former Yugoslavia does not mean that the conflict will be resolved right away. The road to peace there is still a long one.

[Ivanovicova] What policy has the Czech Republic pursued hitherto with regard to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia?

[Vondra] Unfortunately, discussions on our foreign policy during the past two years have been honed on the stance toward the conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It was possible to register a series of tones and opinions, often quite dissonant. I think that this period is now behind us. Our domestic political discussions should not be projected into the specific activities of foreign policy, if the Czech state is to be credible abroad. The purpose of my recent visit was to clarify the Czech stance on a diplomatic level and conduct a dialogue with our partners. One of the results of our domestic political discussion was that it would have been better if we had kept quiet in recent months.

[Ivanovicova] Has this harmed us in any way?

[Vondra] I do not think so. On the contrary. Paradoxically, the undeniable caution has, sui generis, contributed to improving our credibility in the countries involved in the conflict. Because we did not support any of the warring sides conspicuously, we are still an acceptable partner for all of them in the future.

[Ivanovicova] Could Czech diplomacy play a more active role in this regard?

[Vondra] In view of the historic traditions of our mutual ties, we may undoubtedly have better insight into current events. Nevertheless, we have to be aware of our real possibilities. Our time is yet to come. The chances that we will not be left on the sidelines, especially in future development in the individual republics, are good.

[Ivanovicova] Could you be a little more precise?

[Vondra] For example, the contribution made by our citizens to the humanitarian aid for Sarajevo is well known there, and gratitude for it has been expressed. This is something that will not be lost. However, the peace plan, if it is finally adopted, is a compromise in which the international community is involved and where the large powers—the United States, Russia, Britain, Germany, and France—play a major role. I am not sure if, at this moment, there is scope for significant Czech involvement outside the framework of the large powers' endeavors. This will manifest itself later, and not only on the political level, but also on the economic one.

[Ivanovicova] Our participation in UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] has been well received. Is it enough?

[Vondra] Dispatching a roughly 1,000-member contingent is currently at the limit of our capabilities. Incidentally, calculated per capita of the population, the Czech Republic, along with some Scandinavian countries, is in first place with regard to the size of its contingent. The Czech Republic is interested in further service in UNPROFOR and, therefore, supports the extension of its mandate in Croatia after 30 September.

[Ivanovicova] Are the results achieved by the contact group proportionate to the amount of effort expended?

[Vondra] I am convinced that the real state of the contact group's work is directly commensurate to the level of possible agreement among its members—that is, the five powers. It is no secret that the stances of countries such as the United States and the FRG on the one hand, Britain and France on another, and Russia on a third are not completely concurrent.

[Ivanovicova] Does this not prevent a solution to the conflict?

[Vondra] A cooperative approach still prevails in the international community over an out-and-out power-wielding one. None of the aforementioned countries wants to act on its own, so the outcome has to be a compromise. Incidentally, the same applies to the future peace and to each partial cease-fire in this region. The search for future peace in the Balkans is the search for many compromises and balance between individual interests. It is very difficult to find consensus. Despite this, I think that this course of action is, in the given situation, the best solution of all of the bad scenarios. If there is a lack of will and general consensus to extinguish the conflict quickly and by force, then any kind of chaotic and uncontrolled escalation could bring tragic consequences for Europe.

[Ivanovicova] Would the warring sides in Bosnia-Hercegovina not be happier if international assistance consisted of only arms supplies?

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[Vondra] The reality is that, without the cooperation of the international community, they would not, in essence, manage. They are well aware of this. So far, no one has adopted an open and vehement stance against the activities of the United Nations and the peacekeeping forces in the region. Of course, in dealing with individual issues, such as extending UNPROFOR's mandate or lifting the embargo on arms imports for the Bosnian Muslims, the individual republics push for what is in their main interest.

[Ivanovicova] Is Serbian President Milosevic really interested in peace?

[Vondra] It is incumbent upon him to show that he is serious about this and that it is not just tactical rhetoric. In any case, it seems to me that a certain weariness of the war can be discerned from the mood currently prevailing in Belgrade. This is perhaps associated with the fact that Belgrade has become convinced that it can no longer gain much by the war.

[Ivanovicova] What stance will the Czech Republic adopt in the Security Council in the vote on lifting the embargo on arms supplies for the Bosnian Muslims?

[Vondra] The Czech Republic, like Britain, France, and other countries that have troops in UNPROFOR and for whom the main aim is to ensure that the conflict does not escalate into a Balkan war, will adopt a relatively restrained stance on this proposal. It is definitely not an issue that we could push for openly in the Security Council. The very lifting of the embargo, if it were not accompanied by an armed engagement by the international community, would merely intensify the conflict. The suffering of the civilian population, especially in Sarajevo, would be even greater.

[Ivanovicova] How would this affect the Czech UNPROFOR battalion?

[Vondra] The Czech Republic has troops in the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia. This would not necessarily have to mean the end there. The mandate would probably have to be changed, at least as far as its geographic range is concerned. There would also have to be guarantees that the situation in Bosnia would not escalate and spill over into Croatian-Serbian relations to the extent that the further operation of UN peacekeeping units in Croatia would be intolerable. At the moment, we are not considering withdrawing the Czech battalion from the UNPROFOR forces, but the appropriate evacuation plans have been made in the event of an emergency. If such a situation were to arise, then, of course, we would have to leave.

Detonator Exports to Croatia, Slovenia Viewed

AU0110174794 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 27 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by "ivh": "Is the Czech Republic Breaching the UN Embargo?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague/Vsetin—The UN Sanctions Committee has not yet decided on whether the Czech Republic is breaching the embargo on arms exports to the countries of former Yugoslavia by exporting electrical detonators to Croatia and Slovenia. Foreign Ministry Press Spokesman Vit Kurfurst informed a LIDOVE NOVINY correspondent about this yesterday.

As he said further, Sanctions Committee Chairman Jose Luis Jesus asked the Czech Republic to check on the shipments some time ago. According to Kurfurst, the law on arms exports currently in effect contains a list of military material that requires approval, and the electrical detonators (DEM-zh-N type) are not included.

According to Engineer Jiri Varejka, Zbrojovka Vsetin chief manager, the firm has been exporting the detonators to Croatia since 1992, when the explosives factory near Gorazde in Bosnia, the only supplier of detonators for former Yugoslavia, exploded. In doing so, the Vsetin manufacturer squeezed its traditional Austrian competitor, the Schafler firm, out of the Croatian market. As Varejka claims, the Austrians (but also Hungarians) first refused to grant permits for the transport of the detonators through their territory, so they were shipped by air. Transit was later permitted. Varejka does not rule out that it was a matter of competition rather than that of the safety of the transport. The reason for the interpellation at the UN Sanctions Committee might be of a similar nature. The committee is now investigating whether the detonators are not a so-called commodity with alternative applications. Such goods can be used for both civilian and military purposes.

The Vsetin Zbrojovka detonators have been also directly subject to interest of two agents of the U.S. Investigation Bureau (FBI), and the technical data have been passed also to other institutions that are involved in the struggle against terrorism. According to a reliable source, the Irish Republican Army has used Vsetin detonators in at least one attack. "Misuse of the detonators from Vsetin Zbrojovka cannot be prevented, but they are not very suitable for terrorist purposes," the same source reports.

Klaus Explains 'Skeptical' Approach to Euroregions

AU0410092194 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 30 Sep 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Eva Martinkova; place and date not given: "Mayors May Lament, but Communities Are Not So Badly Off"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Martinkova] At a meeting of liberal economists at Cannes a few days ago, you said that our transformation was the product of a combination of deliberate and spontaneous steps. Is it not precisely because of the great number of spontaneous steps that the opposition reproaches the government for lacking a concept?

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[Klaus] Our opposition, left-wing thinkers, and, unfortunately, also some people in the West understand the process that is under way in our country as a steered, controlled, and completely organized transformation of one social system into a different system. This is why also in specialized literature there has from the beginning been talk about the optimal sequence of reform steps, and individual countries have been assessed according to how they fitted into this optimal chronology. I have always said that this is a very simplified view. The reality is richer and far more multifaceted. It is not true that a handful of reform politicians in this country are conducting an orchestra with batons in their hands. This process also has its spontaneous components because 10 million human beings, with their interests, dreams, and wishes, are participating in it. From time to time, they do something other than what the conductor would wish. The validity of all of the literature about the correct sequence of reform steps is therefore very limited. This has been my conviction for a long time, and the atmosphere of the high-minded Mont Pelerin Society motivated me to theorize on this issue a bit more.

[Martinkova] Civic Democratic Party [ODS] candidates for the local elections are currently undergoing training in Prague. Do you think you will succeed in convincing at least your own mayors not to lament about communities' budgets?

[Klaus] A mayor could not be a mayor if he did not lament that he has little money and that things would be perfect if he had more. On the other hand, every year, when we take a look at the budget management, we see that the balances of community accounts are constantly growing. We thus know that, all of the lamentations notwithstanding, the situation in individual communities is not so bad. Finance Minister Kocarnik was showing me charts today proving the growing proportion of communities in public budgets. I believe that, as in other matters, no leap into the dark is involved here that would transplant us right away into the definitive, ultimate solution. The trend in the financial situation of communities is evident, and I think there is no reason to complain.

[Martinkova] You are skeptical toward Euroregions. Why?

[Klaus] I am skeptical not toward Euroregions but toward the Czech Republic entering Europe with individual regions, under the slogan of Europe's regionalization, instead of entering it in its entirety. Therein lies my skepticism. I believe that the future Europe will be a Europe of Frenchmen, Czechs, Germans, Italians, and Poles and not a Europe of Saxons, Baden-Wuerttembergers, Alsatians, Lorrains, Bretons, Provencals, South Bohemians, and North Moravians. I therefore think that the former efforts to forge cross-border regional cooperation lack logic and contain the seeds of certain dangers. While in France, I met with the top troika of French politics—Balladur, Chirac, and Pasqua. I was pleased that their view of Europe was identical. All three of them stress that, in the foreseeable future, they cannot imagine any other Europe but one made up of individual states. Those three politicians consider the dreams about writing off states and about Europe's regionalization into lower entities representing the building stones of Europe to be an unrealizable dream. John Major says the very same thing. Hence, the question of Euroregions must be seen in this broader context. It goes without saying that I do not have the least objections to Domazlice [in west Bohemia] and Furth im Walde [in Bavaria] having the best and closest possible cooperation.

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Meciar Not To Join in 4 Oct Coalition Talks

LD0310223294 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2100 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] [Unidentified correspondent] A session of the political executive of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] ended just a short while ago. According to information given to us by Viliam Sobona, head of the central election team, the main item on the discussion agenda was an assessment of the result of the early parliamentary election.

In this connection, they discussed possible future coalition groupings and possible cooperation with coalition partners. The HZDS political executive selected specific individuals to participate in the aforementioned coalition talks. It was also stated that informal coalition negotiations had already begun. We were unable, however, to get more detailed information.

[Announcer] To add to the information we received over the telephone from Iveta Benikova, here is the latest news from Dusan Kleiman, head of the press and information department of the HZDS.

HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar will not be taking part in tomorrow's discussions between the president of the Slovak Republic and representatives of parliamentary political parties and movements. The HZDS will, however, send a representative to these consultations.

According to Kleiman, the six-hour session of the HZDS political executive analyzed the results of the parliamentary election in connection with the drawing up of priorities for consultative negotiations on possibilities for the formation of a new government of the Slovak Republic and support for it in the National Council. Representatives of the HZDS were allocated to specific negotiations. Kleiman would not, however, confirm whether Vladimir Meciar would take part in them.

He cited as one of the decisive priorities for possible coalition ties the mutual acceptance of fundamental parts of election manifestos in the interests of the advancement of Slovakia.

The session of the political executive also dealt with preparations for the local elections. In the coming days, the HZDS will not hold any news conferences. The political executive decided that leading representatives of the movement, with the exception of Vladimir Meciar, would give the media any necessary information.

The HZDS chairman will meet journalists only after consultative talks have taken place, from which the HZDS press and information department will be issuing preliminary communiques.

Kovac's Office Gives Statement on Party Talks

LD0310201894 Prague CT 1 Television Network in Czech 1830 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] For the second day now, coalition talks have been continuing in Bratislava between the new parliamentary parties. Their key figures will be trying to put together a government that would have at least a simple majority in parliament. The leaders of all seven parties that will be represented in the new parliament are to meet President Kovac on 4 October. This meeting should produce the first candidates for the office of Slovak prime minister.

[Unidentified correspondent] If it turns out that the chairman of the victorious Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] [four-second break in reception] a majority working government, President Michal Kovac will appoint him prime minister. From the statement the president's spokesman gave Czech Television today, it follows, therefore, that Michal Kovac has apparently changed his mind on this question.

Just a few weeks ago, he is said to have declared that he would only ask Vladimir Meciar to form a government if his movement gained a majority of seats in parliament. The cohabitation of President Kovac with the potential prime minister Meciar is now considered possible even by leading representatives of the HZDS, as was recently confirmed to Czech Television by Ivan Gasparovic.

According to available information, the Slovak president is of the opinion that there is essentially no one at the present time who could put together a workable government. That is why Kovac is to receive representatives of the victorious parties tomorrow, in order to discuss with them all of the possibilities for the formation of a government and of candidates for the post of prime minister.

As the Castle stressed today, it is unlikely that the name of the prime minister will be known tomorrow. The president expects Tuesday's meeting with representatives of the new parliamentary parties to be just one of many such meetings before he makes a final decision on who to appoint. According to his spokesman, the president does not intend to become involved in the subsequent process of setting up the Slovak Government.

KDH Head on Forming Coalition With DUS

LD0310181794 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 3 Oct 94

[Interview with Christian Democratic Movement Chairman Jan Carnogursky by correspondent Anna Samelova; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Just over 10 percent of voters lent their support to the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] in the election. This means that 17 deputies from this political entity should sit in the new parliament.

Because KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky adopted a very standoffish attitude toward evaluating the election results, Anna Samelova opened the interview with Jan Carnogursky by asking him what the early election had yielded and what kind of signal they had sent.

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[Carnogursky] The election demonstrated one important factor, and that is that the election coalitions simply did not work. They did not bring about any of the so-called synergy effect. [passage omitted]

[Samelova] Yesterday morning [2 October], you met the leadership of the Democratic Union [DUS] to discuss the possibility of concluding a coalition agreement.

[Carnogursky] We have experience from participating in the present coalition government. There is a strong prerequisite and will on both sides that our deputies' clubs could closely cooperate in the new parliament. The sum total of this is that DUS and the KDH are sufficiently close to each other and would like to go into a coalition together. [passage omitted]

We feel that the biggest responsibility for forming a coalition rests with the parties that won the biggest number of votes, which, in this case, is the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. This means that it should be the HZDS that should conduct talks with other parties on forming a possible coalition. [passage omitted]

MKDH on Distribution of Seats Among Coalition

LD0310223894 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2100 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The executive of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] has been discussing the Slovak parliamentary election results. It stated that, of 17 Hungarian Coalition deputies elected to the Slovak National Council, Coexistence has nine, the MKDH has six plus one—the one thanks to the second scrutiny—and the Hungarian Civic Party [MOS] has one.

According to a spokesman for the movement, also discussed at today's MKDH executive session was the fact that a coalition with the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] and the SNS [Slovak National Party] is unacceptable to them. Other possibilities would still be discussed further.

Hungarians, KDH Agree Presidency 'Essential'

LD0410084494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 4 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the Hungarian coalition met the leadership of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] last night. The Hungarian parties' representatives told the KDH leadership that they do not rule out the possibility of participating in a possible government coalition. The two sides agreed that they regard the preservation of the post of president as an essential condition for the stability of the government.

Left-Wing Parties May Cooperate in Local Elections

LD0310164194 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1400 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Milan Ftacnik, deputy chairman of the the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], said at a news conference in Bratislava that the SDL and the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS] had held talks with the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS].

Their postelection cooperation will not be based on a written agreement, but they will try to set up a mechanism for contacts of deputies' clubs of Joint Choice and of the ZRS. Ftacnik said that, in some districts, the two entities had already agreed to cooperate in local elections [18-19 November 1994].

Jaroslav Volf, chairman of the SDSS, and Jozef Klein, chairman of the Farmers' Movement in Slovakia, said at the news conference that they were interested in preserving the Joint Choice coalition.

Election Official: Shortcomings in Election Law

LD0310225494 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2100 GMT 3 Oct 94

[Interview with Juraj Nota, chairman of the Slovak Electoral Commission, by an unidentified correspondent in Bratislava on 3 October—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent] The Slovak Electoral Commission was in session all day today. [passage omitted] Various members of the Slovak Electoral Commission have noted that the current election law is imperfect and has many shortcomings. What is your view?

[Nota] [passage omitted] As the election took place, we discovered that there were gaps, that it would, perhaps, be best if the new parliament reworked the entire law consistently and adopted a new law or an amendment to the law.

[Correspondent] Will you initiate this amendment?

[Nota] Yes. The final report recommends that this amendment be approved.

[Correspondent] When will you finally finish your election work for 1994?

[Nota] The conclusion will be on 5 October at the last session of the Slovak Electoral Commission. [passage omitted]

Hungarian Leaders Explain Autonomy Idea

AU3009125494 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 24 Sep 94 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Bela Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, Miklos Duray, chairman of the Coexistence movement, and Laszlo Nagy, chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party, by Milan Stanislav; place and date not given: "We Do Not Want Territorial Autonomy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The perhaps most controversial contestant in this year's parliamentary election is the coalition of three Hungarian minority parties. Not only

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other parties, but also the majority of non-Hungarian voters respond to their program with a certain degree of aversion. Miklos Duray, chairman of the Coexistence movement, Bela Bugar, chairman of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, and Laszlo Nagy, chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party, took turns in front of a PRAVDA microphone during a debate on their ideas concerning a solution to the minority issue.

[Stanislav] Slovak political parties, coalition and opposition parties alike, reject the documents of Komarno [of 8 January 1994 containing Hungarian minority demands]. Are you not afraid that your insistence on the demands contained in them might bring dialogue to a halt?

[Bugar] I believe that some statements that have been made were very premature and could be damaging to cooperation. Unlike us, Slovak parties keep claiming that the Komarno documents contain the demand for territorial autonomy. Yet territorial autonomy, in the form in which it exists in South Tyrol, for example, comprises also the minority's own legislative body, which we do not demand. Our aim is self-administration in the sphere of culture and education. In the event of the Slovak Republic's new division into territorial and administrative units, we have prepared two alternatives. But these are not tantamount to territorial autonomy. In view of the fact that politics is a permanent search for compromise, we should sit down and explain individual terms to one another. Let us try to come to an agreement.

[Duray] The true contents of the Komarno documents have not been comprehended, in my opinion. The participants in the Komarno rally delivered their opinion on the reorganization of public administration in Slovakia and said that it should evolve in the direction of reinforcement of local and regional self-administration bodies.

[Nagy] I do not share those fears. I am in favor of Hungarian and Slovak political parties commencing talks as soon as possible, also about the so-called Komarno documents. In these talks, we will inform our partners about their actual contents. We will prove that conclusions from the Komarno rally are not synonymous with autonomy, which arouses fear in Slovak political parties. I believe that most points of the Komarno documents are in conformity with the intentions and aims of Slovak parties. The documents contain important targets in the sphere of self-administration of communities and regions that are common to the residents of all communities and regions of Slovakia. The documents give a specific shape to the principle of subsidiarity. I am convinced that the resolutions of Komarno will not be an obstacle to closer cooperation.

[Stanislav] Could you explain your ideas on cultural autonomy in greater detail?

[Bugar] Every year a sum of 130 to 140 million korunas [Sk] is appropriated from the state budget for the minorities' culture. However, of this sum, Sk50 to 60 million is intended for culture in ethnically mixed areas. As a result, there is no clear view of how much is spent on which culture. The sums appropriated for ethnically mixed areas are used also for Slovak and other culture, and it cannot be argued, as government agencies do, that this money goes to the minority. We keep saying that decisions should not be made bureaucratically from behind a desk, especially when those who decide do not live in the given area and do not know the problems of the Ruthenian, Ukrainian, Romany, German, and Hungarian minorities. This is why we would like to have decisionmaking on how to use the money in our own hands. Of course, it is not our idea that Hungarian parties, for example, should decide which newspaper will get how much. The sum I mentioned comprises subsidies for all minorities. Decisions on the distribution of these subsidies should be made by bodies established, for example, in accordance with our draft law on minorities, which we have submitted to the National Council.

[Stanislav] What are your specific ideas with regard to school autonomy?

[Duray] We do not support school autonomy. What we support is the general strengthening of the powers of self-administrative bodies, including powers in the sphere of education. We have drafted a certain project on how to strengthen non-Slovak schools, especially by means of their transfer into the jurisdiction of self-administrative bodies wherever possible. In areas where the non-Slovak population constitutes a minority, we propose the establishment of so-called minority self-administration to deal with problems associated with the minority's identity.

[Bugar] There is permanent talk about alternative education. To me, alternative means the ability to choose. In Slovakia, unfortunately, alternative is understood to mean that, when seven out of 25 students in a class opt for the alternative type of instruction in Hungarian schools, all specialized subjects in this class should be taught in Slovak. In other words, seven decide, and the other 18 must adjust to it. What kind of alternative is this? We have a fairly good system of elementary schools. Secondary schools, especially specialized secondary schools, are not up to the required standard. First it is necessary to put the concept of the school system on the table. But the decision on it should not be made by government bodies. Let the minorities themselves decide, on the basis of resources allocated per student, whether there will be a school in a specific community. Of course, I am speaking about minority schools.

[Stanislav] Slovak parties see a solution to the minority issue in the formulation of an international standard for minorities by the Council of Europe....

[Bugar] I agree, but that can take years. What shall we do until then? Europe neglected this issue in the past. All kinds of documents are coming into being, such as [Council of Europe Resolution No.] 1,201, which are once valid and then again invalid. Another problem lies

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in the enlargement of the Council of Europe and some other international institutions, which is slowly rendering them incapable of action.

[Duray] We know that such an international standard is being worked on. We have even been informed about individual stages of this work. We are skeptical, however, whether anything will come of it.

[Nagy] We basically agree with this idea, but this international standard can be understood only as a set of principles and not as a specific solution. Each country has its own specific historical development of these problems, which take different forms. As a matter of principle, I am in favor of the solution to this problem in the Slovak Republic being in the intentions of the international standard. At the same time, I would like to express the hope that Slovakia, by the postelection development that is looming here, could set an important example, not only with regard to the formulation of this standard but also with regard to the application of specific cooperation between minority and majority parties in the country's political life. I am thinking of continuation of cooperation as it began to evolve after 1989 in the first democratic government, of which our party, too, was a part. This was not only a stabilizing factor in Slovak-Hungarian relations but also an important driving force of the post-1989 changes in our country. I am confident that, after this election, Slovak policy will continue in this direction.

[Stanislav] Would you accept postelection negotiations, in which the Komarno documents would not figure as the minimum demand but as a basis for the search of compromise?

[Bugar] Naturally. The Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement has been saying from the beginning that the Komarno documents express our ideas, which cannot, in some parts, be implemented in four years. Hence, the documents serve as a foundation; let us hold talks about them. The Hungarian parties must also work out their ideas for the next four years. We are ready to negotiate, but that is the minimum we want. We cannot and definitely do not want to blackmail anyone.

[Stanislav] In your election program, you say, in the part devoted to European integration, "Our slogan is 'Integration and autonomy'." Is there no contradiction here?

[Duray] You must understand that we want autonomy per se for society at large, for all of its elements. If autonomous units and entities do not operate in Slovakia—and I am not thinking at all about minorities right now but, rather, about self-administered units—there will not be democracy in Slovakia.

[Stanislav] In your election program, you accentuate the establishment and development of self-administrative units. You offer two alternative solutions—either a single territorial and administrative entity in the south of Slovakia, or three territorial and administrative entities. Are you not afraid that they might be artificial and nonfunctional?

[Duray] It must be clearly said that the one-region proposal was an automatic response to the project of territorial and administrative arrangement worked by Vladimir Meciar's government. As for the proposal of three regions, I believe that these are in conformity with Slovakia's possible territorial and administrative division. In my opinion, the ethnic principle is only one of many that this proposal takes into consideration. Someone is perhaps afraid that the establishment of regions also on the basis of the ethnic principle will aggravate interethnic relations. I am convinced that people who coexist here will not be divided by borders.

[Stanislav] What does your party expect of the election results, in view of the placement of Hungarian Civic Party candidates on the Hungarian coalition's slate?

[Nagy] We will be satisfied when all three Hungarian parties have their representatives in the new parliament. We would be satisfied if our party had at least one deputy in each electoral region. Of course, we would welcome all Hungarian parties' having the same number of deputies.

Inspection of TA SR Shows Uneconomic Management

AU0310154794 Bratislava SME in Slovak 30 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by Ivan Stulajter: "The Taxpayers Will Most Likely Pick Up REPUBLIKA'S 'Tab'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Press Agency of the Slovak Republic (TA SR) returned a loss of 4.666 million korunas [Sk] in its main activity in 1993 and a loss of Sk20.868 million in business activity carried out without the agreement of its founder (the Finance Ministry). The loss incurred from publishing the daily REPUBLIKA from 1 April to 31 December 1992, which amounted to Sk16.992 million, accounted for most of the loss returned in its business activity," states a report issued by the Supreme Inspection Office (NKU). Following the sale of the daily to the SALUS company, this loss also remained on TA SR's balance sheet.

The NKU report on the inspection carried out in TA SR also states that its former director general, Dusan Kleiman (currently head of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Press Office), on 16 August 1993 submitted a written report to Culture Minister D. Slobodnik and Prime Minister V. Meciar on the situation that had arisen during the publication of the daily REPUBLIKA. D. Kleiman says in it that "TA SR utilized a sum of approximately Sk3.0 million from its budget to pay the daily's most essential costs, and it is necessary to resolve speedily the returnability of these funds to the sources

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intended to finance TA SR's main activity. This should be done before the start of the NKU's inspection, at the latest."

According to the NKU report, TA SR did not even complete the transfer of REPUBLIKA's property to another entity in harmony with the generally binding legal regulations. On 5 May 1994, current TA SR Director General Ivan Melichercik transferred contractually the trade mark and graphic layout of REPUBLIKA to the SALUS company for Sk3.0 million, but, according to an expert evaluation made on 16 March 1994, the value of this state-owned property was calculated at Sk13.0 million. Moreover, the SALUS company only actually paid TA SR Sk1.0 million because Sk2.0 million should have been paid to Matica Slovenska [Slovak Heritage Foundation] for granting TA SR a loan on 30 March 1994.

"By this conduct, TA SR has not disposed purposefully and in the most economical manner of the administered state-owned property in harmony with law No. 278/1993 (a National Council of the Slovak Republic law on administering state property). At the same time, by completing the transfer of 5 May 1994, all of the liabilities (losses) associated with the publication of the daily REPUBLIKA have remained on TA SR's balance sheet as a state subsidized organization," states the report on the inspection that the Supreme Inspection Office carried out in TA SR from 13 June to 31 August 1994. Apart from this, the NKU also uncovered other serious infringements of laws and Finance Ministry decrees as well as the uneconomic disposal of other state financial resources. The Slovak Government dealt with the report submitted by the NKU at its session yesterday.

Border Crossing to Austria Opened in Svaty Jan

AU0410082094 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 30 Sep 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "Pontoon Bridge on Morava River Opens Border Crossing for Slovak and Austrian Citizens"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moravsky Svaty Jan—A new Slovak-Austrian border crossing in the Zahorie region—Moravsky Svaty Jan-Hohenau am March—was opened yesterday in the presence of Rudolf Filkus, Slovak minister of finance, Mikulas Dzurinda, Slovak minister of transportation, communications, and public works, and Erwin Proel, governor of Lower Austria.

The operating costs of the border crossing will reach several hundred thousand Slovak korunas per year. In less than six months, construction workers have built a road from Moravsky Svaty Jan to the border crossing. The border crossing is intended for only Slovak and Austrian citizens—pedestrians, cyclists, passenger cars, and buses, and trucks carrying not more than 3.5 metric tons of cargo. The crossing will be open daily from 0700 until 1900. Opening hours for trucks carrying not more than 3.5 metric tons of cargo are Monday to Friday from 0800 until 1600.

Schmognerova: Price Rises Politically Motivated

AU3009205794 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 27 Sep 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Brigita Schmognerova: "Even Meat Is Used as Ammunition (on the Political Battlefield)"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The consumer prices of food products went up 2.9 percent in August, compared with July. [passage omitted] The average price of boneless hind beef, for example, went up 9.4 percent in August, compared with July, but, in the second week of September, it was 15.1 percent higher than in August. The analogous increase for pork chops was 6.8 percent and 16.5 percent, respectively. [passage omitted] What has happened to meat prices of late? And not just to prices.... Meat not only is more expensive but also in short supply, which, in the final analysis, explains the massive price growth. What is happening on the meat market?

The shortage of meat on the market in the fourth quarter of 1994 is estimated at 5,000 metric tons of beef and approximately 6,000 metric tons of pork. It is the product of several years of declining agricultural production and of livestock production, in particular, for which the poor agrarian policy of the previous governments is also to blame. According to statistical data, beef cattle numbers have declined from 1.6225 million to 940,000 since 1990. The number of cows alone has declined by 191,000. Nonetheless, the preceding government had awarded licenses for the export of almost 13,000 metric tons of beef cattle for the first half of 1994. Thus, supply dropped below the level of demand, leading to higher procurement and, above all, consumer prices of beef. Making up at least partially for this beef shortfall will require several years of concentrated effort. [passage omitted]

The above arguments suffice to explain the trend toward higher meat prices, but they do not answer the question of why it was in the 38th week of this year that meat prices rose as dramatically as they did. One will have to look for an explanation elsewhere: in the deliberate causing of meat shortages on the market by withholding deliveries of pigs from primary producers and keeping back meat in some meat-processing plants, with the aim of driving meat prices to astronomical heights. This is confirmed by the preliminary results of checks carried out by the ministries of agriculture and interior. I am therefore asking myself whether we are not dealing with—in our geographic region new but, in some Latin American states, well-established—political practices of powerful parties or movements that are guided by the motto "The end justifies the means." The end is obvious: In the 40th week of 1994, we will be going to the polls....

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It is necessary to look for solutions to the situation that has arisen, for immediate short-term and longer-term solutions. Which short-term solutions have been adopted? The government has decided to raise meat (particularly beef) imports temporarily, to abolish the compensatory import allowance by the end of the year, to suspend the issuance of export licenses for meat, and to supply the market with meat from the state material reserves.

A more fundamental solution requires that the further decline of agricultural production be halted. How? The reply is provided in the government's "green report." The first step is to lay the foundations for next year's harvest and to react to the consequences of this year's drought, which affected not only potatoes, but also corn, sunflowers, and the like. The government has therefore decided to appropriate additional subsidies for diesel oil used in agriculture in 1994 (so-called green fuel), agreed with November and December subsidies being drawn in September and October, decided that, when drawing on Ministry of Agriculture resources, priority be given to the replacement of technological equipment and the agricultural machine pool, and so forth.

In many cases, there is too big a difference between meat procurement and consumer prices. [passage omitted] The merchants' margin often greatly exceeds the Slovak average of 12-16 percent. [passage omitted] Should further price checks confirm those differences, the government will be forced to resort to setting a maximum margin with regard to the prices of meat and meat products, in the same way as it was compelled, with effect from 21 September 1994, to decree a maximum price for late potatoes of first-quality grade, including the value-added tax.

Why for potatoes? Because the market for potatoes, which are in short supply, has become rife with dirty practice, as a result of which potatoes are being procured from farmers for seven to eight korunas and are being sold for two or three times as much. Someone is taking advantage of the shortage, which is estimated at 53 percent of demand. Following last year's bumper harvest, we imported additional even-cheaper potatoes from the Czech Republic and Poland, and our farmers were then forced to feed potatoes to animals. This spring, behaving in a "market-conform way," they therefore reduced the area under potatoes by about 30 percent. Compounded by drought and a poor harvest, this has produced the shortage on the market.

The maximum price for potatoes is not, and cannot be, a final solution. We must temporarily import more potatoes and abolish the compensatory allowance so that their price is not too high. And what needs to be done next? Suppliers and users must adapt to the new conditions, to having to secure mutual supplies by means of contracts. Contracts between farmers, processors, and retailers must be concluded even before the crops are planted. State intervention can play only a corrective role. [passage omitted]

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Kovacs: Improvement in Slovak Ties More Difficult

LD0410092394 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0900 GMT 4 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Hungary continues to strive for the creation of good relations with Bratislava, irrespective of the Slovak election.

However, Laszlo Kovacs added that the victory of Vladimir Meciar is likely to make an improvement in Slovak-Hungarian ties more difficult. [passage omitted]

Officials Affirm Optimism for Slovak Relations

LD0410101694 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 4 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The results of our parliamentary elections are being continually analyzed in Hungary. However, the results do not give rise to any concerns because the Hungarians can see that there is hope that the good cooperation [with Slovakia], which is being developed, will continue. This is how we could sum up the pronouncement made by Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, political state secretary in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, who was a guest of the Hungarian Television news and current affairs program "Objektiv" last night.

Gregor Martin Papucsek is on the phone from Budapest:

[Papucsek] State Secretary Szent-Ivanyi is the first Hungarian official to publicly assess the Slovak election results. As he said, the Hungarian side was prepared for this development. He is not worried that the new government led by Vladimir Meciar could change, for example, the road signs bill, because Slovakia did not adopt undertakings of this kind with regard to Hungary, but with the Council of Europe. But should this actually happen, it would put a brake on Slovakia's integration into Europe, Szent-Ivanyi said.

The state secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that considerations should not be based on the election rhetoric but on deeds. It is beyond doubt that Vladimir Meciar resorted to rather crude anti-Hungarian statements during the election campaign. But, on the other hand, the tone Meciar adopted at his meeting with [Hungarian] Prime Minister Gyula Horn was much calmer, Szent-Ivanyi said. Szent-Ivanyi thinks that there is no doubt that the new government will be formed by [Vladimir Meciar] the chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia.

But various options exist even in this case. The worst possible scenario would be if the Slovak National Party were to get into the coalition, for this party would be an obstacle on the path on which Slovak-Hungarian relations have embarked recently, the state secretary noted.

Leaders of Hungarian political parties in Slovakia Laszlo Nagy [chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party] and Miklos Duray [chairman of the Coexistence Movement] commented briefly in the "Objektiv" program. Both of them were optimistic regarding the Hungarian coalition's chances of getting into the government. The Coexistence chairman even hinted at the ministries they would be interested in. These are agriculture or the environment, possibly even transport or social affairs.

State Secretary Istvan Szent-Ivanyi commented: This is but a dream that has withered away after the elections.

Flanders, Hungary To Sign Cooperation Treaty

BR0310141894 Groot-Bijgaarden DE STANDAARD in Dutch 3 Oct 94 p 3

[Report by Luc Neuckermans: "Flanders Signs Treaty With Hungary Today"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Flemish Minister President Luc Van den Brande will sign a cooperation treaty with Hungary this afternoon in Budapest. It is the second time that Flanders signs a full international treaty within federal Belgium. In June Flanders signed its first treaty in modern history, with Poland. Yesterday Van den Brande landed in Budapest for a three-day visit. The program also includes a meeting with President Arpad Goncz. [passage omitted]

Out of the 1 billion francs [BFr] which the Flemish Government earmarked for cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe in the last three years, BFr250 million was spent on investments in Hungary. In the economic field, cooperation between strongly developed Flanders and expansive Hungary offers possibilities for joint ventures, exchanges, and investments, in particular for small and medium companies. The New Europe Fund exists to help these companies with their projects in Central Europe, allowing them to participate in joint ventures thanks to Flemish Government money.

European Union

From the Flemish side it is pointed out that this cooperation also gives Hungary excellent access chances to the European Union (EU), which the country would be very pleased to join quickly. In Budapest it will be pointed out very clearly that Brussels is not only the capital of the EU, but also of Flanders. Flanders is also planning to strengthen its presence in Hungary. [passage omitted]

Police Investigating Attack on Iranian Diplomat

LD0310220694 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] National Police Headquarters' officials who have visited Tehran deny media reports that the Hungarian chief commercial counsellor and his wife had been attacked by Islamic fanatics for political or religious reasons. According to the latest information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commercial counsellor Jozsef Nagy's condition is still critical.

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The investigators, for the time being, rule out the possibility that the Hungarian diplomatic couple was attacked by fanatics.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified Hungarian official] So far, no circumstances have been revealed that would suggest that the attack against Jozsef Nagy and his wife was committed for either political or religious reasons.

[Unidentified correspondent] The investigations carried out by Hungarian policemen in Jozsef Nagy's home in Tehran have not led to a turning point in the investigation.

[Hungarian official] The Iranian investigators were interested in our opinion, after they had shown us the scene. I can only say that we have come to very similar conclusions.

[Correspondent] According to [name indistinct] Gyula, the Iranian authorities are investigating the case in the most serious way.

[Hungarian official] The team was set up from several investigating bodies. The case has been investigated by their best experts. They do their best because they are treating the matter with high priority because nobody remembers this type of an attack against a diplomat. [end recording]

Revamping Higher Military Education

94CH0433A Budapest MAGYAR HONVED in Hungarian 9, 16 Sep 94

[Two-part serialized article by Colonel Janos Czekus, Ph.D., university professor: "Alternatives for Developing the University of Military Sciences"]

[9 Sep, pp 24-25]

[FBIS Translated Text] The higher education law that took force on 1 September 1993 (Law No. 80 of 1993, hereinafter: Law) requires deep-seated changes in the institutional system of military higher education.

No other law enacted during the past three or four decades has evoked as profound an emotional reaction from the masses of officers affected, than this Law. A significant number of officers were satisfied, because they sensed that in the long run, the Law would strengthen the prestige of officers, bring closer their military life-style to the European value system, represent the acceptance of the ideal of having uniformed citizens, and would overshadow the inherited clientele and the servile outlook that still exists in a few places.

Recognizing the uniform requirements, another group of officers expressed concern for their livelihood and frequently voiced opposition to the Law. Interestingly, the Law also induced a similar emotional counter-reaction from a few retiring individuals, whose livelihood was not affected by this matter. Similarly, a few officers in leadership positions also opposed the Law, for fear of strong restrictions on their authority and functions.

More than just a few people adopted a wait-and-see attitude in expressing opinions, pondering with skepticism whether the authority of the Law could be enforced in regard to the military.

The variety of emotional attitudes toward the Law has been fueled by a few contradictions in its text, which strongly overshadow certain distinctive features [of military education].

Groups advocating a variety of views fought hard to enforce their respective interests during the drafting stages of the Law. We should approve of the fact that in the end, the need to develop a uniform system for higher education in Hungary has prevailed, and thus, in addition to civil higher education, religious, art, and military higher education systems also became subjects of uniform rules provided by the Law. This fact opens European perspectives for the qualitative and quantitative development of the Hungarian higher education system.

A thorough analysis of the Law reveals the main thrust of the legislative intent:

—The qualitative development of the Hungarian higher education system;

—The establishment of conditions which ensure access to higher education for an increasing proportion of young Hungarians;

—The uniform regulation under law of the activities of institutions of higher education operating in Hungary, irrespective who provides professional direction;

—Legally guaranteed institutional autonomy, freedom to teach, and to conduct scientific research; and

—The encouragement of cooperation among, and integration of, institutions.

The legislative intent could also have been enforced as a result of more thorough preparation, and the omission of contradictions presently incorporated in the Law.

The first such contradiction stems from the categorical definition of the duration of the educational process.

Quite obviously, military skills at the university level could have been acquired in three years, as compared to the military university education presently based on training and troop exercises at a four-year military academy. Accordingly, the presently existing seven-year, two-stage military higher education system has been smashed by framers of the Law, without providing for the financing of the revamping required by the Law. Thus, in a manner alien to the spirit of the Law, outsiders made decisions regarding the changes in military higher education, casting aside distinct military characteristics and forcing the "strait jacket" of four

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years of education during the day, as in civilian education, on military higher education. It should be obvious that in military university education the qualitative criteria should not be met by eight years of daytime education after matriculation (four years in an academy, and four years of university study).

The dominance of outsiders in drafting the Law produced a situation in which the continued legitimacy of university-level military education can only be satisfied by developing a certain forced, parallel educational system not called for by national defense interests, one that consumes significant amounts of money. Discontinuing university-level military education would disrupt the centuries old Hungarian historical tradition of cultivating military sciences, an idea alien to the spirit of the Law. Not to mention the fact that the unsuccessful military university accreditation would also have a grave, adverse impact on personnel conditions at military academies, because Ph.D. degrees would have to be acquired in a different field of science. In our judgment, military science is sufficiently complicated to consume an entire life's energy and attention, if cultivated on good foundations, and in a scientific manner.

The second contradiction stems from the prescriptive requirements related to the two branches of science, or fields of training. Such requirements are entirely appropriate from the standpoint of some civilian universities, since granting the rank of a university to a given institution within a certain field of education is also dependent on the institution's dimensions. This requirement is incomprehensible, however, from the standpoint of military and art (e.g. Academy of Music) universities. With respect to military university education, the legislative intent is not violated by the fact that military universities do not provide instruction in fields of no interest to national defense. Quite naturally, one could introduce additional fields of training in military universities, but the framers of the Law, (and the Law, itself,) do not provide funds for this purpose.

Incidentally, the "two branches of science, or fields of training", referred to in Paragraph 3. of the Law, require interpretation. The Law does not clearly define the meaning of "fields of training." A government decree could provide an unequivocal, accurate definition of this concept. Accordingly, in my judgment, distinguishing features could be determined in this area, too.

At present, military university training and military sciences de facto exist in Hungary. Whether its legitimacy is maintained or discontinued represents an important political decision. As a result of the political decision one could uphold those distinct military characteristics which, consistent with the spirit of the Law, could modify the prescriptions objected to above. This should not necessarily be embodied in amendments to the Law, but in the form of interpretation of the Law, i.e., it should be embodied in a government decree.

We, the teachers at the Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy, aware of our commitment to maintain the continued legitimacy of providing military education at the university level, must not wait for, and mainly, must not rely upon a political decision with a dubious outcome like this.

We must do everything possible to be responsive to national defense interests and to meet requirements flowing from a strict interpretation of the prescriptions.

Even the professionals dealing with the Law at the Ministry of Culture and Public Education acknowledge that a military university has the right to provide most of its education in the framework of a two-step educational process. Accordingly, the task is given: A few, four- or five-year basic educational programs with few attendants must be started, in order to become accredited as a university without any problem. At the same time, most officers with higher qualifications would continue to be trained as needed, by giving credit for the diplomas they acquired at the military academy, (to be admitted to the third or fourth academic year, for example, after a few months of preparatory training).

Our fears related to the duration of training are not fueled by a concern that not enough learning material exists for such long period of training, but by the fact that the cost, and the superfluous character of excessive training would counter the interests of maintaining the continued legitimacy of military university education.

In summary, three fundamental paths are available to liquidate the above contradictions:

—One that aims for the restoration of the previous educational and legal system;

—Another one that prefers to realize and to develop the new educational and legal system; and

—A third path that strives to enforce distinct military characteristics in the framework of the new educational and legal system.

If we choose to proceed along the lines of the third alternative, which, in my view, appears to be the ideal solution, we must endeavor to retain the main goals and spirit of the Law on higher education. It complies with European standards and has come about on the basis of a multi-party consensus.

Among measures aiming for the resolution of contradictions, we may distinguish between basic education provided in military academies and at universities, on the one hand, and instruction having the character of training programs, that prepares for performance in specific assignments, on the other. Most of the basic education may be provided pursuant to the spirit and qualitative criteria of the Law, consistent with the training and qualifications requirements contained in legal provisions, and in a manner fully consistent with the management, scientific research, and training practice found in the rest of the universities and academies. With respect to education provided in the framework of

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training programs, theoretical and practical preparation may take place pursuant to requirements established by the Army Staff, and according to the needs of the various military units, within the strict command system and framework of high-level military leadership.

It is important to separate the basic education function of higher education from the training function that prepares soldiers for specific assignments. The latter, i.e., preparation for specific assignments, takes place at the expense of the quality of basic education. Less time remains available for teaching universal knowledge, all of which prepares a person for pursuing an intellectual life. We cannot be certain that persons trained today to perform a group of specific functions are going to be able to perform in their positions tomorrow.

While the quality of basic education suffers, educational institutions could provide training only for a few, targeted assignments, within the broad spectrum of anticipated military and professional assignments. Accordingly, in the present system, the second function is not fully performed either. This shows the importance of, and justifies the separation of functions; preparation for specific assignments must be provided after basic training, independent from basic education, in the framework of specialized training courses lasting a few weeks, or a few months.

[16 Sep, pp 24-25]

At the Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy we developed a concept for university-level basic education. It requires mainly organizational changes, and no supplemental budgetary resources. The essence of this concept is that courses would be offered in two fields: military sciences, and management and organizational sciences. The basic idea is built on concepts espoused by Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Culture and Education professionals, and, according to uniform opinions expressed by the two ministries, it satisfies the requirements of the Law on Higher Education.

At the same time, this delineation would also represent the two staffs of the defense university. The military science school would have two departments, each headed by an independent deputy dean selected from the staff.

The department of land-based warfare would offer courses in the following specialties:

—all land-based weapons systems;

—reconnaissance;

—artillery;

—technical;

—chemical defense;

—communications;

—electronic warfare;

—guarding the border;

—military security; and

—civil defense.

The air defense and air force department would offer courses regarding:

—all weapons systems used for air defenses, and by the air force;

—rockets used for air defense;

—air defenses in the field;

—fighter airplanes;

—troop carrier airplanes;

—radio technology.

The military logistics department of the school of management and organizational sciences would offer courses in the following specialties:

—military logistics (supply services);

—military operational maintenance logistics (military engineering);

—military transportation logistics (traffic and transportation);

—general military logistics (securing military engineering).

The following specialized courses would be appropriate in the other department of the school of management and organization:

—military human resources management;

—military administrative management;

—military information system management;

—military technical management;

—military business management.

The school of military sciences would provide command and leadership training for field officers. The school of management and organization would train business, maintenance, and organization managers in leading positions.

The qualification to be shown on diplomas issued by the school of military sciences could be "graduate military tactical operations ... (branch of military, e.g. artillery) officer," while the same on the diplomas issued by the school of military management and organization could be "graduate military logistician" or "graduate military manager."

The above method would offer satisfactory opportunities for the resolution of the above-mentioned two main contradictions.

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Since the implementation of this solution demands much work, it would be appropriate to begin transition to this new training system after a one-year pause in training. This would allow just enough time to discontinue differences between the Law and other, mainly lower level, legal provisions, and for filling a series of gaps in legal provisions. The success of this work is impeded fundamentally by unsettled provisions in high-level laws; these, of course, cannot be resolved by the new government, and by the new leadership of the Ministry of Defense at an accelerated pace, "in a matter of days." On the other hand, there are serious barriers in several respects to making "sensible advances" involving institutional authority. Quite obviously, it would also be contrary to law, if in the military hierarchy, a lower-level officer referred to the Law, then went on to suggest that intermediate legal provisions be "transcended."

Establishment of a condition contrary to law is alien to the spirit of the Law. According to Paragraph 12. Section (1)(c) of Law No. 110. of 1993 on national defense (hereinafter: National Defense Law) provides that the minister of defense is "responsible for the legitimate functioning of the military," and that he annuls or changes actions taken in violation of laws.

Accordingly, at present, the Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy has no authority to change lower-level legal provisions, directives, and measures, or the systems functioning under these, which are in conflict with the Higher Education Law. Accordingly, institutional latitude could evolve in the framework of complying with both systems. Quite naturally, based on the principle of freedom to pursue scientific research, the Law, as well as the Constitution guarantee the opportunity to perform scientific research and to develop concepts.

The effectiveness of work to be performed by educational institutions in order to comply with the Higher Education Law is impeded mostly by the lack of a brief—even a one-page—order from the minister. The lack of such an order or action is a rather noteworthy factor.

It is necessary to once again stress: In our institution we must be prepared to make initiatives; we must pursue our activities so that we are not unprepared when legal authority is established. Moreover, with our activities in the pursuit of which we do have latitude, we must stimulate the creation of regulations.

In my judgment, education provided in the two schools must comply with the following requirements.

1. Each branch of the military, and each specialized unit must be provided (with due regard to efficiency) identical training conditions of equal duration.

2. Within each branch of the military, and each specialized unit, a certain proportion of academy graduate officers must be provided defense education at the university level, based on need.

3. Consistent with national defense needs, equal opportunities must be established for officers who have graduated from the defense university, insofar as participation in postgraduate education is concerned.

The new organization and educational system offers excellent opportunities for the development of a curriculum structure and didactic algorithm, which comes closer to civil university education. Social science (classical) education and foreign language instruction would occupy an important place in the above-described system.

In this field, as the centerpiece of research and education, we must cover the following subjects: 20th-century processes, the structures of global and European security, the social science conditions of the changed functions of armed forces, constitutional statehood, and the modern professional and post-materialistic values.

As compared to the educational practice pursued thus far, the sequence [of priorities] should be changed in several respects. Most of the general and global studies should be pursued in the initial semesters of university education. A cluster of issues ranging from security policy to general principles of strategic and military operations should be taught first, while the theoretical elements of tactical operations, corresponding to specialized training, should be taught in the final semester.

This means that general education, independent from the specialty pursued, would be provided during the initial semesters. Building on knowledge acquired at the academy, this would establish the general cultural foundations for more highly qualified officers, and would provide in-depth theoretical and practical knowledge of strategic and tactical operations to commanders and field officers who become active mainly at the tactical level after completing their university studies.

Let us think about this! A student planning to become a dentist does not start his studies by learning about dentistry. Instead, he learns the foundations and attends courses providing general knowledge. The situation is the same with engineers, and in virtually every field of science.

Quite naturally, it is necessary to teach courses concerning strategic and tactical military operations also in the framework of specialized training. This, however, must take place as part of the field of specialization, in a highly focused manner.

Highly qualified officers, graduates of the military university, must have solid knowledge of land-based strategic and tactical military operations, about air defenses and the air force ([involving] all branches of the military) tactical military operations, and of motorized sharpshooting (tank), artillery, and air force and air defense tactical operations, irrespective of their fields of specialization (military branch).

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In my judgment, every student attending the military university should pass at least one final exam, and one comprehensive exam on land-based military operations involving all branches of the military, as well as on air defense and air force operations, and further, they should take an exam ending with a minimum report on knowledge about the tactics of all branches of the military, and on matters related to the deployment of significant specialized forces.

The above goes to prove that the accreditation of a defense university consistent with the Higher Education Law involves significant changes in organization as well as in the educational system, affecting every facet of the latter. At the same time, significant advances must be made in the results produced by requirements established for instructors.

Development plans for the Hungarian military call for an armed force with fewer people, but with more state of the art weaponry and equipment. In modeling the paths of possible avenues for development we find that the role played by officers will significantly change in the future. The approach to NATO warrants that we come closer to the practices of developed Western states, in terms of the equivalence of officers' functions. Correspondingly, beyond proportionate reductions in manpower, the number of assignments available to officers will also be reduced, because the direct training functions will be expected to be performed by noncommissioned officers.

Accordingly, it is likely that the number of officers to be trained is also going to change. Due to the declining need for replacement, the long-term maintenance of three officers' academies and a military university cannot be sustained, in my view. Consequently, the requirements and the needs, along with "trimming" [the structure] as necessary, point toward the establishment of a unified, integrated military higher educational system. These considerations must, by all means, be observed in taking steps today.

The instructors of the Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy do not watch events unfold while twiddling their thumbs; serious research and creative work is being performed for the development of a detailed action plan and various alternatives. This serves as a guarantee for the liquidation of impediments contained in legal provisions, and implementing the changes rapidly and in an organized fashion ensures compliance with accreditation criteria and maintains the continued legitimacy of the institution as a university.

Lawyers Forum on Preparation of New Constitution

94CH0412A Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 26 Aug 94 p 8

[Report on interview with Dr. Villmos Meszaros, chairman of the Independent Lawyers Forum, by Janos T. Turistvandy; place and date not given: "The Constitution and Anomalies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The capital of Hungary is Budapest." Allegedly, that is the only sentence left intact in the [original] text of the repeatedly amended Constitution of 17 August 1949 that had been sponsored by Rakosi and is still in force.

In 1988 the justice minister of the day, Dr. Kalman Kulcsar, contemplated the elaboration of a new constitution. Then, at the dawn of the change of political systems, the Program of National Renewal contained similar plans. Now the left has been given, once again after 1949, the always recurring opportunity to frame a new constitution, and the governing coalition's program promises to have our second written constitution in place by 20 August 1995.

In our previous issue, Justice Minister Dr. Pal Vastagh, Supreme State Prosecutor Dr. Kalman Gyorgyi, and Professor Dr. Andras Sajo expounded their views regarding the framing of a new constitution and its content.

Our interview with Dr. Vilmos Meszaros, chairman of the Independent Lawyers Forum, is a further contribution on this topic. In certain respects, he said, the views of his organization are in agreement with the ideas of the mentioned renowned experts. Specifically, in that there truly is a need for a new constitution. But there are lingering questions as to when that constitution ought to become effective, and what kind of constitution it should actually be. In his view, either society's revolutionary transformation or its organic development might necessitate the enactment of a fundamental law. But because a bloodless revolution had taken place in Hungary in 1989-1990 and parliament had neglected to frame a new constitution at the time, it is not at all certain that society's organic development demands the framing of a new constitution specifically during these months and years; or particularly during the planned period of merely one year.

Dr. Meszaros emphasized: "I fail to comprehend why the framing of a new constitution has suddenly become so urgent, and why such a short time limit has been set for it."

On the other hand, it is undeniable that our fundamental law now in force is structurally incoherent, disjointed, inaccurate, and inconsistent. It regulates unsuitably, among other things, the powers of the republic's president, the Constitutional Court's authority, the area of government finance, states of emergency and martial law, ministerial responsibility, the authority of local governments, the status of public prosecutors, the system of individual rights and freedoms, and certain areas of the economy. The chairman said that, in view of these shortcomings, structural changes would certainly have to be made in the new constitution. "Fundamental civil rights would have to be included after a preamble. A bicameral National Assembly would be necessary, to overcome the difficulties that still exist. After all, the Upper House would be devised on the basis of principles

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entirely different from the ones applicable to the Lower House. That way the two Houses could become mutual checks and balances, the foundations of real democracy. For instance, the Upper House, rather than the Constitutional Court, would oversee the constitutionality of generally binding laws and regulations. As to what should not be left out? There ought to be a part dealing with the legislative process. The public prosecutors should be placed under the justice minister, because the prosecution of crimes is a state [central-government] responsibility. Relations between the state and its citizens must be regulated to remedy or p vent abuses of state power; in the case of oppressiv taxation, for instance."

The chairman noted that, in his opinion, the proposed 27-member Committee for Framing the Constitution was not broad enough, and objected that it would be dominated by the governing coalition's delegates. Because, he said, this was exactly the case when all the parliamentary parties—and even the parties outside Parliament, if they had any suggestions about the new constitution—ought to have equal representation on this committee, regardless of how the people had voted in 1994.

He pointed out that a justice of the Constitutional Court could not serve on the Committee for Framing the Constitution; or more accurately, a justice could participate in the committee's work, but then would be disqualified from sitting on the Constitutional Court in the future, because the two positions were incompatible. On the other hand, the widest possible professional representation must be ensured on the committee, including the delegates of civil organizations that are active in public life and have an interest in constitutional law.

The chairman felt that practically all the amendments to the constitution enacted during the past four years have been illegal, because the Law on Referendums specifies that the republic's constitution has to be ratified by referendum. And that applies not just to the constitution as a whole, but to parts of it as well. It is conceivable to create a new constitution—a constitution by stealth, as Peter Tolgyessy put it—by smuggling in various new provisions through a series of amendments, so that years later an entirely new constitution emerges, one that was never ratified by referendum.

When asked what should become of the Constitutional Court's decisions, Dr. Meszaros replied:

[Meszaros] The decisions of the Constitutional Court will either be incorporated into the new constitution, or they will have to be rescinded together with the old one. In the latter case, they will become the subjects of investigation in the forefront of jurisprudence; and that, too, will by no means be insignificant. For this very reason, the Constitutional Court's significance will not decline; after all, the task of interpreting our most important law will start all over again, from the very beginning. On the initiative of the Independent Lawyers Forum, there has been an exchange of letters with the justice minister. Dr. Pal Vastagh has indicated that there might also be a meeting with him in person, in early September. I expect much from that meeting. Including the feasibility of our organization's participation in framing the constitution. I am confident that the justice minister will be able to soften somewhat the government's present stand on this issue, enabling us to join this important process. What this means exactly is that our organization will be able to nominate a delegate to the proposed—for the time being, 27-member—committee. I do not see any legal obstacles to this.

[Turistvandy] Many people are concerned that the coalition's work style will leave its imprint on the new constitution.

[Meszaros] That is conceivable, and it can be avoided only through the self-restraint and moderation of those in power. There is no other way of preventing it. For it is a basic assumption that any newly enacted legislation will be tailored to the government's taste; and also that, under a democratic constitution, a given political system with a parliamentary majority can do what it pleases. Therefore, only self-restraint and moderation can help. That applies also to amending the electoral laws. I can understand having to amend the electoral laws because of a bicameral National Assembly. But if the unicameral National Assembly is retained, there exists the danger that the given power structure or party grouping might resort to technical changes in the electoral laws, enabling it to produce results corresponding to its interests. That would be contrary to the sound tendency of alternating parliamentary governments. And allow me to ask further. Which Parliament will enact the new constitution? The present one? And is that sure to suffice? In my opinion, let professionals draft the new constitution, subject it to political debate in Parliament, and then let the present National Assembly enact it. But let the new constitution become effective only if the new National Assembly, the one elected in 1998, approves it. That would truly enhance the new constitution's legitimacy. After all, in my opinion, it is not possible to frame by the end of next year a mature constitution capable of withstanding criticism and the test of time.

Hospitals Near Bankruptcy; Solutions Sought

94CH0425A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 27 Aug 94 pp 56-57, 60

[Article by Tamas Vajna: "Health Care Financing: Hospitals At The Brink of Bankruptcy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Some health care professionals say that the health care financing system introduced in July 1993, also compensating for performance, has not proved to be functional. In addition to the 21 hospitals which find themselves in catastrophic financial situations, a plan, jointly developed by the Ministry of Public Welfare and the Social Security, to introduce new financing methods beginning this fall also indicates that the present system is not functioning.*

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"The biggest trouble is that an ownership outlook has not evolved. Neither hospital managers, nor the local governments in the various settlements consider that by now, health care institutions, too, must operate pursuant to the rules of the marketplace," according to Ministry of Public Welfare Deputy State Secretary Miklos Feher, commenting on hospitals at the brink of bankruptcy, or experiencing difficult situations. Inpatient care, however, is quasi-market at best, because regardless of the good reputation of an institution, no one is going to enter a hospital 200 km away from his home for a simple surgical intervention, such as appendectomy. Other than that, the roots of what we have today in terms of financing extend to the basic socialist outlook. To top it off, bankruptcy involving a hospital cannot be treated simply, because an institution that saves human lives and heals people cannot be closed all of a sudden.

Only the Geza Hetenyi Hospital of Szolnok has filed for bankruptcy so far, but this is not the only hospital that is close to becoming financially unmanageable, according to the deputy state secretary. The concerns of the Szolnok institution—faced with a 270 million forint deficit in April—seem to have been resolved since: The city government has allocated almost 100 million forints for the needed structural change, and the National Health Insurance Fund (OEP) is helping the hospital with a 250 million forint interest-free loan.

"Actually, the deficit situations of near bankrupt hospitals date back farther than just the past few years," according to OEP Chief Physician Agnes Gusztonyi. One of the reasons that explains the present situation in Szolnok is that back in the 1980-s, thanks to the good connections of the former management, the hospital managed to overcome its financial difficulties by receiving injections of state and party funds. This is why the former management of the hospital did not receive an increased funding of its budget. After the disintegration of the party state, however, all they had was an artificially low central funding level, with no hope for receiving money from elsewhere. At the same time, the financial situation of the OEP—the organization that finances the operation of the institutions—does not permit that organization to pay bills that have accumulated, due to many years, decades of bad management. Instead, the social security fund finances bankruptcy, provided that the local government owner of a hospital takes the locally necessary steps for infrastructural development, and further provided that the management of a given institution is prepared to shore up its internal business situation. Last fall, the board of the autonomous health insurance governing body has set aside 700 million forints to cover unforeseen expenditures. "The present, untenable situation demands that we expend this amount to manage bankruptcies," Agnes Gusztonyi says.

In addition to providing central government assistance, the Ministry of Public Welfare, also responsible for health care, envisions local bankruptcy management as the solution to the problem. In a statement to this magazine, Miklos Feher said that only 21 health care institutions responded to the Ministry's offer to perform an internal management audit; oddly enough, these 21 institutions are not the same group of 21 hospitals the press has reported to be near bankrupt and working on changing their financial systems, the so-called "twenty-one." The Ministry has contributed a total of 33 million forints for the management audit of eight hospitals. The Ministry is going to publish in detail the findings of these audits before the end of the year, if for none other, but the educate the rest of the hospitals.

The idea to conduct management audits came from the Pal Rethy Hospital of Bekescsaba. The 606 hospital bed institution that finished last year with a 100 million forint deficit requested the management audit itself; thanks to examinations performed, and plans prepared by the City Fund Financial and Management Consulting, Ltd., the hospital has paid its debts, and by now, prides itself in having a 40 million forint targeted reserve. (The fact that the hospital's pharmaceuticals fund was divided and allocated to the various departments of the hospital, and whenever possible, the medication provided to patients by nurses was allocated to the patient's name, contributed to the improvement. This way, the physician who prescribes the medicine, the nurse who distributes the medicine, as well as the patient are aware of the pharmaceuticals used. The management of the Pal Rethy Hospital was not deterred from implementing a reduction in force: They dismissed 69 workers and four physicians.)

It is likely that based on the Bekescsaba pattern, pharmaceutical consumption could also be streamlined elsewhere: Miklos Feher believes that one possible solution would be to reintroduce hospital pharmacies. This way, patients could obtain pharmaceuticals from the pharmacy only, and everyone would not have access to departmental pharmaceutical cabinets, thus reducing the amounts paid for medicines. Establishing "pharmaceutical committees" in hospitals also could produce results: A group of physicians verifying in each patient's case, whether the use of costly preparations is warranted, has proved to be beneficial in West Europe a long time ago. Significant amounts could be saved by using this method, while the quality of care would not suffer, according to the deputy state secretary. High cost food provisions could also be streamlined. In Bekescsaba, for example, contractors provide food to the hospital, and in the hospital restaurant the choices range from the miracles of the reform kitchen [as published] to larded bread, or to meals prescribed by the dietician. Based on professional considerations, the number of workers could also be reduced, and the savings could be used to hire fewer, but more highly qualified professionals, according to Miklos Feher.

The Ministry of Public Welfare and the OEP plan to initiate a program this fall, to permit health care institutions in "disadvantaged situations" to catch up with the

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rest. The Ministry has developed three alternatives to accomplish this. One of these calls for providing available [state] budget funds to these hospitals, allowing them to make improvements from the bottom up. The unfavorable aspect of this method is that it would draw away resources from hospitals that still enjoy relatively favorable financial situations. Ministry professionals are also pondering compensation based on categories: under this system the various institutions—city, county, specialized, and national institutions—would be assigned to financing categories exclusively on the basis of their "rankings." The third possible method would call for calculating the amount to be paid to each individual hospital, with due regard to the hospital bed utilization rate, the size of trained staff, as well as all operating expenses.

During the past few months OEP professionals have reviewed the performance financing system introduced a year ago, and have assessed the impact created by this system. They found that bad financial management in a hospital is not necessarily the cause for shortage of funds. The problem is that as determined by the OEP, the amount payable on the basis of performance financing for the care of one patient is based on prior hospital budgets and on the number of patients cared for by a hospital in 1992 (HVG, 10 Jul 1993). There are great differences between the amount of fees collected this way. For example, at the city hospital in Zirc, the average "base price" of one stay in the hospital is 17,000 forints. In Sopron, the same costs more than 40,000 forints. On top, it is possible that a hospital that has dealt with simple cases two years ago, heals patients requiring expensive pharmaceuticals this year, according to OEP Chief Physician Agnes Gusztonyi.

The OEP's new "bankruptcy prevention" financing technique would be based on paying the bills accumulated by hospitals in the course of a month. Under the new system, the health insurer would pay only on the basis of itemized bills. Agnes Gusztonyi believes that by using this technique, it would also be in the interest of hospital managers to be more efficient: The OEP would examine each month the cost efficiency of treatments, and would not pay for unused capacities, i.e., for "empty beds." In Gusztonyi's view, savings could also be achieved in so-called "hotel expenses." These are unrelated to medical care, yet amount to 35-40 percent, or, in worse cases, 60 percent of the operating expenses. For this reason, the health insurer would also like to define the optimum treatment period for given illnesses, based on multi-year statistics. For example, in case of a "simple" appendectomy, the treatment period would range from three days to seven days, or, at least, this is the amount of time for which hospitals would receive payment. (The present financing system also takes the duration of treatment for individual illnesses into account, but somewhat superficially, according to the critics of the system. The present financing system does not take into consideration frequently occurring complications.) The OEP would prefer not to see premature discharges, because those could set back patient recoveries, at the same time, however, a patient's untimely return to the hospital, and renewed treatment would have to be covered by a hospital from the amount received before, according to the OEP chief physician.

"Like the Ministry of Public Welfare, the management of the autonomous health insurance governing body also envisions an opportunity for disadvantaged hospitals to equalize their prospects by catching up with the rest of the hospitals," Agnes Gusztonyi says. Depending on the outcome of negotiations, the OEP would launch the program this fall, but it would take at least two years—five years, at most—before the service standards of hospitals become equalized. As a first step they would change the 30 years old classification of hospitals. In those days they designated an institution to be a "first" category city hospital, if it offered care in the four basic disciplines: internal medicine, surgery, obstetrics, and pediatrics. This classification is still in force, even though the profile of hospitals has expanded almost everywhere. According to OEP's concept, the actually performed activities would be considered as the basis for a new classification, and thus the new categories and the present base prices would determine the amount of payment. Disadvantaged hospitals could be upgraded to the standards of the hospital that finds itself in the best situation, within the same category. This is what we should strive for, at least. The OEP chief physician says that the financial situation in almost half of the 170 hospitals in Hungary is shaky, to put it mildly.

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Officials on UN Debt, Peacekeeping, Haiti

WS0410113494 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 4 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Pawel Wronski and Edward Krzemien: "Do We Have Money for Haiti Trip? Defense Minister's Gambit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk wants to ask the government to limit the participation of Polish troops in peacekeeping missions. He claims that the Ministry of National Defense [MON] has no money for this because he is still waiting for the UN to pay $31 million for the participation of our troops in previous missions.

The money for peacekeeping operations is provided from the UN coffers. Since 1991, the UN's debt to the Polish MON has been growing. This year, $1.6 million was to be paid each month to the banking account of MON's Department for Peacekeeping Missions Budget. However, in June, the department received $1.5 million, in July $400,000, in August $2.1 million, and in September not one cent.

According to MON's defense department, the UN owes us as much as $31 million.

Currently, 2,100 Polish soldiers are taking part in peacekeeping missions, over 50 percent of them in former Yugoslavia.

MON is spending its own money to prepare new contingents of soldiers. Last year, the ministry earmarked for this purpose the money that was to be spent on new equipment.

Currently, MON does not have enough money for wages for the soldiers. In this situation, Minister Kolodziejczyk has informed the Foreign Affairs Ministry [MSZ] that he will submit a motion requesting limitation of the participation of Polish troops in peacekeeping missions, unless the Council of Ministers finds other ways to finance the Polish "blue helmets."

"Since we are speaking about the UN's indebtedness to Poland, we should not forget that we also owe the UN approximately $20 million," says Jan Woroniecki of the MSZ. "Recently, we have found ourselves among the 10 largest debtors of this organization."

For half a year now, on the motion of the Sejm speaker, the issue of financing Polish peacekeeping missions has been dealt with by the Supreme Chamber of Control. The results of this control will be released late in October.

Most of the costs of the participation of Polish soldiers in the Haiti operation will be covered not by the UN but by the United States, which is coordinating this operation.

According to unofficial information, at its session yesterday, the Committee of Defense Affairs of the Council of Ministers demanded 1 billion zlotys for each trained soldier who will be dispatched to Haiti in the next contingent.

Daily Views 'S' Situation, Walesa's Plans

WS0310150094 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 3 Oct 94 pp 12-13

[Article by Jacek Kurski: "President Wakes the Beauty"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The mass media presented the latest Solidarity ["S"] congress in vivid colors. Well, so much was happening: the file-checking affair, the vote of no confidence for the Pawlak government, the president's visit and his discussions with Zygmunt Wrzodak...

In reality, "S" cannot wake up. I went to all of the "S" congresses, beginning with the first one held in the Hala Oliwii. For three years now I have had the impression that "S," which once was a spontaneous and romantic movement, is petrifying.

Time Stands Still

At all of the recent congresses, I saw the same faces. The same incantations were reiterated—about the arrogance of those in power, about the treason of the political elites, about the sale of the national wealth, about the predatory privatization, and so forth. Still the same symbols, the same ornaments. I can hear increasingly more religious accents. It is not that clergymen want to come to the congress. The delegates themselves use the language of sermons, thus changing the congress tribune into a church pulpit.

Petrifying trends can be observed in the union's structure, as well. The congress would have adopted new election principles for "S" activists if this idea had been backed by a few dozen more voters. In line with these principles, a high-level activist would not have to undergo electoral verification in his plant committee. Support from one of his colleagues from the region structures would be enough. Thus, the "S" bureaucracy would have guaranteed themselves fine "perches" for life. One of the delegates said jokingly that the next congress could then only take a vote on the inheritance of the positions within the union.

The "S" constitution draft was held in the secretariat of the National Commission for two months because there was no time to become familiar with it. As a consequence, signatures were collected at the last moment, at the most unfavorable time—people went on vacation. Under these circumstances, the collection of over a million signatures was a real success, which is not lessened by the fact that this was supported by the church and was evidently assisted by parish priests.

For the sake of justice, the delegates passed an important resolution concerning obligatory payments to the strike

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fund. Conclusions were drawn from the fact that, in the summer, there was no money with which to pay miners for their strike.

However, no one evaluated the failure of "S" in the election. The fact that only 40 percent of the "S" members who went to the polls voted for "S" and 60 percent supported other parties was not commented on in any way at the congress. Everyone seems to be reconciled with the fact that the All-Polish Trade Unions' Agreement is spending "S" money, and the property left over by the Central Council of Trade Unions has not yet been divided.

To sum up, the union is governed by mediocrity, which can be seen in the way Marian Krzaklewski heads the union. This leadership is rather weak, without any major successes in the union's policy. However, it is very effective in internal gamesmanship.

Krzaklewski's position is certain and safe. He secured the support of the delegates and of the National Commission. He also subordinated the presidium of the union to himself. Mazowsze Region head Maciej Jankowski once again found that the position of the "S" chairman is very strong. He attacked Krzaklewski and demanded that his annual report be rejected. Jankowski, who was obviously irritated, said that the National Commission is a political zero, that no conclusions had been drawn from the "S" failure in the parliamentary election, and that everything is secretly decided by the presidium of the National Commission, which has a curbing effect on the union.

Jankowski's arguments are largely correct. However, he has little support—practically none, except for Mazowsze [Warsaw region], Malopolska [Krakow region], and part of Lower Silesia [Wroclaw region].

A Party or a Corporation?

One of the issues that was to be decided at the Mielec congress was whether "S" needs a party. The father of this idea is Senator Zbigniew Romaszewski. He claims that, during the campaign of collecting signatures under the solidarity-independence (such a canon is binding) constitution draft, a new strong social movement became visible, which needs to be organized. Signatures are still being collected and, according to Krzaklewski, there are already 1.3 million of them.

According to Romaszewski, the return of "S" to the historical formula of a sociopolitical movement is no longer possible. Thus, its own political representation must be created, which calls for experts and special structures. People from outside the union must be won over to this idea—senior citizens, young people, small business owners.

"After the constitutional campaign of the union, its popularity increased from 4 to 11 percent. This is the only chance of its kind that cannot be forfeited. I am saying this because the union is an expert in forfeiting its chances. The U.S. democrats lean on the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations], just like the Labor Party supporters in Great Britain, the social-democrats in Germany, and the Peasant-Democratic Party in Austria. Why cannot 'S' have its own party?" Romaszewski asked.

However, if we take a close look at the "S" constitution draft, which would be the basis for the formation of a new grouping, it would turn out that none of the parties listed by Romaszewski would support it. The draft law contains a mixture of traditional national values, with extended privileges of employees and all-pervading powers of trade unions. The tripartite commission, made up of representatives of employees, employers, and the government, rises to the rank of a constitutional organ. The state would be obliged to guarantee social security, maintenance of the unemployed, respect for the right to strike, and so forth. [passage omitted]

Therefore, Romaszewski received applause but not support. The unionists did not enter into the dialogue because they recoil at the word "party." A questionnaire among the activists of the Gdansk "S" revealed that only approximately 30 percent of them are in favor of a union with "party backing," but as many as 50 percent believe that the union has lost its significance because of treason, stupidity, and irresponsibility of the elites who came from the union and because of the fact that they have used "S" for their own party purposes. The idea was not favorably received by Krzaklewski, and, despite the open letter signed by, among others, Bohdan Cywinski, Zbigniew Herbert, Jakub Karpinski, Antoni Macierewicz, Jan Olszewski, Tomasz Strzembosz, and Jacek Trznadel, the party idea, for the time being, at least, was abandoned.

In Solidarity With President?

Lech Walesa, the congress's guest, presented a different political proposal to the delegates. The president announced at the congress a serious talk with Pawlak. He said, "That is the end of playing, gentlemen; definite decisions are necessary" and added "We will cope with the communists like with a little sandwich."

Even if we treat this story as a political fairy tale, the president accomplished a lot by coming to the congress. He presented himself as a moderate politician, a politician inclined to reach compromises, one who calls for unity if there is danger and who is not afraid to stand face-to-face with Zygmunt Wrzodak. The presidential election is drawing near, and the president managed to smoothly pass over the recent accusations and unfriendly gestures of "S" directed at him.

Walesa presented some idea. This is, more or less, what he says: The left pillar has grown too large. This must be opposed. Let us go together, those on the right wing, as well, but not in the post-August camp because its recreation is no longer possible. Let us agree on the most

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important issues. Let us win the parliamentary, then the presidential elections, and then let us split up.

Unofficially, no one could figure out what this was all really about. In line with one interpretation, the president is doing his best to order and early election. An earlier election mean a chance for both "S" and the center right to return to the parliament. However, the condition is unity.

It seems that this is a tantalizing offer for the politicians of the right wing and "S," who have become hungry after being outside the parliament for so long. Integration of the split right side of the political scene under the "Down with communists" slogan may be attractive to even the apolitical unionist grass roots. For such a service, Walesa would win support in the presidential election.

Such a scenario places the Freedom Union in a difficult situation. Whom to support? Should it be, in the name of the law, the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party? Or, against the law, the president and colleagues of the former opposition?

If this is the president's plan, we are about to witness serious destabilization of the state once again.

Walesa's 'Additional Interpretations' of Law

WS0410090094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 3 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski: "How President Did Not Break Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Not long ago the Belweder's ministers, when warding off attacks on the president, kept submitting one solid argument: He has never violated the law.

Since the beginning of his term, Lech Walesa has been reiterating that his powers are not sufficient. He got into the habit of sounding out the law. As if it were a balloon, it will either burst or accept another "additional interpretation."

He continued doing this after the Small Constitution—which, after all, gave him more powers—came into force. Most probably, Lech Walesa has simply become accustomed to the thought that his powers are insufficient and that a method that will allow him to carry out his duties efficiently is to provide additional interpretations of any legal gaps and ambiguities, additional interpretations that are favorable to him.

Lech Walesa decided at the beginning of his term of office, for example, that the National Defense Committee [KOK] would be dissolved and that the National Security Council would be set up, instead. It turned out that KOK is found in the Constitution, and it is not possible to simply dissolve it. Therefore, Walesa attempted to change KOK's name. However, this is the name found in the Constitution. It became normal for the president and his aides to refer to KOK as the National Security Council, thus giving the impression that this was a different organ. This was some kind of an...

Attempt at "Lulling"

...the law to sleep: The National Security Council will become a fact, whereas KOK will die even in the old Constitution because it will be forgotten. The plan has failed. KOK as KOK is functioning even today. However, this method helped the president achieve something. In the Small Constitution, we find references to the National Security Council, and, even though its powers are not as extensive as Walesa wanted them to be (and even though it has not been set up yet), it is there in the Small Constitution. Thus, the first attempt was quite encouraging.

After the 1991 parliamentary election, Lech Walesa asked the victorious grouping, the Democratic Union [UD], to submit three candidates for prime minister. He wanted to select one of them. UD did what the president wanted. Walesa chose Bronislaw Geremek and entrusted him with the mission of forming the government. After the last election, Lech Walesa treated the request for three candidates as a requirement. He demanded that the Democratic Left Alliance, which won the election, present him with three candidates. He persisted with this requirement until the end, even though it is not at all legal.

After recalling Jan Olszewski, Walesa insisted that Waldemar Pawlak, who was then trying to form a government, replace Olszewski's ministers with directors of ministries. Except for those who were directly interested—that is, the forces focused around Olszewski—other groupings did not protest, even though the entire operation was not legal.

Both Hanna Suchocka and then Waldemar Pawlak without any greater reservations agreed to the president's requirement that the issue of filling three ministerial posts be decided by himself. These were to be the ministers of foreign affairs, internal affairs, and national defense. Walesa has brought about a situation in which these ministries are today openly called "presidential." The Small Constitution merely specifies that the prime minister consult the president about the filling of these three positions. The Belweder's "additional interpretation" of this provision is now considered to be the only interpretation.

As far as the liberalization of abortion regulations in the Criminal Code is concerned, Walesa vetoed it, and this was practically the only legal possibility for him to prevent the law from coming into force. However, the president announced that he would not sign the law and that he was ready to stand before the State Tribunal. In this way, he influenced the result of the voting because the Sejm did not reject Walesa's veto because it feared the situation that might develop after that.

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The endurance of public opinion to personnel changes in the National Council of Radio and Television [KRRiT] was tested by Walesa much earlier. Several months ago, when he wanted to recall several KRRiT members whom he himself had nominated, he called upon them to resign. Today, none of these people are members of KRRiT. Walesa accomplished what he wanted, even though the law is still the same as it was several months ago.

Politicians Are Also To Blame

...if the Belweder has lost the feeling of restraint in interpreting the law (which can, but does not have to, be suggested by the president's recent decisions concerning KRRiT).

Previously, such steps taken by Walesa went totally "unpunished." He may have decided that the political class had already accepted this peculiarity of his presidency.

So, if he exaggerates a little, politicians will criticize him, but not severely, and then they will finally agree to the state of affairs that he has created. Also because, when he provided an additional interpretation of a regulation, Walesa discovered a legal gap that had not been noticed by anyone else. Deputies, who, after all, passed those imperfect laws themselves, were not in the best possible position to protest.

Politicians Themselves Spoiled Lech Walesa

Now he did not do anything he has not done before. At that time, this was agreed to, so why not agree to it this time? Therefore, Walesa, in his own opinion, may feel embittered and may ask himself what they want from him. Previously, when I did the same, I was a good guy, but now I am bad.

It may also be that such an attitude toward the law, as displayed by the President's Office, the habit of "adjusting" it to one's own needs, will become more widespread. This is why it is dangerous.

Information is coming from the Belweder that the president is in a good position and that he is satisfied with his recent decisions. The criticism these decisions have encountered may strengthen the president's conviction that politicians again did not understand his "brilliant" step. A "finesse" step, as he likes to say.

Today, the criticism has focused on Presidential Secretary of State Lech Falandysz, who is the deputy chief of the Chancellery. It is not easy to be Walesa's lawyer. It looks like one of the president's characteristics is a lack of legal intuition. The president has some ideas, but there must be someone who would put them into practice. In addition, these ideas occur to Walesa—for example, at press conferences—and, thus, they are made public. Then his lawyers have homework to do: find the relevant regulation.

Walesa has one more characteristic: He is obstinate and very attached to his "wonderful" ideas. If a "bad" law does not empower him to automatically implement his ideas, it has to be quickly changed so that it will no longer stand in his way.

When Lech Walesa says that he is the greatest democrat in this country, he is very profoundly convinced that he is right: Well, he might violate a law and persist with that. However, what does he do? He observes the law and even provides "additional interpretations" and thus "improves" it.

It looks like this time Walesa's prediction was not very accurate. The political class has revolted against his method of "not violating" the law, and the time has come for him to hear, for the first time in his presidency, that he is violating the law.

SLD's Borowski Assesses Government Performance

MM0310100194 Wroclaw GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 21 Sep 94 p 3

[Interview with Marek Borowski, deputy chairman of the Democratic Left Alliance Parliamentary Party and former deputy prime minister and finance minister, by correspondent Roman Marek; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Marek] It is now several months since you left the posts of deputy prime minister and finance minister. Do you not see yourself as a victim of a struggle over the control of the economy that is taking place within the Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party [SLD-PSL] coalition?

[Borowski] No, because I have always tried not to be a victim in various life situations. Some decisions simply must be made, and that is all there is to it. However, to reflect on your question more deeply, I must ask myself when I would have indeed become a victim in that struggle. Well, that would have been quite likely if I had procrastinated and made all kinds of evasive moves long enough to realize in the end that what I was doing was of no use to anyone, or even that it was outright harmful. Then I would have been compelled to leave. But I believe it was not like that. I do not have to be ashamed of what I had achieved up to the time of my departure, and I think that it might even have helped promote certain processes.

[Marek] After one year of the coalition government, we are beginning to see a lack of cohesion in its approach to the economy. Immediately after assuming power, the government announced "scheduled" increases in energy prices, while, at the same time, the prime minister told workers at the Zeran [automobile] plant that the increases were unnecessary. Today, in turn, a dispute is under way over devaluation of the zloty and reduction of the interest rate.

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[Borowski] In my opinion, there is one reason underlying the whole problem—namely, a number of program differences between the SLD and the PSL. It proved impossible to sort them out at the time of initial negotiations between the coalition members, and they are now the cause of the conflicts in a variety of situations. Even so, I would not go so far as to call it a lack of cohesion. What makes a coalition policy noncohesive? Well, it is noncohesive when each contentious matter leaks out of government debating chambers and is then used by politicians who try to mobilize public opinion on their respective sides. The statement by the prime minister you cited earlier is a good example here. If the prime minister had objections to the decision on energy price rises, he could obviously have raised them at a Council of Ministers' meeting or discussed them with me instead of immediately making them public property. The same observation can be applied to subsequent statements made by certain ministers.

You know, I was often present at Council of Ministers' sessions during the rule of the Mazowiecki government, which was referred to as the government of national accord, so I have firsthand knowledge of the intensity of quarrels that they engaged in there, but there was firm principle: It was forbidden to take your comments outside. Anyone who did that was regarded as disloyal. Nowadays, in similar instances, Prime Minister Pawlak is not quite sure whether he should be intervening.

[Marek] Today the prevalent view is that, in matters of the national economy, the government is capitalizing on the work done by its predecessors. Is that really so?

[Borowski] There is no doubt that the present government has added quite a few contributions to the advantageous trends in the economy (for example, the investment concessions or reduction of enterprise debts) and that it certainly has its own economic policy. It is not possible to have a situation whereby you pursue a totally absurd economic policy one year and an absolutely wonderful and highly effective one the very next. In other words, I appreciate the predecessors' achievements, but I believe that the present government improved on their results with regard to all earlier assumptions. In any case, I have right here in my briefcase a number of reports compiled by various sages on the economic results in September and October of last year, and the prognoses these give are indeed black. So I believe that, because we were seen in such a grim light at the time, we must have made some progress during the past year.

[Marek] Some of your critics say that the rule of the coalition government was most advantageous for state enterprises that had their dividend reduced and for farmers, for whom the compensatory payments were introduced. How can this be reconciled with the fact that 30 percent of Poles declare that they are in favor of the free market?

[Borowski] It is in the nature of a market economy that it eliminates the weaker participants. Of course, this is advantageous in the long run. However, we must remember that there is also the social consideration. If the state is rich enough that it can, say, temporarily increase its budget deficit in order to spend more money on social welfare assistance, it can certainly pursue the policy of a perfectly open market game. But our state does not have such resources and must therefore either regulate or restrict the free market at certain points because the social assistance costs can effectively strangle the free market transformations. I believe our actions are rational and that the previous governments simply did not want to undertake them simply because of their doctrinaire approach. That was based on the view that those enterprises that were unable to pay their debts and dividends should be left to collapse on their own. Unfortunately, no one took into account the possibility that the costs of their collapse would, to put it bluntly, be completely unacceptable.

[Marek] The question of universal privatization is still a matter of contention within the coalition. To what an extent is the SLD prepared to take a firm stand in this matter?

[Borowski] First, the decisive voice in this matter belongs to the prime minister and the government. There is a Sejm resolution that says that privatization must continue to be implemented. In the end, the prime minister will have to decide: If it proves too difficult, he will have to do something about changing the Sejm act. And that will be a serious problem. I believe that life will eventually force the prime minister to address it.

[Marek] As deputy premier, you raised the tax liability thresholds. According to announcements at the time, that was only for a year. But it now turns out that they will remain raised during the next year, too.

[Borowski] Please remember that, at that time, work was still in progress on the state budget, which we were expected to prepare in just three months. We did not have the advantage of the three-year prognosis then, so Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko did not have all of the necessary information. Now we have it and we know that this will be so both in the next year and in 1995 [as published]. In any case, just a moment ago one of the journalists present at the press conference asked me how I rated the current government. I told him that my rating would be "less than good." But if, having the three-year prognosis at its disposal, the government still decided to lower the tax liability thresholds, my rating would have to be lowered to that of "just acceptable." We must talk about the more unpleasant, but still unavoidable, aspects of our policy frankly and openly rather than try to play the part of "the good uncle."

Kolodko on Implementation of Privatization Program

LD0310085994 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0700 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko, who is attending the Madrid meeting of representatives of the governments and central banks

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belonging to the member countries of the IMF and the World Bank, has told this program by telephone about the advantages for our country of participation in these bodies.

[Begin Kolodko recording] Here we are receiving support for the economic policy line that we are implementing. We have a whole series of agreements signed earlier, including with the World Bank, on the financing of many of our infrastructure projects, promoting mainly economic development and the input-output of the Polish structure, and also with the IMF and with the International Finance Corporation. There is also a great deal of interest in the ways in which we are implementing this policy from other countries that have greater problems, greater economic difficulties than ours. I think, too, that there is this, that we are trying to introduce our proposals into the discussion on changes in the world economy and the mode of operation itself of the IMF firm, although I must admit that we worked yesterday until 2300, even though it was Sunday, at a meeting of the so-called Interim Committee of the IMF, and no agreement was reached. There is still no full compromise. [end recording]

During yesterday's meeting with World Bank President Lewis Preston, Kolodko gave an assurance that the general privatization program in Poland will be implemented.

KRRiTV Head: Council's Regulations Breach Law

LD0310175294 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1500 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Janusz Zaorski, chairman of the National Radio and TV Broadcasting Council [KRRiTV], said that the council's documents contained deplorable points and proof that the law had been broken.

At a news conference held in the Episcopate headquarters, Tomasz Kwiatkowski, the lawyer and one of the newly appointed members of the council, claimed that since the change of the chairman—that is, Marek Markiewicz's dismissal—the council team had been breaking the law. As an example, he quoted the council's resolution to make any personnel changes dependable on the decision of the whole council rather than on just its chairman.

Counsellor Kwiatkowski claims that there are no collective employers in Poland. In his opinion, the council's regulation is breaking the Radio and Television Act and deprives the chairman of his rights provided for in the act, leaving him only representative functions.

Kwiatkowski also said that the council's regulation to carry out franchising procedures was also a breach of the law. All of these, in his opinion, were to leave the real power in Marek Markiewicz's hands.

Zaorski also blamed the council for its bad relations with ministries with which it had to cooperate.

Official Interviewed on New Arms Trade Bill

WS0310100094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (Strona Rzadowa supplement) in Polish 30 Sep 94 p 4

[Interview with Jan Straus, M.Sc., director of the Central Engineering Board, by Ryszard Poradowski; place and date not given: "Safe Arms Trade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Poradowski] Director, as recently as a few years ago, issues related to the trade in arms and ammunition were a taboo topic in Poland; they were not discussed in public. Right now a draft law on the principles of arms and ammunition trade abroad is being prepared. Does this mean that we are entering a period of normalcy in this area?

[Straus] In recent years, Poland has joined the family of democratic states that enjoy a certain status on the international arena. One of the conditions for obtaining "full citizenship" in this family was the ordering of the entire system of arms trade.

[Poradowski] However, some system existed before that because the arms trade is not a recent development...

[Straus] That is true. Over many years, a system of regulations was worked out. However, today these regulations do not meet all expectations. They are not clear enough.

[Poradowski] What is this new system supposed to be like?

[Straus] It must fulfill three functions: ensure political security to Poland, ensure security to people who deal with the arms trade, and guarantee the economic interests of our country. The old system was a collection of various legal acts, from the Sejm's law on business activity to the law on tariffs. The old regulations differ in importance; some of them are more important than others; it is difficult to execute them; and they fail to regulate many issues, such as those concerning the transit of weapons, as well as reexports of weapons manufactured abroad—not via Poland. The transit of Czech- or Hungarian-made arms through our country is not subject to political control by the Polish Government.

[Poradowski] What is the new law all about, then? What changes will it make?

[Straus] The law envisions fundamental stages of the control system, three important points that I will attempt to explain to the readers. The first one concerns the procedures of giving a company the right to trade in special equipment—that is, to trade in all things that are delivered to the Army and the police, such as equipment, services, technologies, and so forth. In place of the system of licenses, which we have had so far, it is envisioned that a central register of companies entitled

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to trade in arms will be set up in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation. The second stage of control concerns promotion. Today there are no legal sanctions because various companies wage their own uncoordinated promotion campaigns in the area of selling special equipment. As a consequence, their activities are detrimental to Poland's political interests in the international arena. The law on business activity envisions punishment in cases of illegal exports. It does not say anything about the activities that precede this trade. Although it may seem otherwise, this is a very important problem because, in many cases, Poland's interests are harmed and our image abroad is tarnished. The purpose of controlling promotion is also to eliminate Polish-Polish competition on the world's arms market, which is detrimental to us. The last stage is the granting of licenses for import, export, and equipment transit through Poland. This license granting, just as has been the case so far, will be made on the basis of documents checked through diplomatic channels and presented by the buyer—such documents as, for example, an end-user certificate [preceding three words in English]. A novelty will be the selection of custom clearance sites and demanding return information [informacja zwrotna] about the annulment of the equipment's passing the state's border [umorzenie przekroczenia przez sprzet granicy panstwa].

[Poradowski] It looks as if the ministry wants to put the arms trade in order. Does this mean that repressive measures resulting from the new regulations are also envisioned?

[Straus] In comparison to the present state, there will be more such measures. I want to stress, however, that the primary purpose of the law is to set in order the trade in arms and ammunition, in explosives, as well as in products, technologies, and services. They are of special importance for the defense and security of our state.

[Poradowski] Does the West have similar regulations?

[Straus] Of course it does, and we are following a similar path. Nothing is happening there that is not controlled. The world is making various attempts to set the arms trade in order. Lists of countries that are under embargo are drawn up, with the participation of the United Nations and a group of highly industrialized countries.

[Poradowski] This control is of a political nature, I suppose. In the case of the United Nations, it is exercised by the five permanent members of the Security Council...

[Straus] ...that is a group of the largest arms manufacturers.

[Poradowski] Highly industrialized countries set up the system of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, and thus many years ago they already controlled the flow of arms and modern technologies to the East, primarily to the socialist bloc. How has the new political reality in the world changed the approach of these countries toward the problem of the arms and technology trade?

[Straus] These countries are taking into account the changes that have taken place, and this is why they are setting up the "New Reform," a system adjusted to the new situation on the political map of the world. Our new system should therefore be close to it and uniform, but it should also ensure the political autonomy of Poland.

[Poradowski] Is it, therefore, in our interest to adjust to the world system, which forces us to impose limitations on trade, just as industrial moguls would often like us to do?

[Straus] This is necessary because of both the security of our citizens who work in enterprises dealing with arms trade and the observation of international commitments. Is the new law going to curb the arms trade? On the contrary.

[Poradowski] Will this ordering operation help our country, which has found itself in a bad situation?

[Straus] I am convinced that it will. The new law will put the market in order, create conditions for the government to promote special equipment, and make it possible to take rational steps in this difficult market. To make it clearer, let me give you an example. Two countries that are in conflict with each other want to buy our equipment. Logic tells us not to send only one company to the negotiations because, in practice, this represents a defeat. Thus, in such a case, one must act more reasonably and divide the market.

[Poradowski] Poland has built quite a good arms industry over the past few decades. As a result of various developments, frequently because of thoughtlessness or plain stupidity, we have lost markets for our products. We were greatly helped by the competition, which was proved by numerous examples of arrests of Poles who traded in arms. A lot of recent developments, however, have indicated that we are returning to good traditions.

[Straus] As a result of contacts with the world, as well as our own experiences, many provisions of the future law are already functioning. Why? Because what we are doing now is the result of many years of experience.

[Poradowski] The Zacharski case reminded us of the sphere linked to arms, the fight among intelligence services for access to new technologies.

[Straus] Our industry has quite a lot of valuable technologies and, as a consequence, many of our products are enjoying recognition on world markets.

[Poradowski] Who can trade in arms today?

[Straus] People who have a relevant license from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation. We grant the license, but we also demand a license from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as a great deal of

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additional information that would convince us about the credibility of the applying enterprise, including information on potential customers. This is important to our interests and national security.

[Poradowski] At what stage is the law in question, as far as its preparation and implementation are concerned?

[Straus] It is too early to speak about its implementation. In a few days' time, consultations about the executive acts concerning this law will be completed. It will most probably be forwarded to the Council of Ministers at the end of September. The usual procedure will then follow, related to the adoption of the law by the parliament.

[Poradowski] Thank you for the interview. The fact that we are talking about these problems without any inhibitions and censorship-related limitations also proves the normal approach to the arms trade. It is not parsley trade [handel pietruszka], but there is also no reason to create yet another taboo.

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Editorial Views Iliescu-Clinton Meeting

AU0310143194 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 30 Sep 94 p 1

[Editorial by Ion Cristoiu: "A Natural Iliescu-Clinton Meeting"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "When Iliescu appears, the sun comes out!" This legendary slogan of the National Salvation Front [FSN], mainly uttered by the delicate mouths of the no-less delicate female admirers of the president, seems to have been confirmed by the journalists accompanying Ion Iliescu on his U.S. tour. The intense presidential presence close by must have warmed the usually frozen looks of these journalists. As a nostril tickled by a ray of sunshine, their written outpourings sneezed merrily, the consequence of it all being that their dispatches were permeated with a jubilation bordering on apoplexy. Therefore, having the advantage of not being in close proximity to the president when writing this article—actually I was several thousand km away from Mr. Ion Iliescu at the time—I can afford to assess his already famous meeting with Bill Clinton calmly.

How should this moment be seen? With a wet, admiring look, like the journalists accompanying Ion Iliescu or the pro-governmental and pro-presidential scribblers at home? Or with an awry look, like the president's press and political adversaries do? In my opinion, both attitudes are exaggerated. The Iliescu-Clinton meeting should be neither overestimated or underestimated. It was a natural meeting. It was only natural that Ion Iliescu should finally meet with the U.S. President. A simple analysis of the presidential moves of the past five years reveals the existence of a goal followed with dramatic intensity by the Romanian president, namely recognition by the United States. In view of such insistent endeavors, it seems to me only natural that President Bill Clinton deigned it fit to allow Ion Iliescu to meet him. I would have seemed to me quite unnatural had he again been fastidious about such a meeting.

Maybe Bill Clinton has a poor opinion of Ion Iliescu's engagement under the sign of democracy and the market economy. Maybe he would have preferred to be photographed shaking someone else's hand in this respect, instead of Ion Iliescu's. However, had he given in to such subjective preferences, he would have given proof of political imbecility. The gestures and statements of a leader like Bill Clinton are not ruled by feelings, but by state reasons. The latter must have whispered to him that it would be a great mistake to keep rejecting a leader who has been making smiling advances to the United States for the past five years, particularly when this leader has several assets that cannot be ignored. He won two elections that the Americans considered free and correct. He is the leader of a country that, through its position and size, has a particular importance in the Balkan, and even European, context. He is a politician whose ability in foreign affairs has put him in a position (much coveted by many other European heads of state) of having good relations with all sides involved in the conflict in Yugoslavia. He is at the head of a country that has rallied to presidential calls promptly, whenever the United States blew the trumpet, even through such good behavior by this amenable and subservient country has cost it quite a lot economically—just look at the Gulf war and the Bosnian war.

It was also natural that the Iliescu-Clinton meeting should take place at a hotel in New York and not at the White House. Avoiding inviting him on a state visit, Bill Clinton wanted to emphasize the distance that still separates Ion Iliescu, in the eyes of the Americans, from the other leaders from the east, who benefited from a much sought-after reception on the front lawn of the White House. It is obvious that the U.S. President's information about the domestic situation in Romania carries quite a lot weight in this ostentatiously reserved attitude. Between receiving Ion Iliescu at the White House and refusing to talk to him, Bill Clinton has chosen an intermediate solution, namely the meeting in a hotel in New York. From this point on, Ion Iliescu can go either forward or backward. Forward, toward an official visit to the United States or backward, toward the previous isolation. Everything depends on the Romanian president, particularly on his ability to convince the Americans that his statements in favor of democracy and the market economy are the expression of personal convictions and not the result of a Ceausescu-like shrewd calculation aimed at fooling the West.

MiG-21 Crashes During Military Exercise

AU0310193994 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 30 Sep 94 p 1

[Report by Oana Maiuga: "It Is No Longer a Joke: Another MiG-21 Has Crashed!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Major Marin Manta was the pilot of a MiG-21 fighter that crashed yesterday, 29 September, at 1207 local time [1007 GMT] at the Bogata military firing range, near Turda.

The aircraft was scheduled to participate in a tactical exercise that included live-fire drills on 1 October 1994 in the Apuseni mountains. So it was to have been involved in an exercise in which the pilot used live ammunition.

After crashing, the aircraft caught fire. The pilot, who had 15 years' experience, ejected safely and is now in the Cluj Surgery Clinic.

Major General Constantin Harpaila, the commander of the Aviation Division, visited the scene of the accident immediately after it occurred.

New Cholera Cases Indicate Disease Spreading

AU0310213394 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 29 Sep 94 p 3

[Report by Cora Munteanu and Eugenia Mircescu: "Cholera Is Spreading"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] After the cholera cases discovered in Constanta and Targu Mures, yesterday, 28 September, there were new cases appearing in other Romanian counties. The most tragic situation is at the Neuro-Psychiatric Children's Home in Galati. Out of 19 children who have already been affected by diarrhea, 12 have been hospitalized and one has died. Although it has not yet been confirmed, experts suspect that these are cholera cases. In the same children's home, another 45 children, who had contact with the sick ones, have been undergoing various tests.

Yesterday, a case of cholera was confirmed in Tirgoviste. In Sibiu, of 30 persons who were recently abroad, one is hospitalized because he is suffering from diarrhea. Another suspected cholera case has been registered in Braila.

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Serbs, UN Agree on 'Normalization' of Ties

LD0310191794 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Following talks in Pale between the leadership of the Srpska republic and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] representatives, Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Srpska republic people's assembly, said that an agreement had been reached on the normalization of relations between the two sides and the resumption of free movement for the UN peacekeepers and members of international humanitarian organizations on the territory of the Srpska republic.

Sergio de Mello, head of UNPROFOR's civilian department for former Yugoslavia, expressed his satisfaction at the agreement that, he said, helped overcome the problems that had arisen after NATO's air strikes against Serb positions in Sarajevo on 22 September.

Recalling that the Serbs had honored their part of the agreement by securing water, electricity, and gas supplies to the Muslim part of Sarajevo, de Mello said that, following arduous talks, the Serb and Muslim sides reached an important agreement on the exchange of prisoners through the mediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

He pointed out that there had been word at the meeting about the urgent reopening of Sarajevo airport and the blue paths passing through it. The need was also voiced for the resumption of links between the Serb and Muslim military commands in order to avoid the outbreak of frequent incidents in the Sarajevo area.

General Michael Rose, UNPROFOR's commander for former Bosnia-Herzegovina, was told about the gross negligence in the use of the airport, Krajisnik stressed, specifying that the Muslim side had taken advantage of and abused Sarajevo airport in its struggle against the Serb people.

Izetbegovic Views New Relations With Croats

AU0210211294 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 23 Sep 94 pp 5-6

[Interview with Alija Izetbegovic, president of Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "I Admit, Croats Are Not Equally Treated in All Parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina Under the Control of the B-H Army!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *After the Croatian-Muslim agreement reached in Zagreb on 13 September this year, it seems that the danger of possible revival of clashes between the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H] has been avoided, and that both sides, more or less under pressure from abroad, have agreed to implement the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.*

Several days after the Zagreb agreement, the units of the 5th Corps of the B-H Army entered the occupied region of Croatia, cut the road between Glina and Dvor, and liberated a smaller part of the northern sector of the UN Protected Area.

We discussed with President of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbetgovic the new Croatian-Muslim alliance and a whole string of concrete problems in the mutual relations, the most critical of which is the resistance to the return of the Croatian refugees in the regions under the control of the B-H Army, as well as to the return of the Bosniak refugees in the regions under the control of the HVO, and also the unequal participation of Croats in the Bosnian administration.

[GLOBUS] What are the things that make the agreement signed in Zagreb on 13 September different from previous Croatian-Muslim agreements, which were regularly ignored? Is this really an agreement of crucial historic importance?

[Izetbegovic] This time the decisions are more concrete, while the implementation of some of them can be easily verified, for instance, the decision on placing the road M-17 (from Metkovic via Mostar to Zenica) under the control of mixed police. Very soon we and our public will know whether the other side wants to or whether it is able to implement this decision.

It is not good to declare each event as historic, but the latest meeting in Zagreb is certainly very significant.

[GLOBUS] Is the Zagreb agreement also a basis for the formal military alliance of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina that has been considered ever since the summer of 1992?

[Izetbegovic] I do not think so. I hold that Croatia is not interested in it at the moment. The question is closely connected with the fate of the occupied regions in Croatia, while it seems that for the time being it is a political option that counts, rather than a military option for the settlement of the issue of UN Protected Areas. I say for the time being. Which means, we shall wait and see.

[GLOBUS] Can the military successes of the B-H Army at Banija, that is, the fact that the Army has liberated a part of the occupied regions of Croatia, be considered as the first act of implementation of the hypothetical, or perhaps future military alliance?

[Izetbegovic] No. The actions taken by the B-H Army that you are referring to rest upon a clause in the agreement on cooperation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992, which speaks about military cooperation in the bordering regions.

[GLOBUS] What should an integral military agreement between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina refer to?

[Izetbegovic] I am not a military expert. One day, if the conclusion of such an agreement happened to be on the

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agenda, we would call military experts to propose a draft. Nevertheless, I think that such an agreement would have to define clearly who is the aggressor, that is, the enemy, what is the strategic goal of the war, what are the direct or strategic military goals, what means both sides should invest in accomplishing those goals, and also to define measures of coordination, most probably the joint staff, and such things.

[GLOBUS] Do you believe that President Tudjman sincerely wants to implement the Washington agreement?

[Izetbegovic] I shall tell you my considerations about that. I believe that the implementation of the Washington agreement is a vital interest of Croatia. I also believe that President Tudjman wishes well for Croatia. From these two premises follows a conclusion that President Tudjman should sincerely support the Washington agreement. As you see, it is a pure logic. Whether we are logical and whether we can always be logical, is a different question.

[GLOBUS] How do you assess in that context the appointment of Dario Kordic as chairman of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Do you think that Gojko Susak is also a supporter of the Washington agreement?

[Izetbegovic] Kordic and Susak are Tudjman's people. I do not know what they think, but I am quite sure that they will do as Tudjman tells them to. And what he will do, or what he could be expected to do, I have already explained to you.

[GLOBUS] Which Croatian politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina do you consider to be supporters of the Washington agreement?

[Izetbegovic] If I answer this question, the next question will be who are opponents of the Washington agreement. Of course, there exist both supporters and opponents, although the situation is not at a standstill, it is changing day after day. For you, journalists, my answering this question would be very productive, while for me, or rather for the goals I stand for, that would be quite counterproductive. Because, you have to admit, our goal is not to entertain the public, but rather to do something concrete.

[GLOBUS] Was the revived coalition of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and HDZ inevitable?

[Izetbegovic] The Federation can be preserved only by these two parties. Even so, there have been many difficulties. Just imagine how the situation would be if we forced some more complicated combinations on the HDZ, which is quite suspicious and sensitive about other parties anyway. After all, it is not a totally pure coalition in terms of parties. In the government there are many nonpartisan representatives of both peoples. Democracy is not a natural state, it is a matter of culture, something that people learn.

[GLOBUS] In which parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina are the relations between the Bosniaks and Croats most tense?

[Izetbegovic] In Mostar and Gornji Vakuf. I would say that the situation is still most difficult in Stolac. All the Bosniaks have been expelled from there. As you see, there are even worse relations than tense relations.

[GLOBUS] How do you assess the situation in Mostar?

[Izetbegovic] I see it as difficult and persistent, but extremely slow moving forward. When we observe the hands of a watch, it seems to us that they are standing still, but the impression is wrong, they are moving. In the past six months a considerable step forward has been made in Mostar, but it took precisely six months.

[GLOBUS] Do you think that the Croats are absolutely equally treated in all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] Formally—yes; in reality—no. I refer to the regions under the control of the B-H Army. The situation differs from place to place. As for the territories under the control of the HVO, Croats are more equal there, as Orwell would put it.

[GLOBUS] Why are the Croats still leaving Zenica? Did you know that since the Washington agreement 5,000 Croats have left Zenica?

[Izetbegovic] Emigration, unfortunately, exists, although the number that you have mentioned is certainly overstated. Why are they leaving? One thing is for sure: nobody is forcing them to leave, or expelling them. Go there and check this out. Still, the people are leaving, and nobody leaves his home without a reason. In Bosnia a tectonic disorder of the first degree has taken place; the earth is quaking, and there will be tremors for a long time. There will be no real security for a long time.

Generally, classes of people with a low standard of living are in pursuit of a higher standard of living, and such migrations are happening all the time. If you can find for your family and yourself a more secure place for living, if you have a university diploma and some money, and lack patriotism and nostalgia in your heart, you will leave. If this can comfort you, I will tell you that many Bosniaks are leaving as well. True, their number is quite smaller, out of understandable reasons.

[GLOBUS] The Zagreb agreement mentions the return of refugees. How is their return to be accomplished? How will it be made possible for Croats to return to Bugojno, or for Bosniaks to return to Stolac?

[Izetbegovic] People say that even a journey to faraway Mecca starts with the first step. First steps will be extremely difficult, but they ought to be made. First 100 families ought to be returned to Vares and Stolac, after which the practice should be continued courageously and persistently. I do not see any other way out. Bosniaks could make that first step. I think they have already made it. I have been informed that some 1,000 Croats

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have returned to Vares. If 1,000 Bosniaks returned to Kiseljak, the process would continue. Now it has completely stopped.

[GLOBUS] Why did the Bosniak side insist so much on reciprocity until the Zagreb agreement, even though it is well known that in the Croatian-Muslim war at least twice as many Croats were expelled as Muslims?

[Izetbegovic] Reciprocity does not mean the same number, it means only mutuality. I do not know the exact numbers, and I am afraid that nobody knows them, but if it is true that the number of Croat refugees is twice as large, let us take it for true, that means that for each 100 Croatian families 50 Bosniak families should return, or something like that. I do not see any other possibility.

[GLOBUS] How do you intend to establish equal national participation of Croats in the police, diplomatic missions, and other state services?

[Izetbegovic] Very simply: the authority of the federal government should be extended to the regions under the HVO control, which is not the case right now. The Federation, with more or less equal participation of Croats, exists only on the territory controlled by the B-H Army. In the territory controlled by the HVO it does not exist at all. Some things are possible, some are not. Possible are joint authorities in the common territory, while joint authorities are not possible in the Bosniak territory. Otherwise, we are coming to what our people described by the saying: what is mine, that is only mine; what is yours, that is both yours and mine.

If you analyze the conclusions made in Zagreb a little better, you will notice that we tried to add some more logic into our relations. One of the conclusions, if you remember, was the establishment of regional administrative bodies on the basis of the 1990 election results. That was one of our demands. The Croatian demand was the participation that you are talking about. If the project with regional authorities fails, I am afraid that we shall come to a general deadlock.

[GLOBUS] What is your relationship with Archbishop Puljic like?

[Izetbegovic] It is correct. I feel deep reverence toward that man.

[GLOBUS] How do you assess the behavior of Bishop Peric and Provincial Pervan?

[Izetbegovic] To tell you the truth, I do not know much about the attitudes and behavior of Peric and Pervan, or to be more precise, I do not know reliably enough, so I shall refrain from any comment.

[GLOBUS] To what extent is the Islamic religious community, headed by Reis-ul-Ulema Mustafa ef. Ceric [as published], an important factor in the political life of Bosnia-Herzegovina? How do you assess possible political implications of the announced Ceric's fetva [as published] of mixed marriages?

[Izetbegovic] The Islamic religious community has an important place in the life of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its political influence is increasing, but indirectly, that is, through believers.

As for the hypothetical fetva of the reis-ul-ulema, I can not say anything about it. I do not know its content. I can only state my personal judgment. The institution of marriage is generally going through a crisis. In some countries 50 percent of marriages end in divorce as early as in the first years. Mixed marriages have an extra burden to deal with.

[GLOBUS] Is it true, as Western intelligence services and diplomats claim, that a serious misunderstanding has come about between you and Haris Silajdzic? If yes, what is the cause of the misunderstanding? If no, how do you view those reports?

[Izetbegovic] That is not true. It is no secret that I am not satisfied with the government's work on the internal plane, but this could not be assessed as a misunderstanding between Silajdzic and me. On the contrary, I think that our political attitudes coincide in some most important issues. Still, we cannot stop such rumors, because you journalists must have more information, while "misunderstandings" of this kind are quite a convenient topic.

[GLOBUS] In your opinion, how will the easing of the sanctions against the FRY influence the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] If the border is really closed, then the easing of the sanctions will not be particularly important. But the issue of borders is uncertain as much as it is important. Indeed, that question is of crucial importance at the moment.

[GLOBUS] Do you expect that this fall the arms embargo might be lifted at last? What would the lifting of the arms embargo mean for the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina right now?

[Izetbegovic] We shall certainly insist on that, but at the moment the probability of its lifting is 50-50.

[GLOBUS] Do you think that the establishment of an integral Bosnia can be achieved through negotiations, or will the Bosniaks and Croats be forced to liberate the occupied territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina militarily?

[Izetbegovic] Unfortunately, the latter is more probable.

[GLOBUS] In the recent military successes around Konjic, the HVO relinquished the territory it controlled to the B-H Army, but it did not actively take part in clashes. Would you make a comment on the conduct of the HVO?

[Izetbegovic] General Drekovic, who is in charge of the operations in that region, has praised the HVO for its correct behavior on that occasion. But correctness is not

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the same as alliance, and we need alliance. Perhaps we shall get it some other time.

[GLOBUS] How near to realization is the idea of confederation between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina? What are the obstacles to the confederation?

[Izetbegovic] I do not expect it in the near future. It certainly depends on the rhythm of implementing the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The obstacles are of the same kind as well.

Croats Unhappy With Izetbegovic's UN Speech

LD0110160594 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 1 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Dario Kordic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], described as indicative the speech by Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic before the UN General Assembly, in which Izetbegovic completely failed to mention either the Bosnia- Herzegovina Federation or the confederation with Croatia.

Kordic said that between 23,000 and 25,000 Croats had left their homes and moved out of the areas under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army since the signing of the Washington agreement, while at the same time 5,000 Muslims had already returned to the areas under HVO [Croatian Defense Council] control.

Croats Question Muslim Sincerity on Federation

LD0110195794 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 1 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Electoral Assembly of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] for Mostar is being attended by high-ranking officials of the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna. The assembly is electing by secret ballot 17 members of the municipal council and five members of the supervisory committee. Ivica Tomic has the report.

[Tomic] Greeting the participants in the assembly, especially the representatives of Volunteers' and Veterans' Associations and the families and widows of fallen defenders, Party Chairman Dario Kordic said that the Croat people no longer wanted brotherhood and unity but wished to know what was theirs, as well as that they wanted their Croat municipalities—the condition for the return of expelled Croats to their homes.

Unfortunately, since the signing of the Washington Agreement some 23,000 Croats from Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla, Bugojno, and other towns under Muslim control had moved out; in the meantime, 5,000 Muslims had returned to Livno, Tomislavgrad, Mostar, and other towns controlled by the Croat side, Kordic said, pointing out that the Croats were sincerely in favor of the creation of the federation, but also that the other side did not always behave in kind. This he illustrated by emphasizing that in his address to the UN General Assembly, Alija Izetbegovic did not once mention the federation, much less the confederation with Croatia.

Mostar Mayor Mijo Brajkovic spoke about the 6,000 employed in Mostar and the resumption of the work of schools and university. He especially underlined that Mostar should be administratively divided into several municipalities; if not, he would resign.

Those who believe that the war is over should not delude themselves, Brajkovic said and called for better cooperation between the leadership and bodies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and municipal authorities. [passage omitted]

Pero Markovic described the attack on the headquarters of the European Union's administrator in the Ero hotel as an act committed by Muslim or Serb intelligence agencies, adding that the investigation will confirm and corroborate this. [passage omitted]

Muslim-Croat Federation Seen 'Doomed to Failure'

LD0310160194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1425 GMT 3 Oct 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Oct. 3 (TANJUG)—Western sponsors tried to revive the Washington accord on Muslim-Croat federation by having Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic meet in New York, but Muslim and Croat mutual suspicions continued.

Continued clashes and media recriminations for endangering the federation undoubtedly indicated that this "marriage of convenience" was doomed to failure.

The Muslim-controlled Sarajevo radio cannot possibly forget that Tudjman said at a session of the United Nations General Assembly last week that "Croatia supported the 'Contact Group' plan on a political solution for dividing Bosnia."

The radio said Tudjman "persists on an integral and sovereign Croatia, whereas on the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether by pure coincidence, agrees to a division of Bosnia."

Izetbegovic reproached Tudjman for omitting to make a single reference to Muslim-Croat federation, created in March this year after a year of fierce Muslim-Croat fighting.

A threat by Muslim 7th Corps Commander Mehmed Alagic that, unless Bosnian Croats unblocked Vitez, he would raze to the ground this Croat-controlled town in central Bosnia spoke most clearly about the non-functioning of Muslim-Croat federation.

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Vitez is a crossroads for Muslim convoys for central Bosnia, without which it has no chance of surviving.

It is highly unlikely that Muslims and Croats would even in the distant future forget scores of thousands of killed in mutual fighting, innumerable plundered villages, demolished catholic churches and mosques.

Muslims ethnically "cleansed" about 150,000 Croats in the most brutal way, and the Croats "repaid" them but only with one-third of this figure.

One of the problems burdening the Muslim-Croat "marriage" was Mostar, a divided city in southern Bosnia, which each side claimed. They fully agree only on one point: never to mention some 30,000 Serbs who lived in that city before the war.

Croats obviously count on central Bosnia with mighty military and other industries of the former Yugoslavia which remain there.

Croats also know well that according to the holy book of Koran members of all religions, except Islam are infidels, against whom a "holy war"(jihad) to extermination must be waged.

The started war with the "infidels"—as thought also by Izetbegovic in his programmatic book "Islamic Declaration" could stop temporarily until new forces and munitions were collected, but in no way permanently.

'Dark' Side of Humanitarian Organizations

94BA0420A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 5 Sep 94 p 19

[Article by Mirsada Bosnic: "Sarajevo 'Humanitarians': Profiteers Without Borders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *There are as many as 130 "humanitarian" organizations in Sarajevo; citizens have never even heard of the majority of them, much less received aid from them.*

It appears that the Sarajevo street scene indeed continues to supply its sly humor. The joke from the distant days of the 1984 Olympics is making the rounds again: "Only those who work for foreigners live exceptionally well; the more sensible people learn languages, while the rabble waits for news from the surrounding hills." And that is just the way it is: In terms of status and money, Sarajevans can be divided into those who have gotten their hands on some position abroad, or perhaps in a local humanitarian organization, and those who wait for aid from them. So does it then come as any surprise that there exist around 130 humanitarian organizations in the besieged city!?

Both Sides

Obviously, there is dark flip side to such a large number of humanitarian associations, of which the number that actually assist Sarajevans can be counted on the fingers of one hand. If that were not the case, would so many applications for registration of a humanitarian organization have been submitted to the Sarajevo Higher Court, for which, in turn, 30 signatures of adult citizens are needed? And that settles the matter: The status of legal subject is granted, together with a seal, a letterhead, and a logo, and both sides of the humanitarian can get to work. One side should be that which the name itself (human) indicates: thus, work aimed exclusively at helping people, especially those under the greatest threat—children, the elderly, and the enervated victims of the war. But the other side is everything that is decidedly opposed to the proclaimed kind and elevated goals. In Sarajevo that means the following, in short:

1. The procurement of passports! Specifically, in this city that document is a genuine rarity, and in order to get one it is necessary to gather so many papers, documents, and certificates that the first one always expires while the last one is being issued, and then the whole cycle is repeated. Those who manage to get one through their good connections usually do not have the opportunity to use it. The majority of those who do not have a passport think up ideal plans for what all they could attain with it. However, those who have both a passport and the opportunity to show it at places provided for that around the world generally do not need humanitarian organizations in their lives.

2. Unimpeded entry to and exit from the city! Even when lucky people get a passport, that still does not mean that they can travel to civilization. Specifically, in order to leave the city, but also to return to it, they need special papers issued by the local authorities, without which traveling is out of the question. Without "your own man" in a position of power, it turns out that these permits are a greater obstacle to travel than is getting a passport itself. But humanitarians are exempt from that process. And if a UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] blue card, with which one flies elegantly by plane on the Sarajevo-civilization route and back again, is "seized" on the basis of one's status as a local humanitarian, the whole situation begins to assume a fairy tale-like quality.

3. Importing humanitarian and commercial goods to the besieged city! For example, one average bag can hold 20 kg of instant coffee. During the worst of times, the price of such coffee rose to as much as 450 German marks [DM] per kilogram! Thus, free flights on UNHCR planes, where according to humanitarians no rigorous measures are taken to weigh and check personal baggage, yield a handsome profit. But the "blue roads" are opening up too. Goods are procured most frequently in the Republic of Croatia and transported to the Sarajevo suburb Hrasnica, which is on the far side of the airport runway, and thus open to the world. There, commercial goods are taken over from private firms by humanitarian organizations and moved to Dobrinja, on this side of the runway. Of course, according to the agreement only humanitarians have the right to pass along that route.

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Anyone who has not followed the procedure and collected the signatures of 30 hungry Sarajevans, to whom he will later sell the same goods at a high price, must pay a service fee to local "humanitarians" for the goods transported into the city. But if the situation is set up in such a way that the same group of people "control" both a humanitarian organization and a private enterprise, success is guaranteed. Some of the arrived goods are distributed to citizens, while the rest are sold at Sarajevo markets.

For a Crumb of Food

Today, when the "blue roads" are closed, 20 percent of the goods are sold to uniformed people in front of the tunnel that leads under the Sarajevo airport runway. But the latest Sarajevo gossip indicates that such a transaction is far more disadvantageous than "humanitarian" operations. Supposedly, one of the city's better-known supermarket owners, a certain Alemko, got a good thrashing when he moved goods through the tunnel while wounded people were waiting for him to be allowed through. Someone had no understanding of commerce!

Nevertheless, Sarajevans remember much harder days, when food in the city was worth its weight in gold. Then, the five strongest and most wide-ranging humanitarian organizations had the opportunity to bring in goods: the Muslim charitable society "Merhamet," the humanitarian organization of the Bosnian Archdiocese "Caritas," the humanitarian charitable society "Dobrotvor" (the head of it recently left for food and stayed in Pale), the First Children's Embassy "Medjasi" (charges were recently dropped against the controversial Dusko Tomic for lack of evidence that food from Macedonia had intentionally ended up with Karadzic's Serbs), and ADRA, for whose services, such as the transport of packages with wardrobe out of Sarajevo, a fee of DM5 each was charged, while packages entering the city were generally opened and their contents selectively reduced. But anything was tolerated just for a crumb of food.

Then the "neohumanists" began to emerge. Some of them hung out in front of Sarajevo mosques during the month of Ramadan and gave a loaf of wheat bread only to believers following evening prayers; others hoarded bags and bags of potatoes, waiting for better days (read: prices), so that completely rotten potatoes ended up in Sarajevo garbage dumps; others yet organized aid only for those who believe in the Koran.... But all of them have found their "golden goose" in the founding of humanitarian organizations.

Serbs Demand Role in Running Sarajevo Airport

AU0310150494 Paris AFP in English 1431 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 3 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs are demanding a voice in running Sarajevo airport as the price for allowing the UN-run airstrip to resume flights, a source said here, as talks on reopening the airport were in progress Monday.

The Serbs, who handed the airport over to the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in June 1992, shut the airport down nine days ago by warning they could no longer guarantee the safety of aircraft using it.

The threat was issued to punish the UN force for ordering the September 22 destruction by NATO aircraft of a Serb tank, an airstrike ordered after Serb forces attacked a French light tank, seriously wounding the driver.

"They are demanding a much bigger say in the running of the airport," said the source, who asked not to be named.

"They have accused UNPROFOR of being the transportation company for the Moslems," the source said, adding that the demand was also a demonstration that the Serbs could close down airport operations at will.

Viktor Andreyev, UN civil affairs coordinator for Bosnia, was holding negotiations with the Bosnian Serb authorities at the airport Monday, said UN Protection Force spokeswoman Claire Grimes.

She refused to elaborate while the talks were on going, and declined to comment on suggestions that the Serbs wanted to negotiate a greater role in running the airport.

On Saturday another source told AFP that Bosnian Serb commander General Ratko Mladic had informed UNPROFOR he would shut down the airport for two weeks to punish the airstrike.

The Serbs already have a liaison officer at the airport who checks shipments to ensure weapons are not being delivered to the Moslem-dominated Bosnian Army.

Offer To 'Rent' Airport to UN

AU0410095494 Paris AFP in English 0923 GMT 4 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 4 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs are demanding the United Nations concede Serb ownership of Sarajevo airport as the price for resumed flights, and are offering to lease the airstrip back to the UN operation here, sources said here Tuesday [4 October].

"The Serbs want to renegotiate the entire airport agreement, and even want to rent the airport to the UN, even for a nominal amount, to emphasize that it's theirs," a source who asked not to be identified told AFP.

UN Civil Affairs Coordinator Viktor Andreyev held talks Monday with the Serb leadership in their Pale headquarters but failed to reach agreement on reopening the airport, closed now for 11 days.

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All relief aid flights were cancelled September 23 after two planes were hit by small arms fire on take-off. A Serb threat to aircraft using the airport two days later effectively shut the airport.

The threat was issued to punish the UN force for ordering the destruction by NATO aircraft of a Serb tank, an airstrike ordered after Serb forces attacked a French light tank, seriously wounding the driver.

The Serbs also want a greater voice in the running of the airport—which they handed over to the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in June 1992—and have accused the UN force of acting like a "transportation company for the Moslems," the source said.

The Serbs already have a liaison officer at the airport who checks shipments to ensure weapons are not being delivered to the Moslem-dominated Bosnian Army.

On Saturday another source told AFP that Bosnian Serb commander General Ratko Mladic had informed UNPROFOR he would shut down the airport for two weeks to punish the airstrike.

UN officials have refused to comment on the airport issue while negotiations are on-going, but have made optimistic noises concerning the airport's reopening, talking in terms of days rather than weeks.

However, observers here said the secrecy surrounding the talks appeared to signal the two sides were far apart.

Serbs Block UN Aid Convoys Bound for Gorazde

AU0310180394 Paris AFP in English 1745 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 3 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb troops blocked a UNHCR convoy carrying urgently needed food to the besieged Moslem enclave of Gorazde on Monday [3 October], despite a pledge from Serb leaders to allow aid trucks free passage, a UN aid official said.

Two convoys, carrying some 180 tonnes of food from Belgrade, were held up at Dobrun, some 40 kilometres (25 miles) northeast of Gorazde, said UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski.

"They were told by the Bosnian Serbs that there was no clearance for them to go to Gorazde," said Janowski. "We are a bit concerned about these two convoys being stopped in Dobrun," he added.

"It looks like the old game. We get permission from Pale but when you get to the checkpoint you are told by the local commander there is no clearance," he said. "We have seen it a million times."

Bosnian Serb leaders agreed Saturday to lift a ban on UN convoys transiting Serb-controlled areas but failed to honour the pledge Sunday when Serb soldiers stopped four convoys which had been granted clearance, forcing the cancellation of three others.

The development marred an otherwise successful day for land convoys through Bosnian Serb-held territory.

Six scheduled UN Protection Force supply convoys left as planned while a seventh was held up by technical problems in Kiseljak, 35 kilometres (20 miles) west of the Bosnian capital Sarajevo.

Iranian Ambassador Offers Troops for UN Mandate

AU0310170894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Member of our Presidency Stjepan Kljuic received Ibrahim [word indistinct], ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Bosnia-Herzegovina, today.

They discussed the role of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the implementation of the federation on the ground, and the creation of conditions for the return of refugees and displaced people. In his talks with the Iranian ambassador, Kljuic stressed that some forces within UNPROFOR were not enforcing UN interests, but rather those of their governments. This, he said, is particularly evident with the British and the French, who [words indistinct] the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina. We believe that the participation of Islamic and Latin American countries' forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia would contribute to a more just and comprehensive implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions, Stjepan Kljuic said. Stressing that the federation was the only right way for the Bosniaks and the Croats, and that its [words indistinct].

Reiterating Iran's readiness to help, [word indistinct] repeated his country's offer to send [word indistinct] troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of UNPROFOR, despite the possibility of British and French soldiers withdrawing. He promised that he would discuss housing construction for returning refugees with the relevant Iranian Government authorities, and stressed that Iran had already secured buses and financial funding for the return of the refugees.

NATO Planes Step Up Flights Over Herzegovina

LD0310150394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1436 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Doboj, Bileca, 3 Oct (TANJUG)—Muslim units resumed attacks along all sections of the Doboj and Herzegovina fronts, TANJUG correspondents reported citing Srpska republic army sources. [passage omitted]

The command of the Srpska Herzegovina Corps said Muslim attacks launched yesterday on Serb positions in the Konjic area were resumed today.

Several hundred destructive shells hit the defense line held by the Corps' troops but the frontline remains unchanged despite fierce Muslim infantry charges.

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NATO planes are constantly flying over Serb positions and villages on the Herzegovina front. They are frequently flying in larger groups at the prohibited altitude of below 3,000 meters.

Serb Army Commander Ready for 'Definitive' Truce

LD0310193694 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview with the GAMMA news agency, Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic, the commander of the main headquarters of the Srpska republic army, has expressed his readiness to conclude an agreement with the Muslim and Croat military leaderships on a complete and definitive cessation of hostilities.

Mladic proposed the holding of a meeting of all the warring sides' military commanders. The meeting should be attended by commanders from Croatia—whose Armed Forces are deployed in former Bosnia-Herzegovina and are aiding Croats in central Bosnia—representatives of the Croat Defense Council, the Muslim forces, and the Srpska army.

Army 3d Corps Takes Territory on Teslic Front

AU0310202794

[FBIS Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1800 GMT on 3 October carries in its regular 40-minute newscast several reports on the continuing fighting in the country.

Describing the situation in Bihac, Mirza Sadikovic reports that "the offensive by the united aggressor [Bosnian and Croatian Serbs] on the Bihac region, code-named Breza '94, is still under way. The intensive shelling that started yesterday has continued throughout today. Karadzic's chetniks have been shelling the areas of Buzim, Bosanska Krupa, Bihac, and Cazin. Hundreds of howitzer, tank, and mortar shells have landed on these towns, on vital facilities in Bihac, the industrial zone, and the defensive positions along the entire front line in the 5th Corps' theater of operations. Several civilians have been killed, but information is still incomplete. Entire villages are being razed to the ground so it is senseless to speak of material damage. On top of all this, there have been chetnik infantry attacks on the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau and Grabez all day long, while this afternoon attacks were intensified on the Otoka and Buzim parts of the front. All these attacks have been repulsed and the defense lines are stable."

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 3rd Corps reports that "another victory can be listed in the war diary of the 3rd Corps. Early this morning, following detailed preparations, units of the 3rd Corps carried out a coordinated and strong counterattack on the Tesanj- Teslic front. Within just an hour of fighting, over 20 square kilometers had been liberated southeast of Teslic. A number of dominant heights have been liberated, such as Kikic Brdo, (Cvit), and Stolacka Kosa, and the villages of Stolac, Panici, Djukici, Mujici, and Jezera. In the general panic that ensued following the attacks by our forces from several directions, the chetniks fled toward Blatnica and Teslic, leaving behind their dead and wounded. The fighting is still under way but at a somewhat abated intensity. The bodies of 28 chetniks have been brought over to our side, while the units that participated in this operation had just a few wounded soldiers. The chetniks, during their retreat, forced the population of these newly liberated villages to flee with them, frightening them with stories of reprisals by the 3rd Corps. The entire successful operation was followed closely by 3rd Corps Commander Brigadier Sakib Mahmuljin. He has publicly praised the fighters and officers of the 7th Glorious Muslim Brigade, the 319th Hill Brigade, the 330th Infantry Brigade, the El Mudzahid unit, the Independent Sabotage Battalion, and the Independent Engineering Battalion. As I say, the population of the liberated villages has fled en masse, but Brigadier Mahmuljin has called on these people to return to their homes, as the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is guaranteeing them full security."

In his report from Konjic, Omer Karic says that "today the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor from his strongholds in (Plocno), (Borim), Dobri Dubalj, and Sipovac has been firing with tanks, 155- mm howitzers, and mortars of all calibers at the Bijelo Polje area in the Mostar Commune. Chetnik tanks and howitzers have also been targeting the M-17 highway in Salakovac and (Zeljusa). The shelling is still under way, but there have been no casualties today, unlike last night when two people were killed in the chetnik shelling of Bijelo Polje. As for the Konjic front, the aggressor has been firing antiaircraft machine guns, and lobbing 82-mm and 120-mm mortars at the defense lines and the villages of (Gasici) and [name indistinct]. The chetniks launched an infantry attack in the region of (Kister), but the 4th Corps repelled it."

Reporting from the 7th Corps' theater of operations, Sead Suskic says that "the aggressor has been firing at the defense lines with antiaircraft guns and machine guns, and mortars. The residential districts of Travnik and Turbe were shelled this morning, but fortunately there were no casualties. As for the Bugojno-Kupres part of the front, the aggressor has been firing with sniper rifles and small arms. The positions of the 7th Corps fighters have not been spared the aggressor's attacks, either. Several times the chetniks attempted infantry breakthroughs, but our fighters pushed them back to their original positions, inflicting serious losses on them."

The studio announcer cites the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps that "this is the 50th day that the chetniks have been furiously attacking the free Ilijas territory and Mt. Cemer. The aggressor from Jasen, (Koca), Srednje, [word indistinct], and Vrhovo fired

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dozens of destructive shells at the positions of our fighters in Mosevicko Brdo, Polom, Zavrsje, and Vijenac." On the Visoko front, "the enemy fired mortars and antiaircraft weapons, while snipers in (Kut) and Cekrcici have been intensely targeting Gradina and Kopaci. The aggressor's guns fired at Prijeko and Visocica, while a 82-mm mortar fired at the town center, wounding two people. In response to the enemy fire, our gunners used a recoilless gun to destroy a chetnik gun in (Grmak). As for the Sarajevo front, the aggressor in Sljivik, near the Jewish Cemetery, fired several rifle grenades, while one of their snipers was firing at Obala."

Enes Musovic reports from Gorazde that "today the chetniks have been firing at (?Vranovice) with howitzers, thus displaying to the entire democratic world that they are not only continuing their aggression against Gorazde but also that all the UN Security Council resolutions are just a dead letter."

The studio announcer says that "over a 100 large-caliber missiles have landed today on Bivalici and Stari Teocak. According to incomplete information, two people suffered serious injuries."

An unidentified correspondent reports from Olovo that "[words indistinct] firing 120-mm mortars at the defense lines in the area of (Prvosevo), and firing a Zis 57-mm antitank gun at the Grabovica area and [word indistinct]. The aggressor's forces and equipment have been spotted regrouping on the Nisici heights. Olovo is being shelled as I file this report at 1700."

Muslim Attacks Continue Despite UN Warnings

LD0310215594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2103 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 3 Oct—Muslim forces today continued attacking Serb positions on Mt. Bjelasnica, Mt. Igman, and Mt. Treskavica, within the Sarajevo "exclusion zone"—SRNA announced this evening, quoting a communique from the information service of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the army of the Srpska republic.

The Corps communique says that the Muslim forces "are suffering huge losses," but "they have continued bringing in fresh forces" despite warnings from UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces].

Muslims Attack Sarajevo Suburb; Civilians Killed

LD0410013794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2258 GMT 3 Oct 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct. 3 (TANJUG)—2 civilians were killed and 5 wounded Monday in a strong Muslim artillery attack on Sarajevo's Serb suburb of Ilijas, the Bosnian Serb SRNA news agency said.

Quoting Bosnian Serb military sources, SRNA said one of the killed civilians was a 14-year-old boy and two of the wounded were children.

SRNA said Muslim forces continued to attack Serb positions on Mounts Bjelasnica, Igman and Treskavica, which are inside Sarajevo's exclusion zone.

The military statement said Muslim formations "suffered great losses" but were "continuing to bring in reinforcements" despite warnings to cease fire from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia.

The statement, as carried by SRNA, said the Serb districts of Krupac and Vojkovici on the slopes of Mt. Igman were exposed to constant fire from Muslim snipers and anti-aircraft machine-guns.

UNPROFOR Monday said the situation in the area of Sarajevo in the past 24 hours was unstable because of the Muslim attack and the Muslim forces present in the demilitarized zones on Bjelasnica, Igman and Treskavica and the nearby area of Rakitnice, SRNA said.

The UNPROFOR statement also said the force had sent a protest to the Muslim side.

The UNPROFOR commander for Sarajevo has met with Bosnian Muslim Vice President Ejup Ganic to discuss the Muslim offensive on the Sarajevo front, the UNPROFOR statement also said, as carried by SRNA.

Mostar Mayor Blames Croats for Shooting Incidents

LD0110204194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 1 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic has issued a statement in which he says that extremists from the western part of Mostar are firing at people and buildings on the left bank of the river on a daily basis despite the presence of numerous representatives of international organizations.

Those shooting from the western bank in Mostar would like to cause a similar response from the left bank, thus reigniting the war that will enable some people to continue enjoying the spoils of war seized from the Bosniak people.

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Foreign Minister Says Ties With U.S. Improving

LD0410124294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 4 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, is returning from Washington today. On the eve of his departure from Washington last night Granic said that relations between the United States and Croatia are improving.

Following last week's Clinton-Tudjman meeting, yesterday's talks at the Congress testify to these good relations, Minister Granic stressed adding that at his meetings with members of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the House of Representatives and Senate, full agreement was reached on all the important political issues regarding southeastern Europe.

In the course of these talks, Granic stressed that our country regards the return of protected areas to the country's constitutional and legal system, the implementation of the Washington agreement, economic cooperation with the United States, and its help within international financial institutions and NATO programs as the most important issues.

Secretary Perry Meets Defense Minister Susak

LD0310145294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry and UN Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi ended their talks at the Divulje base, near Split, where UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] logistics units are situated. Our correspondent reports on what they talked about and agreed on:

[Correspondent] Yasushi Akashi, UN special envoy to the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Yasushi Akashi said after today's meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry at the Divulje base near Split: In two hours of talks we agreed on the most topical issues—particularly on NATO forces which would support UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We also agreed that this is necessary in order to make operations more efficient as we expressed our commitment to a peaceful process and our desire to have the Contact Group's plan accepted by those who have so far failed to do so.

As U.S. Secretary Perry said, there are suggestions that air attacks should be launched in Bosnia-Herzegovina without prior notice. UN Representative Akashi maintains that the security of personnel is the most important thing because UNPROFOR's main task is of a humanitarian nature. Prior to his departure from Split airport the U.S. defense secretary also met with Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak. During their 10-minute meeting the two ministers discussed the UNPA [UN Protection Area] zones and the security situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Perry on 'Constructive' Meeting

LD0310165394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Before his departure from Split, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry met Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak. Here is what he said after the talks.

[Begin Perry recording in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I had an interesting and constructive meeting with Mr. Susak. I was on my way back to the United States from the defense ministers' meeting in Spain where we had agreed on more effective use of NATO forces and their protection of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I conveyed the contents of my talks with General Sir Michael Rose [UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina] to Mr. Akashi [UN special envoy] in Split this morning, and I believe that these talks will result in closer cooperation between NATO forces and the United Nations.

I briefed Minister Susak on the conclusions of the meeting in Spain and the talks with UNPROFOR, and I believe that cooperation between the defense forces of Croatia and the United States will improve in the future. This will be reviewed in greater detail in Zagreb in November. [end recording] [passage omitted]

U.S. Reportedly Requests Arming of Bosnian Muslims

LD0310224394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2040 GMT 3 Oct 94

["Pool item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Oct. 3 (TANJUG)—The United States last week asked Croatia to arm Bosnian Muslims in exchange for their agreement to postpone their exemption from the arms embargo on former Yugoslavia.

The statement given to TANJUG by diplomatic sources at the United Nations headquarters Monday was confirmed to Western reporters by Croatian diplomats in New York. It was not specified whether U.S. President Bill Clinton had asked this of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman during their meeting in New York last week, or if the proposal had been made at some other level.

The sources said that the United States had not been willing to pay for the weapons or transportation costs. As a result, the Croats got angry and rejected the U.S. proposal, the sources said. Croatian diplomats gave as additional reasons for the rejection the fact that Croatia itself did not have sufficient weaponry. They also said they did not trust the Muslims.

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The United States threatened to exempt Bosnian Muslims from the arms embargo on former Yugoslavia if Bosnian Serbs failed to accept the "Contact Group" map on Bosnia's division by October 15. After a year of heavy fighting, Muslims and Croats signed an agreement on forming a binational federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in Washington in March this year, under strong pressure from the United States. Under the agreement, the Federation would subsequently enter into a confederation with Croatia.

Both Muslim and Croat sources confirm that things are functioning far from well in the new federation. The sources report about increasingly frequent Muslim-Croat clashes, especially in central Bosnia.

'Hostile' Leaflets Distributed in Serb Krajina

LD0310205094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1943 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 3 Oct (TANJUG)—The Interior Ministry of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] disclosed today that leaflets with hostile content had been distributed in the areas of Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, and Banija on 1 October and in the night between Saturday and Sunday and that the persons dispersing them were still at large.

The leaflets, entitled "A Proclamation to the Serb People in the Occupied Regions of the Republic of Croatia," call on "esteemed Serbs, citizens of the Republic of Croatia," to crush the "war-mongering policies pursued by the chetniks and extremists headed by [RSK President] Milan Martic." The leaflets, bearing the Croatian Government's stamp and the signature of Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Milas [as received], also call on the citizens of the RSK to accept cultural autonomy in two districts—Knin and Glina—and "coexistence with full guarantees for cultural, national, and human rights."

The leaflets also appeal to the Serbs to support "the most powerful party—the SDS [Serb Democratic Party of Krajina]—headed by Milan Babic," which, it is said, was "ready to accept coexistence." Asked to comment on the leaflets, Milan Babic, RSK foreign affairs minister and SDS chairman, said that this was "pure nonsense and an attempt to sow discord in the RSK through a trick." "This is not the first time that someone is trying to slander the strongest Krajina party and me as its chairman," Babic said, adding that "people know very well what sort of policy the SDS of Krajina has been pursuing right from the start. Therefore, it is not necessary to deny this or even waste time talking about such nonsense."

The information service of RSK President Milan Martic described the leaflet as "sheer stupidity," adding that the leaflets were most probably brought into the RSK by officials of international organizations. "There is no reason, and our people know only too well, why the SDS of Krajina or any other patriotic party in Krajina should accept so-called coexistence with Croatia," the Krajina president's office has said.

Martic: Krajina To Request FRY Aid If Attacked

AU0410115994 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Oct 94 p 7

[BETA attributed report: "Martic: UN Resolution Is a Chance for Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kragujevac, 2 Oct—Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], said that in the case of a new aggression by Croatia, the RSK would "request military support from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], which is guaranteed by the signing of the Vance plan."

"A continuation of the war would be far bloodier than the earlier conflicts and would certainly not go the way the Croats planned. That is why I hope they will not opt for this suicidal move," said Martic in the Radio Kragujevac "Hallmark of the Times" ["Pecat" vremena] program. Martic assessed that the adoption of the UN Resolution extending the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] mandate "offers another chance for the continuation of the initiated peace process."

"The Resolution provides Croatia with the possibility of accepting our initiative to solve many controversial issues over the next six months," Martic claimed. "The stances of the earlier resolutions, which in effect prejudge a political solution to the conflict, cannot bring any progress because they essentially dispute the provisions of the Vance plan on which the UNPROFOR mandate is based," said Martic.

General Tells Troops 'Fateful Hour is Nigh'

LD0110181194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 1 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian Army's Osijek operational zone today celebrated the third anniversary of its founding at the Gasinci training range. The units were innspected on this occasion, after which Major General Djuro Decak, the commander of the Osijek operational zone, submitted a report to Corps General Janko Bobetko, the chief of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. Vera Madzar reports.

[Madzar] Addressing the troops at the Osijek operational zone's third anniversary celebrations, Corps Gen. Janko Bobetko, the Croatian Army's chief of the General Staff, recalled the times of war and said that behind us were tanks and people who had passed the test of the best wartime schools, without whom we would never have had our homeland Croatia, and pointed to the tasks over the next three months and after.

[Begin Bobetko recording] They are counting on having taken Baranja forever, on Vukovar being their town, they are convinced that what they had occupied in Slavonia belongs to them. Gentlemen, the task awaiting us is completely obvious, the question will be perfectly clear; if this moment arises we will say: Gentlemen, the

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ultimatum expires at this or that hour—perhaps we will not give one at all—for you to leave every square inch of Croatian territory.

For this reason, the time at our disposal, what we are doing on the setting up of certain commands and the entire system of the Croatian Army, all this should not be construed as some sort of a campaign—let us do something, anything, so the Army is not bored.

Gentlemen, the fateful hour is nigh. We have informed the whole of progressive mankind that Croatia would no longer tolerate blackmail or haggle over the parts of its territory under occupation, and that it will expel the aggressor, relying on its own resources. [end recording]

[Madzar] If a peaceful solution is not found, this will be our sacred duty to these Slavonian plains full of unmarked graves. All these people had unselfishly sacrificed their lives, these diligent and peace-loving Slavonian peasants managed to stop the overwhelmingly superior enemy. This is no longer the case, said Corps Gen. Janko Bobetko, the Croatian Army's chief of ghe General Staff, and this was today also attested to by the tactical maneuvers performed by the tank corps.

Peace Envoy Affirms OIC Support for Federation

AU0310143394 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 13 Sep 94 p 5

[Interview with Dr. Miomir Zuzul, President Tudjman's special envoy for peace negotiations, by V. Staresina; place and date not given: "Croatia Is a Crucial Support to the Muslims"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Integral and sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina was supported again at the ministerial conference of the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC] last week in Islamabad. However, with the continuous demand for lifting the arms embargo imposed on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, ministers of the OIC countries demanded in the final declaration that the arms embargo imposed on Croatia also be lifted. For the first time after the summit in Jedda (over two years ago), Croatia was invited to the OIC conference as a guest. Shortly after he returned from Islamabad, Dr. Miomir Zuzul, who headed the Croatian delegation, said:

Well Informed

[Zuzul] The Croatian delegation was received very well; all those we talked to—and we talked to the representatives of all the OIC countries—emphasized that they supported Croatia and the federation of the Bosniaks and Croats. They were not only interested, but also very well informed of the problems, which was often not the case with the people from the countries that are much closer to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that the prevailing force at the conference, so to speak, was a moderate Islamic force, which supports Bosnia-Herzegovina, primarily because the Muslims are in danger there, but it does not take exclusive, fundamentalist positions as starting points. There were some such voices, but they were quite marginal.

[Staresina] What aim did the Croatian State delegation have in attending the conference?

[Zuzul] Primarily to show that the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina is also the problem of Croatia, that these two problems are indivisible because they are both results of the Serb aggression; to emphasize that, at this stage, the only possible solution is the one that takes the approach to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia as one problem. Moreover, we wanted to express our readiness to help in searching for the solution, we stated that we supported the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and that the idea of a confederation with Croatia was also important to us. The Muslim part of the federation will always maintain certain relations with the OIC, which involves all the Islamic countries in the world. Therefore, we also want to establish communication with this organization and avoid the communication blockade that used to exist between Jedda and Islamabad.

Some Progress After All

[Staresina] How close are the OIC countries to the idea of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, considering that in the former declaration, there was talk exclusively of the unitary state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosniaks having been deprived of the right to defend themselves and liberate it?

[Zuzul] I think that a certain progress has been made in relation to the former declaration, passed in Geneva in early August. Now there is talk of the federation—somewhat shy, but it will depend on the overall development of events. Understandably, there are some Islamic countries that find the idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a Muslim state the most acceptable, but the position that the support of Croatia is crucial for the survival of the Muslim people in Bosnia-Herzegovina prevails. This was quite explicitly stated in the bilateral talks we held.

[Staresina] Judging by the media reports, some of the OIC countries have announced that they would individually lift the arms embargo imposed on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, that their peace troops would remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that they would even send more troops if the Western European countries withdraw their soldiers.

[Zuzul] There was no talk of this during the official part of the conference, but it was discussed in the bilateral contacts. The unilateral lifting of the arms embargo and the troops remaining in Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of the troops of other countries, is an option that has been assessed internationally as potentially very dangerous. Those who issued such statements did so before the conference. This was openly announced by Pakistan,

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Malaysia, Iran.... However, when we talked to them, it turned out that they were aware of the danger this implies.

Avoid the Conflicts

I think that everyone would now like to avoid the danger of wider conflicts. They are prepared to adjust their moves to the global solution that would help the Croat and Muslim people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, rather than lead to jeopardizing peace—even on the international scale.

The decisiveness to help, expressed in the final declaration, was not diminished, but the declaration does not have the aggressive charge based on the principle: if the world does nothing, we will do something. Instead, it counts on the world to do something, and in case it does not, the Islamic countries leave open the possibility of considering what to do. The declaration is mostly aimed at the United Nations.

[Staresina] Does the readiness expressed by Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey to have their troops remain if the others withdraw still stand then?

[Zuzul] They expressed the readiness to have them stay, but also to consider it within the framework of the global context. That means that they do not intend to leave the troops that would immediately start fighting a global war against the Serbs. For several years now, certain periodicals have stated as one of the greatest dangers for the world the religious and civilization conflicts—for instance, that of the Islamic civilization against the Christian Orthodox. There are many such potential sites; Bosnia-Herzegovina is not the only one. I think the awareness of how great a danger it is does exist and that it will influence future moves.

[Box, p 5]

The Embargo

[Staresina] As the deadline for the lifting of the arms embargo approaches, the formerly greatest supporters have become more cautious than before. What is the Croatian position?

[Zuzul] We are against the lifting of the arms embargo being the only mechanism of the international community for resolving the conflict. It would mean that the international community has exhausted all other mechanisms and that it leaves those living in the area to resolve the problems with weapons. Croatia will continue to support the option that the international community try to resolve the problem, that all the possibilities of political pressure be exhausted. However, if it becomes evident that there is no other solution, then we will not only accept but demand the lifting of the embargo, not only for Bosnia-Herzegovina but for Croatia, too.

[Staresina] There is more than one way in which the embargo can be lifted. Which do you think would be the most acceptable?

[Zuzul] If the embargo is lifted, I think it should be connected with the appropriate support of the international community—not just political support. The most probable model in this case would be the lifting of the embargo combined with air strikes, and the worst option would be the international community lifting the embargo and then giving up on everything.

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Gligorov Rejects Adding Suffix to Country's Name

AU0310145494 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In an exclusive interview for the THE MACEDONIAN TIMES, Macedonian President Gligorov stated the establishment of an independent and sovereign Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] practically means a revision of the Bucharest Treaty. He pointed out German Foreign Minister Kinkel informed of his plan for resolving the Greek-Macedonian dispute. The plan is negotiable, Gligorov said, but the part suggesting a suffix for the name of our country is "unacceptable for us, and I stressed this in the United States and Germany." Gligorov also spoke of Europe's attitude towards the Balkans. Macedonia is oriented towards Europe and this practically means that Europe ought to change its views on the Balkans and begin considering it its own integral part, instead of a merely geographical notion.

VMRO-DPNME Says Government Attacking Media

AU0110205494 Skopje MIC in English 30 Sep 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] has announced that the government is attacking the private media. At this party's press conference, it was stated that three local TV stations in St. Nikole have been banned. Also in this town, according to VMRO-DPMNE, the objects and entire studio equipment of "TV Pako" was most brutally demolished. The TV station in Vinica was also closed with a decision of the Ministry of Urbanization, while the "Electrodistribution" due to an allegedly unpaid bill, cut the electricity at the TV station in Stip.

VMRO-DPMNE Official Opposes Federalization

AU2909114994 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 23 Sep 94 p 4

[Report on question-and-answer session in which VMRO-DPMNE Vice President Dosta Dimovska answers readers' questions; place and date not given: "We Are Not a Terrorist Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Anica Antic from Skopje] When we voted for the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Movement for Macedonian National Unity], you promised all the best. What happened to those promises?

[Dimovska] I have to remind you that we have not taken part in the government over the last four years, and therefore we could not carry out our economic program. Only part of it was accomplished. Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] became independent and it acquired all the characteristics of a state, although not in the way the VMRO-DPMNE wanted it. We are now offering a new program for the elections and, if we win, we shall be able to accomplish our promises.

[Nada Likar from Skopje] I am puzzled by the letter "R" in the VMRO's name because it reminds me of war. What is your opinion on this?

[Dimovska] You remember the hard times that we had in the period of the formation of the Macedonian state, when the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] was here and when there were conditions for an armed conflict. The VMRO-DPMNE did not do anything to create the atmosphere for causing an incident and we did not do anything to prove labels that are glued to our name, that is that we are a terrorist party. The fact that we have the name VMRO shows that we are successors of the historical VMRO, and I cannot see anything wrong in following historical traditions.

Without Concessions

[Slobodan Trajkovski from Skopje] Is it not true that your candidate for president, Ljubisa Georgievski, is a communist, who has been intentionally brought into your party and has he been investigated?

[Dimovska] Ljubisa Georgievski has been a member of the VMRO-DPMNE since 1992 and he has accepted our political program, which he has publicly advocated. He is a respected intellectual, a film director, and a political essayist. We are not the police and we do not investigate people. If we think in that way we shall not trust anybody.

[Dragan Sokolovski from Skopje] Why did you not form a coalition with the Democratic Party [DP]?

[Dimovska] Our party tried to do things in the interest of Macedonian national unity. We offered a written proposal to the DP. In that proposal we suggested Petar Gosev as our common candidate for president of the state. We also offered to have an equal number of candidates for members of parliament, and we also suggested nominating a prime minister from the membership of the party with the more votes, while the chairman of the assembly would be nominated from the membership of the other party. You will agree that these proposals were favorable. However, we did not receive a positive answer from them. Petar Gosev replied to us that the majority of their members would vote for Kiro Gligorov, and that is something that we cannot understand, knowing that it is an opposition party. We consider that Gosev's attitude is not in favor of Macedonian national interests.

[Pece Ristevski from Skopje] If you come to power, what will your policy toward Greece be?

[Dimovska] Our stance is to develop friendships with all our neighbors, but it has to be based on reciprocity, and as far as Greece is concerned, it has to be based on respect for the Macedonian nation that is living in this country. We will never accept negotiations with Greece on any concessions on our name or flag, or the article of

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the Constitution dealing with concern for the Macedonian nation in Greece. With the mediation of international organizations we shall do our best to correct the injustices that have been done against these people. Genocide should be stopped and their names should not have to be changed, and so on.

[Dimce Tumbov from Titov Veles] If the VMRO-DPMNE wins the elections, will it continue the negotiations that the present government has started with international financial institutions?

[Dimovska] We do not have exact information about the negotiations with these institutions, but we shall certainly review the arrangements and we shall decide which of the arrangements are in the interest of the Macedonian national economy.

[Zoran Todorovski from Bitola] How long will you allow state companies to be destroyed and state capital plundered?

[Dimovska] Our party strongly criticizes the mass destruction of state companies that is being artificially organized by managers affiliated to the government. The Law on Privatization has thrown a large number of workers onto the streets overnight, while the managers are becoming very rich. We put forward 80 amendments to the Law on Privatization and none of them was accepted. We have a special economic program that will stop the merciless destruction of the state companies and that will provide opportunities to large state companies to be privatized, but much later. We shall create conditions for the revitalization of the companies and for the workers to go back to work.

[Zvonko Dimitrovski from Skopje, a soldier in the FYROM Army] Will you stick to your initiative for the alteration of the coat of arms and what will you do about the denationalization of property?

[Dimovska] One of the first questions for us will be to finalize the constitution of the Macedonia state, including the passing of a law on the coat of arms. You know that our proposal is to make the lion our traditional coat of arms. As for denationalization, our proposal was to pass such a law before the Law on Privatization. We are preparing a new law parallel with a new law on privatization that will revise the privatization so far, which is tantamount to plunder.

There Is No Federalization

[Stojce Trajkovski from Kicevo] What is your program on interethnic relations?

[Dimovska] We think that this government is making a lot of concessions to the Albanian minority and thereby violating the Constitution and the law. If we come to power, we shall not accept such impossible demands from the Albanian minority. We favor respect for the Constitution and the rights of the minorities in conformity with international conventions. We shall not allow any pressure to expel Macedonians from their homes. We shall support equality in the sense of citizenship, but we shall never allow the federalization of Macedonia.

[Zorica Ristevska from Tetovo] Your election slogan is "a nation state for the Macedonian people," but this can be accomplished only by war, as happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Dimovska] The policy that is being conducted now, that is that Macedonia is a multinational state, will lead to war. Macedonia is not Bosnia and it is not inhabited by several nationalities. The representatives of national minorities cannot have the rights of a nation, such as the right to self-determination and secession. If the minorities want peace, they have to accept that Macedonia is a nation state of the Macedonian people and the citizens living in it.

[Unidentified reader from Skopje] What will the VMRO-DPMNE do about the 120,000 citizens that do not have citizenship [according to unofficial census results] and is it known that they are Albanians?

[Dimovska] They will have the status of foreigners.

[Mile Suvopolski from Skopje] What are your views on defense and the Macedonian Army?

[Dimovska] You know that we are in favor of building a modern Macedonian Army to defend our state's sovereignty and integrity. We think that the Macedonian Army has been underestimated by the present government, which has not made any efforts to modernize the army because it is giving minimum financial support from the budget. Moreover, it has allowed a great number of army officers who participated in the JNA aggression on territories of the former Yugoslavia and who should be prosecuted to become officers in the Macedonian Army. And those Macedonian patriots who saved a great many Macedonian soldiers, I am referring to the officers of the TMRO [Secret Macedonian Revolutionary Organization], were expelled, either retired or suspended.

[Kosta Naumov from Skopje] What will the VMRO do about unemployment and is it possible to recognize the right of the unemployed to welfare payments?

[Dimovska] We have a special program to stimulate employment that will engage a lot of young people. As far as your proposal is concerned, it is interesting and we shall take it into consideration.

[Unidentified reader] Can Dimovska tell us where the money is that was deposited in our banks?

[Dimovska] In Belgrade.

[Box, p 4]

[Mitre Mitrevski from Skopje] When will the congress of the VMRO-DPMNE be held in Salonika?

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[Dimovska] The regular VMRO-DPMNE congress will be held next year in the Republic of Macedonia. If Greece wants to be cooperative, it should not mind us erecting a monument at the site where the historical VMRO-DPMNE was founded. However, we have neither put in our political program that we shall hold a congress in Salonika, nor have any officials of our party ever stated as much.

VMRO-DP Promises Revision of Privatization

AU3009170494 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 26 Sep 94 p 4

[Question and answer session in which Vladimir Golubovski, president of the Internal Macedonian Revolution Organization-Democratic Party, answers readers' questions; place and date not given: "Ilirida Is Irrational"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Question] If you win the elections, will this cause strained relations with the Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]?

[Golubovski] The question of the Albanian minority is not our main preoccupation. We think that if we insist on a state based on the principle of equal respect for the laws and their validity by all citizens, this can solve the question of the Albanian minority, because this is the reason for their disloyalty and disrespect for the Constitution and the laws.

[Question] What will you do if you win the elections and if the Albanians proclaim "Ilirida" [Albanian territorial and political autonomy in their region of FYROM]?

[Golubovski] I think the Albanians have finally understood that they are really a minority in the Republic of Macedonia. The census produced some statistics that determine the position of the Albanians in Macedonia. However, this does not mean that, although they are much fewer in number than they predicted, they will not enjoy civic rights. Nevertheless, the demand for "Ilirida" is definitely irrational, and I believe that they themselves have started to give up such ideas.

[Question] What do you think about the punishments imposed on the Albanians who organized a "paramilitary" army?

[Golubovski] I consider they are an adequate response to the danger that may be caused by creating a paramilitary army. The criminals were lucky because Macedonian law is quite moderate. If we obtain enough seats to have influence in the next parliament, we will fight for tougher punishments for this type of crime.

[Question] What do you think about the extra students in schools as a result of starting new classes for Albanians who are not obliged to pass entry exams? Can we as mothers do something about the fact that certain people are ruining the childhood of our kids by degrading them at the very start?

[Golubovski] Unfortunately, there are some spheres in the state executive power that are in the hands of the Albanian minority. These areas are subject to constant bargaining with the aim of maintaining the coalition, and why quality is not respected in the area of education. A solution for these problems can be found if the public opinion applies pressure to the political parties, and the best way to do this are to hold elections; the citizens should punish the political parties for their inconsistencies, such as bargaining at the expense of national and state interests.

[Question] Does the VMRO-DP [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party] regard itself as the direct successor of VMRO?

[Golubovski] Yes, we consider we are the direct successor of the VMRO of 1893 in its capacity of representing a real Macedonian option. We think that the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Movement for Macedonian National Unity] has abandoned the VMRO's original idea.

[Question] Recently, our ambassador in Bulgaria stated that economic cooperation with Bulgaria can be improved. What is your opinion about that, in the light of Bulgaria's political problems?

[Golubovski] If we consider the economic, not the political aspect of this question, we must admit that many world companies have offices in Sofia now with which Macedonia used to maintain contact via Slovenia or Croatia in former Yugoslavia. Since the Macedonian market is limited, it is necessary to use this opportunity and open up all directions, but on the condition that we separate economics from politics.

[Question] Some 50 percent of private businessmen pay no taxes. Will they continue to get away with this?

[Golubovski] The problem of taxes contains a big question that is a problem in itself, namely the capability of the state to impose tax discipline. All must be equal before the law. In the social democracy ruling in Macedonia today, it seems that the rulers of the state and their friends are not obliged to pay taxes. This is why honest people have to pay twice as much taxes to make up for what the others are not paying. In implementing the principles of liberal democracy, we would reduce taxes, but everyone would have to pay them.

Revision of Privatization

[Question] What guarantees to you offer for privatization?

[Golubovski] It will be of great importance if the elections bring changes and if the VMRO-DP has a chance. I can tell you that we will insist on revising everything

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that has been done, but in an objective way, so as to define the real situation, and we will also insist on a model that we find appropriate and more suitable for the Republic of Macedonia.

[Question] Do you intend to form a coalition with any party?

[Golubovski] We will go to the elections alone, but if we have a good result, we will have to assume a responsibility to the other voters, who should have their representatives in the government.

[Question] What is your opinion about the presidential candidates Gligorov and Georgievski?

[Golubovski] We have publicly stated that we cannot accept the VMRO-DPMNE candidate Georgievski because our approaches to national unity differ, and because think that all Macedonians must be part of national unity, regardless of their political affiliations. On the other hand, we are against revenge as a method in Macedonian policy. I doubt that any party like the VMRO-DPMNE, which does not have a clearly defined political program, can compensate for its handicap by employing radical methods, and this will remain a handicap for its presidential candidate, should he win. It is simply a matter of lack of confidence, because of what the party and its candidate may do. On the other hand, we cannot say that we support Mr. Gligorov, in view of certain statements he has made to foreign mass media, but also because of certain election activities in Macedonia, when he stated that Macedonia is a multinational state.

[Question] Why do you not run for president?

[Golubovski] For a very simple reason—the constitutional and legal conditions. In the present elections, a very short time was allowed for collecting 10,000 signatures, and an additional problem is that they have to be submitted to a responsible body. This made the procedures excessively complicated, and to run for president is a very risky political action for anyone in Macedonia.

[Box, p 4]

[Question] How would you solve the dispute with Greece?

[Golubovski] I think that the passage of time will produce the solution. However, one day a situation will arise when Macedonia and Greece will have good-neighborly relations. Greece offers the shortest road from Macedonia to Europe, and I think that the Republic of Greece and the Republic of Macedonia both have a natural interest in solving our mutual problem.

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National Assembly Ratifies GATT Agreement

AU3009202894 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 30 Sep 94

[FBIS Translated Text] With the ratification of an agreement on Slovenia's accession to GATT, our country became a full-fledged member of this organization. Formal opportunities have now been created for our country to be among the founding members of the World Trade Organization, which will succeed GATT in the coming year.

At the proposal of President Milan Kucan, the State Chamber at an extraordinary session elected Ivo Bizjak as the Slovene human rights ombudsman. His mandate will last six years.

SKD Agrees To Stay in Government Coalition

AU0310124794 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 2 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD] are willing to continue participating in Drnovsek's cabinet, however, on the basis of a new coalition agreement with the Liberal Democracy [LDS] and a new program.

This was the conclusion that the SKD caucus reached in a secret ballot yesterday. Of the 29 caucus members present, 23 supported this decision, five abstained, while 1 ballot was invalid.

The caucus members confirmed the practice of decision-making and coalition harmonization between the SKD and the LDS. In the drafting of a new program, the SKD negotiators will be obliged to advocate a policy that will secure economic growth, the faster transformation of the state, comprehensive and honest property transformation, the just and rapid compensation of injustices, and the introduction of religion and ethics with the elements of patriotic education, which would match European standards, as a subject in school curriculums.

The party caucus also decided to keep the foreign minister's post, however, they did not discuss a particular candidate.

110 T-72 Fire-Control Systems in Iranian Hands

AU0310201094 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 3 Oct 94 p 2

[Report by Vesna Kalcic: "Fotona's Equipment Now on Austrian Tank"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Klagenfurt, 1 Oct—The shipment of Fotona's "electronic optical equipment," which was seized at Vienna's Schwechat Airport in June, because, according to the prevailing Austrian legislation, it should have been accompanied by a special permit from the Austrian Defense Ministry and declared as military materiel, is not the 13th such shipment, as we have reported previously. On the contrary, Fotona has sent 20 such shipments to Iran via Austria. It was concluded on the basis of documents by both forwarding agencies Schenker and Intereuropa that 110 pieces of electronic fire control systems, manufactured by the Ljubljana-based Fotona, have already reached Iran via Austria.

Including the last shipment, Iran would have had 120 electronic fire control systems, which it needs for 120 T-72 tanks of Soviet manufacture (which it purchased from the former Soviet Union) and not for U.S. M-60 tanks, as reported earlier. The T-72 is considerably lower than Western tanks and, thus, more difficult to hit. Its gun measures 12.5 cm in diameter and can fire up to a distance of 5 km. With the electronic fire control system, sent to the Iranian buyer by Fotona, at night a tank can fire twice that distance. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Austrian Army purchased three such Soviet tanks from eastern Germany cheaply, installed Fotona's equipment on one of them, and tested it. The results were more than satisfactory. [passage omitted]

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Federal

Delay in Implementing UN Resolution Reviewed

LD3009150794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1408 GMT 30 Sep 94

["Pool" item by Stevan Cordas]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept. 30 (TANJUG)—United Nations Resolution 943 on easing the anti-Yugoslav sanctions has not yet come into force despite the fact that all requirements have been fulfilled.

At the same time, the U.N. Security Council has shown unusual efficiency in the case of Haiti—it took it 24 hours to lift the sanctions against that country at the United States' proposal, despite the fact that conditions for that had not been met.

There is no doubt that the Russian representative on the Security Council was referring to Yugoslavia when he said his country had abstained from the voting on the Haiti sanctions because of the council's inconsistency.

The U.N. Security Council seems prepared to lift the sanctions against some countries overnight, while in case of others it delays a similar move for months, he said.

The key condition for putting Resolution 943 into effect is a report on Yugoslavia's consistent implementation of an embargo against the Bosnian Serb republic, which is expected to be submitted by Pellnas, head of the U.N. humanitarian mission in Yugoslavia.

On August 4, Yugoslavia severed all political and economic relations with the Bosnian Serb republic and closed its border for all but humanitarian transports after the Bosnian Serb assembly failed to accept Yugoslavia's advice to sign the "Contact Group" plan on Bosnia's division.

Pellnas is expected to submit the report to co-chairmen of the international conference on former Yugoslavia David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, and Stoltenberg is to immediately forward it to U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

Butrus-Ghali's signature on the report would put Resolution 943 into effect.

A few days ago, Stoltenberg and Owen met in Belgrade with Pellnas and his team and visited a border crossing between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serb republic.

After the visit, they said that there were no problems on the ground and that the United Nations would "very soon" receive a report on the findings of the humanitarian mission.

Pellnas has also repetedly confirmed Stoltenberg's and Owen's statements, which shows that there are absolutely no obstacles for sending the report to Butrus-Ghali.

Nevertheless, the report has not yet been officially submitted to Butrus-Ghali and the reason for that is hard to guess.

Pellnas said his team had been entrusted with a highly delicate task at a very delicate moment, but his explanation can hardly justify such a long delay of his report.

The resolution had first been expected to go into effect last Wednesday, then on Friday, but the latest news indicate that a decision to that effect could come next Monday.

In the meantime, it is certain that the current delay suits the protagonists of the war option in Bosnia-Herzegovina and creates conditions for grave incidents calculated to make the United Nations revoke its decision.

Jovanovic Debates Vance Plan at UNSC

LD0110110094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0013 GMT 1 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] New York, 30 Sep (TANJUG)—The Vance plan does not prejudice the issue of a political solution to the problem of Krajina and any different interpretation of the plan could aggravate the situation with unpredictable consequences, Vladislav Jovanovic, Yugoslavia's foreign minister said on Friday.

Speaking in an open debate at the UN Security Council [UNSC] before the vote on a UN resolution to extend UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] mandate, Jovanovic objected to some parts of the resolution which, in his view, discriminated against a political solution.

He stressed that since the outset Yugoslavia had been in favor of both the Vance plan and the Contact Group's plan for Bosnia. However, he added, some parts of the resolution were biased and reflected the Croatian side's positions exclusively.

The issue of extending UNPROFOR's mandate must be dealt with separately from the search for a political solution to the crisis, Jovanovic said, adding that the issue of the UNPROFOR mandate and its extension and the need to protect the Serb population cannot be used as instruments of political pressure on one side in the negotiating process.

According to Jovanovic, difficulties surrounding the implementation of the Vance plan must not be used as a pretext for dismissing the plan altogether. The FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] is of the view that conditions are not yet ripe for terminating the mandate of the peace forces, Jovanovic stressed adding that the presence of UNPROFOR In the protected zones is needed until a comprehensive political solution is found.

We are witnesses to constant threats by top Croatian officials who insist that they will resort to force as the most effective way of resolving the issue of the UNPA's

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[UN Protected Areas] and imposing Croatia's rule in Krajina, Jovanovic said. We fully agree with the UN secretary general's view that a military option would have unpredictable consequences and would not lead to a lasting peace, he added, and went on to stress that peace was possible only through negotiations between the sides involved in the conflict.

Jovanovic said that from the very outset of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the FRY had insisted that a solution was possible only through political means and negotiations that would be based on respect for the equality of each nation and its legitimate interests.

He also made reference to the dangers of lifting the embargo on arms deliveries to the Muslims in Bosnia, stressing that such a move would only serve to inflame the conflict to unpredictable levels. Yugoslavia, as he put it, was doing its utmost to persuade the Serbs in Bosnia to accept the Contact Group's plan and would continue to do so despite the fact that the sanctions against Yugoslavia remained in place.

However, we firmly believe that the most efficient way of restoring peace in the region is by lifting all sanctions against Yugoslavia urgently and unconditionally, Jovanovic stressed.

He stressed that a peaceful solution to the conflict in Bosnia was possible providing the vital interests and the need to treat all three peoples as equal were taken into consideration.

Army Commander Perisic Meets With UN Commander

LD0110113794 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 30 Sep 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The chief of the general staff of the Army of Yugoslavia [VJ], Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, and his aides yesterday received the commander of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] military forces, French General Bertrand de Lapresle, at the latter's request, the information office of the VJ's general staff says in a statement. Several issues of common interests relating to the sphere of cooperation between UNPROFOR and the VJ were discussed. Gen. Perisic drew de Lapresle's attention to the behavior of the Croatian side over the issue of Prevlaka and its attempts by public pronouncements and the conduct of its armed units in both the yellow and blue zone to provoke a conflicting situation and to engage Yugoslavia militarily despite the fact that Yugoslavia had provided no reason for such behavior.

In reference to the situation on the border between the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, they came to conclusion that as a result of good cooperation with UNPROFOR, the number of border incidents had declined considerably. The two sides agreed that impartiality on the part of UNPROFOR was of vital importance for resolving all conflicts. Hope was expressed that inconsistencies in this sphere would be overcome, it is said in the conclusion of the statement.

Government Recognizes Red Cross Immunity

LD3009163194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1515 GMT 30 Sep 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept. 30 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government on Friday decided to recognize to the International Committee of the Red Cross the status and immunity of an international organization, to provide integrity of its premises and archives and establish exemption at payment of taxes and custom duties.

The government assessed that the ICRC plays a significant role in the war conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and adopted a bill confirming the agreement between Yugoslavia and the ICRC on the status of that humanitarian organization.

ICRC has so far signed such agreements with 34 countries, including the United States, Russia and Switzerland.

In accordance with the new composition of the Yugoslav Government and the new organization of Yugoslav ministries, the government appointed a commission to follow the international conference on the former Yugoslavia. Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic was appointed chairman of the commission, and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic vice-chairman.

Border Monitor Head Submits 'Conclusive' Report

AU0310200394 Paris AFP in English 1946 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, Oct 3 (AFP)—The head of the international mission to Yugoslavia, retired Swedish General Bo Pellnas, has handed in a report over the situation on the Yugoslav-Bosnian border, a mission spokesman here said on Monday [3 October].

"The report from Mr. Pellnas has gone to Geneva today," spokesman Kjetil Nordby told AFP.

He added that the co-chairmen of the conference on the former Yugoslavia, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, "have been working on the report for the (UN) Secretary General" Butrus Butrus-Ghali on the basis of "the findings of the mission... which were compounded in a conclusive report today."

Nordby said the mission had "no further comment at this moment" on the issue as it did not wish to preempt any conclusions reached by the co-chairmen or Butrus-Ghali. [passage omitted]

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Belgrade Initiative Proposes Talks With Albania

AU0310194994 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Sep 94 pp 14,15

[Report by Bahri Cani: "Our Proposal Is Serious"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Our initiative from two days ago, that the foreign ministers of Yugoslavia and Albania should meet in New York to consider the possibility of normalizing relations and to start a dialogue, is really serious. It is uncertain, however, whether it will come to realization."

This is how the highest Yugoslav diplomatic circles have commented for BORBA on the latest Federal Government initiative—supported also by the Foreign Political Committee of the Council of Republics in the Federal Assembly—regarding the establishment of dialogue between Yugoslavia and Albania. Our sources claim that the Yugoslav side is persistently insisting on a dialogue between Belgrade and Tirana, while the Albanian authorities are trying to have the dialogue start on a Belgrade-Pristina basis with the mediation of a third party.

Our sources assess their (Yugoslav) policy as following a conciliatory line, while Albanian policy is inconsistent, following a hot-cold principle. In view of this policy and a series of recent events, Yugoslav officials are somewhat skeptical about the possibility of the ministers meeting in New York.

"While we are trying to start a dialogue, Albania has severely attacked Yugoslavia twice in just the last 10 days. The first time was in a letter from President Sali Berisha to the representatives of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the second was in his speech in Djirokastra on 18 September," our sources claim. Hence, they say, the disappointment of the Yugoslav authorities with the behavior of Albania. However, the Federal Government did not fail to reply. Late last week it issued a statement in which the attention of the international public is drawn to Albania continuing its hostile activities against Serbia and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], that is, against the entire Serbian people. President Berisha is accused of nationalist and greater Albanian ambitions. As evidence of these assertions, the letter cites Albania's recognition of the statehood of Kosovo, the opening of a Kosovo representative office in Tirana, and support for Kosovo's secession from Serbia.

Albania and Berisha's administration are also accused of discrimination against national minorities, which, the Federal Government underlines in the letter, can be seen in the trial of some members of the Greek minority, attempts at the forcible displacement of Serbs, Montenegrins, and Goranians [Goranci] from the area around the town of Vraka, as well as in trials against their own political opponents.

In its Action Program for the Normalization of Relations Between the FRY and Albania, the Federal Government underlined that it is ready to discuss all the disputed questions, and also the possibilities of developing economic cooperation. To our question as to what is actually meant by "all the disputed questions," and whether these also include possible talks on Kosovo and its status, our sources told us that it was a broader formulation. As for the talks on the status of Kosovo, their answer was short and clear—no.

It is expected that in the talks all the questions regarding the position of national minorities will be discussed. "Let them state their views, and we shall state our views of how the problems should be resolved," our sources in the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs told us, adding that the most important thing is that those talks should finally start. As for Kosovo, they resolutely emphasize that it is an internal Serbia matter, and it will not be discussed with any foreign country.

For the time being, the only certain thing is that the initiative was launched more than two months ago. In the meantime Albania has accused Serbia and the FRY of constantly working—together with Greece—on the destabilization of the southern Balkans. On the other hand, the Yugoslav authorities have not been silent as well. Most recently they have twice made severe protests and accusations against Albania.

Although for now there are mostly negative vibrations, it is assessed, the people we talked with still hope that the talks will start in New York, where the UN General Assembly has begun its work. Federal Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic will be there until 10 October.

Article Describes Army's Food Supplier

AU0310161194 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 18 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by Milan Bozokin: "Food for Soldiers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Karadjordjevo military farm is the biggest food supplier for the Yugoslav Army. This "military food producing plant" used to be the army's biggest supplier in earlier times, too, and has retained its function. This is a proof that the quality of products sold to the army is on a high level, which has enabled the company not to lose the Yugoslav Army's trust. The company has consolidated its reputation over many years.

Founded as a state-owned company in 1921, it can be said that Karadjordjevo has a long tradition. It has undergone many transformations. Today it is a modern plant specializing in food production, forestry, and hunting tourism. It is situated on the territory of Backa Palanka and Bac Communes, with branches in Sid, Ruma, and Surcin Communes. From the point of view of organization, it is a part of the Federal Defense Ministry's Military Economy Department.

Farming, truck farming, cattle raising and fodder processing have been developed on 7,000 hectares in Karadjordjevo. Apart from that, there is a hunting area of

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approximately 16,000 hectares, where there is game raising, hunting tourism, forestry and wood processing.

The Main Army Supplier

"Karadjordjevo's basic task is to supply the Yugoslav Army with food. We cannot afford to make any mistakes in this and we have not," Cvetko Milovanovic, Karadjordjevo deputy general manager, told us. "Yugoslav Army units have priority as customers; only the food surplus is sold on the free market. It is an advantage that we produce food for a known customer. Both sides are happy. We have a secure market for our products, and the army has a reliable and stable source of high-quality foods at reasonable prices. We do not give away our products, however. We sell them to the army. Karadjordjevo is a company organized on market economy principles. We supply Yugoslav Army units with farm products (60 percent) and cattle (20 percent) annually," the manager told us.

You only get a clear impression about the size of Karadjordjevo if you visit the cultivated fields, and pig, poultry, beef cattle and sheep farms. Most of the cultivated fields and cattle raising facilities are in Backa Palanka. In Mladenovac there is a beef livestock farm for 2,000 head. Branko Lazic, manager of the cattle raising division, says that calves are brought to this farm after they have reached a weight of 280 to 300 kilograms. They are fattened up here to a weight of 450 to 500 kilograms. This weight is achieved in 210 days. Close to the breeding facilities there are silage boxes with a capacity of 1,200 metric tons of fodder for fattening beef.

There is a farm with 620 Simmental dairy cattle, which produce 3,000,000 liters of milk per year.

There is a pig farm in Novi Majur, close to Backa Palanka. Ranko Gutic, the farm manager, says that 15,000 pigs are fattened there per year. The fattening process is completely organized at the farm—from the production of food to the fattening itself and medical care. Gutic says that the biggest problems now are expensive medicines and fodder components.

There are calf and sheep farms in Obrovac. The former pig farm has been transformed into a calf farm. Calves are brought here after a 10-day suckling period and are fattened to reach 250 kg. Female calves are used for breeding, and the males remain in the fattening process. There are 2,500 sheep at Karadjordjevo. Apart from Obrovac, there is a sheep farm in Surcin, too. They are kept there exclusively for meat, they are not milked and produce young throughout the year. Sheep are used to manufacture wool, too—4 kg of wool per sheep per year is obtained and sold.

Irrigation Does Not Help Either

If you pass Karadjordjevo's fields you notice that the corn stalks are still green, and that sugar cane is in an excellent condition. The reason is watering. Milutin Jovic, deputy general manager for farming, says that a 3.2 km channel was constructed between Obrovac and Gajdobra for the irrigation of the sugar cane, potato and corn fields. Some 23 percent of all fields in Karadjordjevo are irrigated, but this year's prolonged drought has affected the crop.

"Although we took all the necessary measures, including watering the fields, we could not beat the drought, so that all crops are smaller than expected," Milutin Jovic says and continues: "We sowed wheat over an area of 2,493 hectares and reached 4.9 metric tons per hectare with 13 percent humidity, which is below the expected quantity. Sugar cane was grown on 420 hectares. We expect 50 metric tons per hectare on irrigated fields, and 38 metric tons in those with no irrigation. We sowed mercantile corn on 1,850 hectares, and seed-corn on 50 hectares; the complete quantity is used for cattle breeding and silage. We have our own drying plant in Novi Majur, a 12,000 metric ton elevator and a fodder mixer, where 1,000 carloads of fodder are produced per year," Jovic said.

The sunflower harvest, which is sown on 600 hectares, started in Karadjordjevo last week. The harvest of the seed-sunflower on 153 hectares has been completed and the crop amounted to one metric ton per hectare. The potatoes, sown on 139 hectares, are being taken out now.

Karadjordjevo is obliged to supply the Yugoslav Army with 2,000 metric tons of potatoes. Although modern agricultural measures were applied, unfavorable weather conditions affected the crops so that they will amount to only 15 metric tons per hectare, which is 5 metric tons less per hectare than last year. The harvest of the medium-early cabbage grown on 1.5 hectares has started, too. The remaining 20 hectares will be used for the preparation of winter food since Karajdordjevo is obliged to supply the army with 600 kg cabbage for the coming winter.

In spite of very unfavorable weather conditions, Karadjordjevo production results will be very good. They will, admittedly, not be at the level of the last few years, but Karadjordjevo will still rate better than related companies. Colonel Cvetko Milovanovic, the deputy general manager, explains this in the following way:

"We have had a good organization of work and have applied modern agricultural measures for a long time already. Apart from that, we are motived by obligations toward our customers, especially toward the Yugoslav Army. We make profits, too. All of these factors make it possible for us to retain our reputation and esteem."

Serbia

Milosevic, PM, Bank Official View Economic Plan

LD0310181994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1302 GMT 3 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 3 Oct (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received

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Dragoslav Avramovic, governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, and Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic, who briefed him on the process of preparations for the realization of the "Economic Development, Social Justice, and Financial Effectiveness of the Economy 1995-97" program, says a statement issued by the president's office today.

It was concluded that the preparation of three programs—one relating to the system of salaries, pensions, and taxes; one to the reform of the financial system; and one being an investment and public works program—represented the implementation of principles contained in the program of the reconstruction of the monetary system and the strategy for national economic recovery, the implementation of which began on 24 January this year.

A conclusion was reached that it was realistic to expect all activities stemming from this program to be completed by the end of the year. This will create conditions for beginning the new year with well-rounded and precisely defined tasks for the implementation of the economic development program, the statement says.

Program for 'Surplus Work Force' Urged

AU0110204794 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Sep 94 p 11

[Report by Mila Jankovic: "Bureau Means Postponement of Agony"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The problem of the surplus work force is increasingly becoming a common denominator of numerous companies, bringing serious social consequences and the great dissatisfaction of those left jobless through it. Some 900,000 surplus workers were anticipated when Avramovic's program for the country's economic recovery came in effect and 50 million dinars were secured in the budget for their subsequent maintenance (in this and over the next two years).

However, as Nikola Ristivojevic, director of the Republican Institute for Labor Market, "dares to claim" that it has now transpired that the analysts have nevertheless made a mistake and that, "counting on at least a minimal increase in production," the number would be considerably lower—approximately 700,000 people.

This, naturally, does not mean that the problem is any smaller, Mr. Ristivojevic says. "On the contrary, a surplus work force is never solely a consequence of technological changes in a production process, nor, as is the case here, solely of an economic blockade, but a problem that will exist for as long as there will be a market economy. This only speaks of how vital it is that the state realizes that the problem of the surplus work force cannot be resolved mechanically, but with a clearly defined system." [passage omitted]

"Our institute maintains firmly that the problem of technological surplus cannot be resolved by sacking people and referring them to employment bureaus. Our goal is to make factories and their managements design programs for the reemployment of these workers. Let me clarify what these programs are. This does not mean something along the lines of "I have 2,000 surplus workers, I will put 1,950 of them on unemployment and retire 50 of them, and the mission is, thus, accomplished." The problem of people's existence must be resolved actively, that is, each company must, if the conditions for it exist, design a program of new employment with the financial assistance of our institute, or seek another company in which this could be accomplished and transfer its workers there, again with the assistance of our funds." [passage omitted]

Alleged Arms Deliveries to Croatia, B-H Viewed

AU0110192494 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Sep 94 p 7

[Article by Miroslav Lazanski: "MiG Aircraft Do Not Respect the Embargo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The international weapons and military equipment market is undergoing a change now that the 15 October 1994 is approaching, the date the White House set as the beginning of the possible lifting of the arms embargo from Alija Izetbegovic's government if the Bosnian Serbs do not accept the Contact Group plan. If the United States decides to lift the embargo from the Sarajevo Government, either unilaterally or together with the UN Security Council, the situation for arms exporters to the territory of the former Yugoslavia will change radically. Their present big profits—which have been made in spite of the international arms embargo that is valid for all warring factions in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on a market that has "swallowed" all possible weapons and military equipment—are now endangered.

What Egypt Has Forgotten

According to the British intelligence data covering the period from April 1992 to April 1994, Croatia was the former Yugoslav republic that bought the most weapons. The purchases amounted to $660 million. During the same period, Alija Izetbegovic's government bought weapons and military equipment worth $162 million. According to the same source, the countries of the former Soviet Union sold Croatia weapons worth $50 million and sold Izetbegovic's government weapons worth $20 million. Private Swiss companies sold Zagreb weapons worth $90 million and the Sarajevo Government weapons worth $9 million.

Austrian companies sold Croatia weapons worth $61 million and Bosnia weapons worth $2 million, whereas weapons worth $320 million from the arsenal of the former GDR [German Democratic Republic] army reached Croatia and $6 million worth reached Bosnia through eastern German private companies. Turkey sold

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Croatia weapons worth $10 million and Alija Izetbegovic arms worth $6 million. Egypt gave the Sarajevo Government weapons to a value of $25 million and gave Croatia weapons worth $2 million. Private South African companies sold Croatia weapons worth $10 million, and from Singapore there came military equipment to the value of $20 million for Croatia and to the value of $2 million for the Sarajevo Government; the value of weapons from Iran for Alija Izetbegovic's government amounted to $35 million, and for Croatia $5 million. Saudi Arabia sold the Bosnian Government in Sarajevo weapons and military equipment worth $20 million.

Of these transactions, the most interesting is that of Egypt since it received 300 tanks from the former Yugoslavia as a present immediately after the June Six-Day War against Israel in 1967. The tanks were taken from Yugoslav military storehouses, painted in desert colors, and, each with ammunition and a full fuel tank, loaded on ships bound for Egypt. The late Egyptian president, Mr. Anwar al-Sadat, wrote about it in his memoirs. Egypt is now delivering weapons to one of the warring factions in the former Yugoslavia....

Victim Status

According to the bills of lading, Croatia has received most weapons from the arsenal of the former GDR army, from Swiss factories and through Austrian companies, which means that it wants to diversify its combat system and to apply Western models as soon as possible—to the extent this is now possible. From the countries of the former Soviet Union, Croatia has acquired antiaircraft RPG-22 missile launchers and M-17M helicopters. Armbrust antitank-missile launchers came to Croatia from Singapore. MiG-21 "Bis" and MiG-21 "Uti-Mongol" fighter planes for training purposes came from Germany. Some of these aircraft are still camouflaged according to the former GDR air defense pattern. If we know that fighter planes are not "toys" that can be transported easily, even if disassembled into parts, the arms embargo on the territory of the former Yugoslavia is really ridiculous.

As far as combat equipment and weapons for Alija Izetbegovic's army are concerned, this army has approximately 10 "Mi-8" and "Mi-17" transporter helicopters, which have come from somewhere. They also have antiaircraft and antitank missiles. The dilemmas that arose in Izetbegovic's government about the removal of the arms embargo are a result of the Muslim leadership's preference for the present situation: They have the status of the military weaker side and the victim, they receive weapons from all sides through illegal channels, and the proclaimed embargo has enabled them to exert moral and psychological pressure on certain circles in the United States. Apart from that, there is a permanent flow of military, economic, and other aid from the Islamic world. The situation on 15 October will be ambiguous.

Article Views Domestic Private-Plane Production

AU0110192294 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Sep 94 p 13

[Report by M. Sasic: "'Vila' and 'Kojot' Are Conquering the Sky"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pancevo, 24 September—To have a good car is not fashionable any longer, it is fashionable to buy a plane. The employees of the Utva Company of Pancevo, which manufactures the "Vila" light plane, and of the Aleksic Company, which sells small planes manufactured abroad, claim that this statement is not exaggerated. The only Yugoslav manufacturer of planes and Aleksic, a small private company, know that they will be facing a big task so that they have—as Jovan Aleksic, the owner of the Aleksic Company says—made a gentlemans agreement on fair competition and cooperation wherever possible. Utva will assembly planes that arrive in parts from the American continent, and Aleksic will also sell planes manufactured in Pancevo. Aleksic thinks that, with good marketing support, 300 to 500 light planes could be sold on the Yugoslav market each year. The prognoses of the Utva Sales Division are more optimistic.

The Plane—Car of the Middle Class

Since May 1994, when it was reported that the Utva Company had manufactured the first domestic superlight plane and that its price was 20,000 dinars, Boro Grabovac, the head of the marketing division of the Pancevo plane factory, has been recording the names of the people interested in buying a plane.

"The testing of the "Vila," organized at the Aeronautics Institute in Zarkovo and at the Air Force Center, lasted longer than we presumed, but now everything is fine. By the end of September, all tests will be completed, so we can expect that the Ministry of Traffic and Communications will issue the operating permit," Grabovac said. [passage omitted]

It is expected that the best buyers will be "the people who have everything except a plane." They do not ask how much it costs and are ready to pay right away. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Serbs Sentence Albanian Professor to Imprisonment

AU3009205894 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 29 Sep 94 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Ukshin Hoti—Five Years' Imprisonment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Another political show trial ended today in the Serbian Prizren District Court. The passing of the sentence of five years' imprisonment on

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the defendant Ukshin Hoti caused anger and a furore among the 80 people present in court.

[Words indistinct] verdict according to Serbian recipes.

It took only three minutes to announce the sentence. Procurator Dobrivoje Peric was not present. Nada Hadziperic, the presiding judge, announced the bench's decision and declared Professor Hoti guilty of the crime of "violating territorial integrity," under Article 116, which is punishable under Article 138 of the Penal Code that carries the "signature" of the FRY. The judge also said that the accused should continue to be held in detention, and that his defense counsel had the "right" to appeal to the "higher level" of the Serbian Supreme Court in Belgrade.

Judge Nada [name illegible] did not explain the bench's verdict, but "wrapped up" the business quickly, purely in order to carry out the instructions of those who devised this peculiar kind of trial, resembling many other political trials against Albanians in Kosova.

The sole "evidence" brought against Professor Hoti was that when the state security inspectors arrested him on 16 May this year they found in his pocket a manuscript of political declaration of the Party of National Unity [Partia e Unitetit Kombetar, abbreviated in Albanian to "Unikomb"] in Kosova on the basis of which Unikomb was labeled an "illegal hostile organization." The professor was also charged with being a member of the Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosova. At the trial, Procurator Dobrivoje Peric called this party too an "illegal organization."

Professor Ukshin Hoti [word illegible] all these [word illegible] during the trial, aided by his lawyers Hazer Susuri, Hysni Bytyci, Destan Rukigi, Bajram Krasniqi, and Ismet Gashi.

It is now utterly clear that the aim of the Serbian occupier has been and remains to compromise our national movement, in order to demonstrate to the world public the supposed "intractability" of the Albanian "rebels" and to sap the political will of the people of Kosova, expressed in their referendum for a sovereign and neutral state of Kosova.

However, Professor Ukshin Hoti's sentence was not accidental.

This intellectual has been constantly in the sights of these villains since the demonstrations of 1981. In 1982, Prishtina District Court sentenced him to nine years' imprisonment for "counterrevolutionary crimes." Two years ago, Rabovec Magistrate's Court imprisoned him for 60 days, sending him to serve his sentence immediately, while the Serbian militia in Gllogoc tortured him with the utmost savagery.

Before the verdict was announced, we talked to Ukshin Hoti in the courtroom. He said that he felt well, and that he had read all the articles about him both bofore and after the trial, including those about the protest evenings in Prishtina.

After the sentence was pronounced, Ukshin Hoti turned to the judge and said, "You should realize that you are punishing freedom of thought!"

Judge Nada Hadziperic replied, "You can put your comments in your appeal." While the judges bench was leaving the courtroom, Ukshin Hoti, proud and stoical as always, turned to the public with the following words: "Thank you and see you soon in the united Albanian republics."

At the end of the trial, Hysni Bytyci, one of the professor's defense lawyers, said, "It has once again been shown that the Serbian courts are sentencing innocent Albanians without any evidence."

The charges were devoid of all veracity, and nothing in them were true except Ukshin Hoti's name, surname, and profession.

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